FALSAFEH (THE IRANIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY)
Year:2011 | Volume:39 | Issue:1|Papers Count:7

Duns Scouts the famous theologian of thirteen century under the influence of Avecina’s doctorine of “Nature” on the basis of hierarchy of the unity presents a hypothesis and describes the unconditioned nature as minor unity and individual entities as numerical unity. As a celeberating hypothesis of “distinct forms” it accounts with the haeccity as the criterion of individuality of external entities. Mutual examination of the fundamental principlse of both philosophers; this article explains the deficiencies of Scotus’s approach.

One of the muslim philosophers' solutions for the problem of evil is that"a) It is privation of an entity; then it is evil by itself, such as: darkness, poverty, ignorance and etc.b) evil is of two kinds: It is an entity ; then it is evil by accident, that is, it is evil because it redounds to "a", such as: earthquake, storm, microbe and etc. But as non-entities have no cause, so evils are not created by God and ascribed to Him."But one of the evils is "pain" and its nature (i.e whether is it an entity or non-entity?) and that" is it evil by itself or by accident? " has been disputable among philosophers and theologians. Some of muslim thinkers have regarded it as contradictory to above solution. The aim of this article is:I. Survey of nature of pain - specially critique of Molla-sadra, s doctrine about this–and response to this question that " is pain evil by itself or by accident?"II. Presentation of my point of view about evils and pain: none of the evils are eviles by itself but contrary, all of them are evils by accident and there is only one evil by itself, that is pain, since the other evils are evils as such, because they redound to pain and likewise it is an entity not mere privation.

One aspect of self-knowledge is consisted of interaction between soul and actions, ethics and knowledge. According to Sadra's opinion, soul is united with its acquired knowledge and long-term dispositions. The main Principles of the theory include: nivocal of Entity, (Principality of Existence) and its Gradation) Substantial Motion of Soul, Identity of the Knower and the Known, bodily Contingency, Unity of Soul and Human Body, Reciprocal Causation of Soul and Body.Based on mentioned premises, every human reality at first is in the lowest rank of existence. By conjunction of substantial motion, the soul intensifies until reaches perfections while all result degrees are just the ranks of a single reality. The highest level of soul has all acquired perfections in simple form, whereas the lowest rank (material body) is affected by habits and states of soul.). Middle ranks also are common in impression and impressionability from each other. Therefore, relationship between soul and action is conceived in three species:1. The presence of mental forms of actions in the soul extent.2. The presence of habits in soul essence.3. Incarnation and ideation of long-term dispositions at appropriate forms in physical body.

Moral psychology is an important part of ethics. Some of the recent interpreters of Nietzsche’s philosophy have tried to elaborate a Nietzschean naturalistic moral psychology based on his remarks and pose it against other positions in moral psychology, especially the Kantian one with its fundamental claim that third-person accounts of moral psychology have no bearing on a morality which purportedly guides us from the first-person perspective. Two of the main related constituents of Kant’s moral psychology are the concepts of will and deliberation, which in this paper I will try to show how, according to these recent interpreters, Nietzsche explains them entirely in terms of a system of desires, without any appeal to a separate will. If the Nietzschean account is correct, then the Kantian view that deliberation proceeds from a standpoint detached from all desires could not be maintained.

There have been two custom views on the relation of metaphor and philosophy. Some philosophers (esp. analytical philosophers) take metaphor dispensable, and tend to philosophical texts without metaphor, constituted on proper usage of words. Others take metaphor indispensable as the foundation of philosophical concepts. This attitude usually implies reducing philosophy to mythological discourse and inaccurate rhetoric. By embedding metaphor at the heart of language and escaping the classical opposition of metaphorical–proper, Derrida attribute philosophy and rhetoric same nature, while avoids negative evaluation of philosophy. By deconstructing metaphor, Derrida declares the death of metaphor (and so proper sense), and together with it, the death of philosophy, in the classical and historical sense of it. In this article we want to defend this claim that sense does not control language from without, rather it is the result of uniformity of well-founded metaphors, which are the essence of language.

Afdal al-Din Kashani (Baba Afdal) lived and thought in times in which philosophy was in a precarious state due to Gazalli's well-known criticisms. The former thought that this situation is caused by addressing the Metaphysica Specialis as the proper object of philosophical investigations. He did not interest in many of the issues that other philosophers (especially Peripatetics) addressed, so that one can say he did not follow the pattern of the great authorities. For him, to live a virtuous life is a part and parcel of the traditional philosophy. In short, Baba Afdal can be regarded as an innovator Islamic-Persian philosopher who changed the traditional philosophy formally as well as materially. Among the Iranian philosophers, Baba Afdal is first that he wrote his works mainly in Persian. Moreover, among those who wrote in Persian, he is set apart by the remarkable beauty and clarity of his prose. When reading his writings, we realized that the author implicitly tries to exclude knowledge of God from the realm of philosophy and replace knowledge of self with it. For Baba Afdal, the heart of the issue in philosophy is self-knowledge that voiced in the Delphic maxim "know thyself".

In the present study, I explain how the great logician Qazwini, Dabiran al-Katibi (600-675 AD)questioned a well-accepted “complete inclusion” rule with a counterexample in modal logic (concearning with, possibility and contingency).This rule demonstrates a vise versa relation between contradictories of two universal concepts when a “complete inclusion” relation exists between them. Two letters by Katibi and the responses by Khawaja Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, all are provided with a brief and concise expression. This issue will explain, and reconstruct the problem.