Security Analysis of Two Lightweight Certificateless Signature Schemes

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PAKNIAT NASROLLAH

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Journal Paper

Paper Information

Journal: JOURNAL OF COMPUTING AND SECURITY Year:2018 | Volume:5 | Issue:2 Page(s): 59-65

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Information Journal Paper

Title

Security Analysis of Two Lightweight Certificateless Signature Schemes

Author(s)

PAKNIAT NASROLLAH | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

Certificateless Cryptography

Cryptanalysis

Signature

Industrial Internet of Things

Healthcare Wireless Sensor Networks

Abstract

Certi cateless cryptography can be considered as an intermediate solution to overcome the issues in traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) and identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC). There are a vast number of certi cateless Signature (CLS) schemes in the literature; however, most of them are not e cient enough to be utilized in limited resources environments such as Internet of Things (IoT) or Healthcare Wireless Sensor Networks (HWSN). Recently, two lightweight CLS schemes have been proposed by Karati et al. and Kumar et al. to be employed in IoT and HWSNs, respectively. While both schemes are claimed to be existentially unforgeable, in this paper, we show that both these Signatures can easily be forged. More speci cally, it is shown that 1) in Karati et al. 's scheme, a type 1 adversary, considered in certi cateless cryptography, can generate a valid partial private key corresponding to any user of its choice and as a consequence, it can forge any users' Signature on any message of its choice, and 2) in Kumar et al. 's scheme, both types of adversaries which are considered in certi cateless cryptography are able to forge any signer's Signature on an arbitrary message.

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APA: Copy

PAKNIAT, NASROLLAH. (2018). Security Analysis of Two Lightweight Certificateless Signature Schemes. JOURNAL OF COMPUTING AND SECURITY, 5(2), 59-65. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/341718/en

Vancouver: Copy

PAKNIAT NASROLLAH. Security Analysis of Two Lightweight Certificateless Signature Schemes. JOURNAL OF COMPUTING AND SECURITY[Internet]. 2018;5(2):59-65. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/341718/en

IEEE: Copy

NASROLLAH PAKNIAT, “Security Analysis of Two Lightweight Certificateless Signature Schemes,” JOURNAL OF COMPUTING AND SECURITY, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 59–65, 2018, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/341718/en

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