ForSts: Tacit Collusion in the Repeated Non-Cooperative Games Using Forwarding N-Steps Reinforcement Learning Algorithm

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Golzari Hormozi Amin; Khasteh Seyed Hossein; Nikoofard Amirhossein; SHirmohammadi Zahra

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Journal: COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING (INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS IN ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING) Year:2022 | Volume:12 | Issue:4 Page(s): 1-12

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Title

ForSts: Tacit Collusion in the Repeated Non-Cooperative Games Using Forwarding N-Steps Reinforcement Learning Algorithm

Author(s)

Golzari Hormozi Amin | Khasteh Seyed Hossein | Nikoofard Amirhossein | SHirmohammadi Zahra | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

Cournot

Electricity market

Nash equilibrium

Non-cooperative repeated games

Prisoner’s Dilemma

Reinforcement learning

Abstract

In the game theory, the well-known solution to obtain the best profit in non-repeated games as much as possible is the Nash equilibrium. However, in some repeated non-cooperative games, agents can achieve more profit than the Nash equilibrium by tacit collusion. One of the methods to achieve profit more than Nash equilibriums in tacit collusion is Reinforcement learning. However, Reinforcement learning-based methods consider only one step in the learning process. To achieve and improve profit in these games, more than one step can be used. In this regard, a learning-based forwarding N-steps algorithm called Forwarding Steps (ForSts) is proposed in this paper. The main idea behind ForSts is to improve the performance of agents in noncooperative games by observing the last N-step rewards. As ForSts is used in the game theory to learn tacit collusion, it is evaluated by the iterated prisoner’ s dilemma and the Cournot market. Prisoner’ s Dilemma is an example of a traditional game. The results show that in the iterated prisoner’ s dilemma, the agents using ForSts achieve better profit than the agents playing in the Nash equilibrium. Also, in the Cournot Electricity market, sum of the profit of agents using ForSts is 3. 614% more than the sum of profit of agents` playing in the Nash equilibrium.

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APA: Copy

Golzari Hormozi, Amin, Khasteh, Seyed Hossein, Nikoofard, Amirhossein, & SHirmohammadi, Zahra. (2022). ForSts: Tacit Collusion in the Repeated Non-Cooperative Games Using Forwarding N-Steps Reinforcement Learning Algorithm. COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING (INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS IN ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING), 12(4 ), 1-12. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/954555/en

Vancouver: Copy

Golzari Hormozi Amin, Khasteh Seyed Hossein, Nikoofard Amirhossein, SHirmohammadi Zahra. ForSts: Tacit Collusion in the Repeated Non-Cooperative Games Using Forwarding N-Steps Reinforcement Learning Algorithm. COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING (INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS IN ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING)[Internet]. 2022;12(4 ):1-12. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/954555/en

IEEE: Copy

Amin Golzari Hormozi, Seyed Hossein Khasteh, Amirhossein Nikoofard, and Zahra SHirmohammadi, “ForSts: Tacit Collusion in the Repeated Non-Cooperative Games Using Forwarding N-Steps Reinforcement Learning Algorithm,” COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING (INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS IN ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING), vol. 12, no. 4 , pp. 1–12, 2022, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/954555/en

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