Instead of surveying the effects of institutions on economic growth through statistical analysis, this study tries to review them from the standpoint of institutional theorists with the aim of giving some explanations on economic growth. The study reveals that formulating appropriate policies to expedite economic growth, which is indeed resulted from the impacts of various institutional elements on economic growth, requires more than merely pure quantitative surveys. This means that to do so, the researchers should take into account the factors such as market-creating institutional components, institutional change know-how, and socio-political institutions' impact on economic performance. On the other hand, apparently, from among the various solutions to forge economic growth, the one proposed by North and his colleagues, i.e. moving toward democratic order to reach economic growth is the best sustainable approach.

In recent years many scholars have discussed the impact of development on democracy. In this article, by using a comparative study approach, we review the literature of the effect of development on democracy. We also, focus on recent debates, provided by Acemoglu (2001-2009) and his colleagues and Ingelhare and Welzel (2001-2009) who have offered two opposite views regarding the matter. Our aim is to compare the effective democracy with electoral democracy. While electoral democracy includes just the elections, Effective democracy includes genuine autonomous choice and the extent to which elites actually follow legal norms or elite integrity.This article shows that effective democracy will put an end to dispute about the effect of development on democracy and a minimum level of development is required for reaching to effective democracy. Therefore our findings theoretically reject Acemoglu and his colleagues’ view that development does not have any effect on democracy. Also, in this article it is shown that contrary to Ingelhare and Welzel’s theory there is not a linear relation between development and democracy and still many unsolved problems prevail.

The theories of the transition to democracy in the past decades consider political and economic development as a movement that started with enlightenment and then will inevitably lead to prosperity and progress. This is almost moving in a dogmatic way to realize liberty for all the countries of the world. Late theories and especially the development research Approach of Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson with an emphasis on politics, economics and history; They have shown that there is no coercion in the transition to democracy, but a completely unstable balance that must be constantly protected. The research question is: How was the relationship between the power of the state and the society in the constitutionalism and what is its relationship with the transition to democracy? in constitutionalism, the power of the Shah Decreased and provided for the development of society as one of the foundations of the transition to democracy. Under the subjugation of the cage of norms and the weakening of the state's capacity as another basis for the transition to democracy, the synchronic strengthening of society and the state and the rise of the Shackled Leviathan as the Equilibrium of transition to democracy did not happen, and Iran was thrown out of the narrow corridor of liberty. The method of this research is historical-explanatory sociology, and its data has been collected through library-documentary studies and analyzed in the framework of Acemoglu and Robinson 's theory.

Regarding the important role of health in economic growth and development, the purpose of the present paper is to investigate the impact of life expectancy, as the most important indicator of health, on economic growth in Iran during 1965-2009. The estimated Smooth Transition Regression (STR) model supports a nonlinear threshold behavior in the relationship between life expectancy and economic growth in the country in a two regime structures with a threshold level of 55.34 years. In other words, our findings are both consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) for the negative impact and with demographic transition theory for the reducing effect of life expectancy on economic growth in Iran. This shows the country is approaching the stage of the fertility transition, where the increase in life expectancy will bring about a decline in population.

In 2024, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson were awarded the Nobel Prize in economics for their research on the role of institutions in economic development. Their studies highlight that inclusive institutions, which promote broad participation in both the economy and politics, are essential foundations for development. In contrast, extractive institutions that serve the interests of specific groups hinder economic and social progress. Iran’s current state, characterized by inefficient, extractive institutions that protect minority interests, disrupts the country's development process. Drawing from the Nobel laureates' findings, it is clear that institutional reforms to enhance transparency, eliminate rent-seeking, and increase public participation are essential for setting the country on a path to development. In Iran, key obstacles to development include policies that favor specific groups over the general population, limited political participation, and the lack of an accountable party system. These economists stress the importance of reforming political and economic institutions to enable inclusive, participatory governance that can foster economic growth.

Introduction: The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan during the 1990s and their seizure of power was an important event in the fate of this country. Their fall and the establishment of the republican system in 2001 seemed to herald Afghanistan's entry into the corridor of democracy. However, the unexpected resurgence of the Taliban in the summer of 2021 was surprising to the world. This article attempts to examine the shaky process of democratization in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021, from theoretical perspective of Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. This analysis seeks to answer this question: : what causes to the failure of democratization in Afghanistan and the rapid return of the Taliban?The integration of these factors facilitated the restoration of authoritarianism by the Taliban. The data in this article has been collected through library and documentary studies and analyzed in the framework of Acemoglu and Robinson's theories. The findings show that democratization of Afghanistan grows with the emergence of the Leviathan and empowers the society by eliminating anti-development norms.Despite international efforts for democratization that began at the Bonn Conference, Afghanistan's recent history witnessed the sudden fall of the Islamic Republic and the rapid return of the Taliban. The goal of the conference was to establish a new government and end the Taliban rule, but Afghanistan's deviation from the democratic path and the rapid resurgence of the Taliban reveals deeper complexities beyond common themes such as a collapsing state or systemic corruption. The vital role of participatory governance and social empowerment for sustainable democracy in Afghanistan was neglected. This failure highlights the complex relationship between govenment and society that is crucial to the maintainance of democracy. Therefore, we will further analyze the failure of democratization in Afghanistan and ultimately, the rapid revival of the Taliban. Emphasizing the nature of the state and society in Afghanistan and its consequences on democratization will be our focus.Research question: what causes to the failure of democratization process in Afghanistan and the rapid return of the Taliban?Research hypothesis: The hypothesis is that the nature of govenment in Afghanistan aligns with an absent Leviathan due to the weak structure and anti-democratic power of society. In such a setting, the cage of norms dictates policies and prevents the simultaneous strengthening of both the state and society, thus preventing the emergence of a Shackled Leviathan as a counterbalance to democracy.Methodology and theoretical framework: This research examines the prerequisites for the transition to democracy in Afghanistan with a historical sociology approach. It rejects a simplistic and linear view and instead emphasizes the interplay of political and social factors. Drawing on more recent perspectives like Acemoglu and Robinson's, it highlights the necessity of a balanced relationship between state power and social consciousness. This balance, called the "Red Queen Effect," emphasizes the need for both the goverment and society to evolve and compete to preserve individual rights and independence and ultimately stenghten democratic transition. Acemoglu and Robinson analyze the normative barriers of democracy as the "cage of norms." Under the constraints of norms and the weakening of the state's capacity as another basis for the transition to democracy, the simultaneous empowerment of society and the state and the emergence of the Shackled Leviathan as an optimal transition point to democracy will not happen.Results and discussion: Afghanistan's weak state structure and social dominance hinder democratic transition. Norms constrain policy, halts govenmental and social progress and thwart a Shackled Leviathan. The lack of unified power hinders the use of resources and provision of public services and fuels poverty. Tribal values exacerbate the exploitation and violence that has become normal since the war. State-Social competition fails and hinders progress. Even intermediary institutions such as Jamiat-e-Islami, Hizb-e-Islami and Dawat-e-Islami did not prioritize increasing their modern capacity to collaborate with the govenment. The Afghan national government ignored the influence of the “Red Queen” concept and instead promoted specific tribal groups, a policy that was at odds with social awareness. During the democratization years, it was not the state but rather the actions of foreign forces that prevented major events such as the re-emergence of the Taliban. The stability of the state was not inherently linked to its authority. In a realm where there is no single authority (akin to an absent Leviathan), social support may falter or cease at any moment, affecting the stability of the state. This moment in Afghanistan coincided with the fall of the republic and the rapid rise of the Taliban.Conclusion: During Afghanistan's Republican era, the absent Leviathan struggled to enforce laws, curb violence, resolve conflicts and provide public services. In fact, Afghanistan had wrapped itself in a facade of democracy, yet it had not even set foot in its corridor. The weak structure of this supposedly democratic system led to internal conflicts even during elections, deepened the state's weaknesses and limited the nation's development potentials amid foreign interventions. The divisions of Afghan society challenge the American narrative that simply hands the country over to the Taliban. The re-emergence of anti-modern authoritarianism was a gradual process, not a sudden event. Afghanistan lacks strong state authority which dims the prospects for democracy or stability. The lack of state authority and the resistance of rival factions perpetuate the cycle of violence. Escaping this, requires more than temporary changes—it requires leadership and dismantling the norms that fuel this cycle.

Reviewing the history of Iran's development efforts in the past 150 years shows periods of accompanying, or being ahead and behind countries. Japan and South Korea have a clear position in this field. This research examines Iran's development situation in comparison with these two countries in historical periods (1860-1926 and 1963-2010), within the framework of North, Acemoglu, and Robinson's institutional model. This approach focuses on formal rules, procedures, and organizations to explain the relationship between institutional structures and the success or failure of policies. The main question in this research is that despite the creation of political structure in Iran in the 19th century, compared to the experiences of Japan In the second half of the 19th century and South Korea in the early 20th century, why did the development program in Iran not go well and comprehensive political and economic institutional arrangements were not achieved? The obtained results show that the alignment of the government and the developing nation in Iran has not been successful due to the lack of institutional development.

Purpose: Democratization is a process which is construed as a inevitable way to reach development, to redistribute income among citizens. The hypothesis of research was the relationship between intergroup inequality and democratization. Method: we tried to address the process of democratization in two contries, Iran and Saudi Arabia, based on deferent statistics and analyses, with a descriptive- analytic appraoch. Findings: first of all, we found the political system type of the two countries was not democracy. In addition, democratic movements had an up and down trend in Iran while was not appeared these movements in Saudi Arabia. Another finding was that, based on diferent statistics and researches, there was an intergroup inequality in Iran. Conclusion: It can be argued that, based on Acemoglu and Rabinson`s economic theory, democratic movements in Iran is a response to socio-economic inequalities in the scale of society. In comparison, in spite of a monarchic system governing the Saudi Arabia country, and based upon economic growth and welfare, and to some extend distributing fairly wealth among the country`s citizens, there were not democratic and radical movements.

Introduction: The study of the relationship between the educational system and the political system has been one of the main concerns of sociologists in different eras (Bobba & Coviello, 2007). An important part of these studies has directly or indirectly emphasized the effective role of education in the emergence of democracy as one of the rudimentary conditions of democracy. Another part of studies has concluded that the relationship between education and democracy is inverse and democracies based on their internal logic have sought to make education a public good. Another view considers education as a factor of reproduction, both in the political system and in the class asan important element in preserving the status quo. Finally, another group of studies has attributed the relationship between education and democracy to a third factor--economic infrastructure. In contrast to the mentioned studies, which believe in the relationship between education and governance, some studies reject the real relationship between these two constructs or at least parts of them. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2005) as well as Bobba and Coviello (2007) showed with some statistical controls and econometric methods that education and democracy are not related...

The present study seeks to answer the following question: 'why Turkey and Iran have been failed to use the critical junctures of recent decades as a starting point for national development and shaping regional development? ' To answer the research question, new institutionalism was used as a theoretical approach to understand regional development. Acemoglu and Robinson's theory of Critical Junctures was also used to explain the reasons for the failure or success of countries in achieving development. In terms of research method, the present study is a case-oriented historical comparative study. The unit of analysis of this research is the country and global, international, regional and national events and conditions are selected and analyzed in relation to it. According to the study, Iran and Turkey have experienced two critical junctures since the 1990s, one as a result of internal processes and national elections and the other as a transnational event such as the military occupation of Iraq or the Arab Spring. It seems that Iran and Turkey have chosen the path of national development in the first critical juncture, but in the second critical juncture, both countries have entered into internal and regional tensions and conflicts and the process of national development have been encountered with several obstacles. In addition, the two countries have not been able to move institutionally and sustainably toward economic convergence over the past two decades. This inability has prevented the emergence of a developed region in the Middle East. The Middle East identity based conflicts, exacerbated by foreign interventions and confrontational politics, have shifted the region's environment to militarization and security, making the space conducive to economic growth and prosperity leaving the region in poor economic growth and prosperity.