KHERADNAME-YE SADRA
Year:2019 | Volume:25 | Issue:1 (97) |Papers Count:7

Miftā ḥ al-qayb is the first work which was formally written on theoretical gnosis by Ṣ adr al-Dī n Qū nawī . Miṣ bā ḥ al-uns by Shams al-Dī n Fanā rī , which is a detailed commentary on the mentioned book, has also had a significant role in granting a demonstrative nature to gnostic discussions. Some gnostics, such as Imā m Khomeī nī , are among the researchers whose glosses have been extremely useful in explaining and clarifying the concepts discussed in Miṣ bā ḥ al-uns. This study intends to explain the levels of the order of being in the view of Imā m Khomeī nī based on his glosses on Miṣ bā ḥ al-uns. The level of the existence of the Truth in the arc of descent is the same chain of existence in the order of being, which consists of the mentally posited attributes and determinations, i. e. stations of essence, henas (aḥ adiyyat), and monas (waḥ dā niyyat). In other words, Almighty Truth enjoys certain determinations which are initially manifested at the station of essence, which is nameless and attributeless, and then descends to the level of henas, following which they descend further to the level of monas. The station of monas is a level at which the names and attributes of the Truth are explained in detail. Immutable essences are the forms and manifestations of such names and attributes; in the same vein, external essences or real affairs are the manifestations of immutable essences. This study was carried out to review, analyze, and evaluate Imā m Khomeī nī ’ s views regarding the levels of the order of being.

Mullā Ṣ adrā pays due attention to linguistic issues in the phrasing of his ideas and discusses the difference between nominal and copulative meanings. His commentators have detected some incoherences in his views so that they have judged some of them to be more accurate and, thus, more favorable, than some others. Through propounding and comparing Mullā Ṣ adrā ’ s views regarding the nominal and copulative meanings of being, the author presents a framework for posing some ontological, epistemological, and linguistic discussions in this paper. At the same time, relying on the linguistic discussions in jurisprudence (uṣ ū l-i fiqh), he introduces an analytic-linguistic approach in order to solve the problem of the existing incoherences. Mullā Ṣ adrā believes that, on the one hand, one can reach the univocality of the nominal meaning of being (hast) through the univocality of the copulative meaning of being (ast). On the other hand, he argues that the difference between copulative being and predicative being pertains to their species. This view of Mullā Ṣ adrā has raised different debates, interpretations, and questions among authorities in the field of philosophy. Some of these questions are as follows: Are these two views consistent with each other? Is this theory consistent with the gradation of existence and its univocal meanings? Are copulative and predicative existence commensurate with each other? Are the two classifications of being in the Transcendent Philosophy; i. e. the three-fold division of being into copula, copulative, and soulish and the two-fold division of being into copula and independent being, in contrast to each other? Are these two classifications consistent with Mullā Ṣ adrā ’ s views in the field of nominal and copulative meanings?

Some people believe that death renders life meaningless, and a limited and mortal life is not worth living, especially if it entails hardships and pain. In contrast, through demonstrating the immortality of the soul, Mullā Ṣ adrā maintains that there is no quiddative limit either for the truth of being or for human beings, and human life is not limited to the world of matter. Man’ s motion begins with worldly efforts; however, it continues with death, and true and supreme life is attained in the light of death. Life will have its complete meaning provided that it attains immortality in the hereafter. Mullā Ṣ adrā defines some mediocre and supreme purposes for human beings and believes that the level of happiness depends on the level of soulish perfection. He also argues that Man’ s reality is mirrored in their theoretical intellect, which brings about true happiness. Moreover, he believes that the motion of practical intellect on the route to happiness paves the way for the transcendence of theoretical intellect. According to Mullā Ṣ adrā , the world is a symbol of purgatory, which is a symbol of the hereafter. For him, the world and the hereafter are the same graded existence; they do not have any conflict with each other, and the hereafter represents the world in its most perfect form. Resurrection means attaining a kind of ontological openness and reaching an intellectual level which is the same true stage of Man’ s existence. At this stage, all human beings will have a common grasp of the meaning of life; nevertheless, the true and maximum meaning will only be available to those who have attained the supreme stages of existence and the level of immateriality.

Several arguments have been adduced on demonstrating the individual unity of being. Most of these arguments, which have been presented by such gnostics as Dā vood Qayṣ arī , Ḥ amzah Fanā rī , and Ibn Turkah, suffer from some defects in terms of a confusion of concept and referent. In his glosses on Tamhī d al-qawā ’ id (the section on the arguments on the demonstration of the individual unity of existence), Ḥ akī m Moḥ ammad Rezā Ghomsheī has presented an argument which demonstrates the pre-eternal necessity of God. However, three criticisms have been advanced against it. The first concerns the meaning of the absolute nature of being, which has been stated ambiguously. The second criticism questions the confusion of concept and referent. The first part of the third criticism targets the whole argument, based on the presupposition of the realization of the essence of nature, and its second part objects to the consistency of the realization of the essence of the nature of existence with limited existences, as acknowledged in Ghomsheī ’ s argument. Finally, the fourth focuses on the absence of any kind of innovation in this argument. Following an analytic-comparative method, this paper examines all these criticisms and responds to the first three of them. Accordingly, the authors acknowledge the truth of Ḥ akī m Ghomsheī ’ s argument by presenting a detailed discussion in this paper.

Exoteric and superficial interpretations of religion have always existed in the social history of religions, and some of them have given rise to a number of uncompromising and takfī rī trends. This has resulted in the portrayal of a coarse, cruel, and dogmatic face for religion. The criticism of such exoteric interpretations was one of the essential components of Mullā Ṣ adrā ’ s philosophy. He devoted at least two of his works, Kasr al-aṣ nā m al-jā hiliyyah and Sih asl treatise, completely to this theme. This critical approach in Mullā Ṣ adrā ’ s philosophy has various dimensions, which have not received the attention that they truly deserve. Therefore, following descriptive and content/document analysis methods, this study aims to present and examine such dimensions. These dimensions include linguistic, rational, and psychological elements in understanding religion. An overall study of the mentioned elements indicates that exoterism may result in the rise of religious dogmatism, flaring up of raging arguments, emergence of mundane and pseudo-scholars instead of true scholars, and development of the culture of hypocrisy and discord.

The belief in the createdness of the world is the essence of a proposition which, after believing in the One God, is the most significant of all divine beliefs. Mī r Dā mā d’ s particular view in this regard entails the demonstration of a real commencement and trans-temporal origination for the world of being. Through referring to the failure of his preceding philosophers regarding the rational explanation of the problem of the appearance of the world, Mī r Dā mā d maintains that the content of the modified version of the theory of “ perpetual createdness” (ḥ udū th dahrī ) is among his innovations and the most important fruit of Yamani wisdom. On the other hand, Mullā Moḥ ammad Ismā ‘ ī l Khwajū ī in his treatise of Ibṭ ā l al-zamā n al-mawhū m attributes this theory to Jalā l al-Dī n Dawā nī , matches his view with the theory of perpetual createdness and, in this way, implies that Mī r Dā mā d adopted this theory from Dawā nī ’ s works. The present study examines Khwajū ī ’ s claim through investigating a number of metaphysical analyses.

Most Muslim philosophers – including the Peripatetics, Illuminationists, and Sadrians – have rejected the possibility of change and motion in immaterial things based on their own principles. However, during the last two decades, some authorities in the field of philosophy have opposed this idea and argued for the possibility of motion and change in immaterial thing. This theory has attracted the attention of a number of academic centers, and some papers and books have been written on this subject. The proponents of this view have provided some arguments in its favor, and its opponents have rejected them. Following an analytic approach, this paper defends the theory of the existence of motion in immaterial things at two stages. Initially, the authors provide a response to the criticism targeting the main argument of this theory and defend its legitimacy; secondly, through resorting to the createdness of the soul, they present a new argument in its favor. Finally, they conclude that the mentioned theory is acceptable in the realm of rationality and reasoning and is superior to its counter-theory.