Abstract This essay presents William Wainwright’s conception of religious reasoning. He rejects the view that proper reasoning in religion must be limited to “neutral technical reason” (NTR), modes of reasoning that are neutral and acceptable to all parties in a religious disagreement. He emphasizes that religious reasoning, as seen in outstanding practitioners from different religious traditions, incorporates additional elements, such as appeals to revelation, emphasis on religious reading, rhetoric, acknowledgment of mystery, and especially “passional reason,” in which the arguments presented and the conclusions accepted depend essentially on the state of the reasoner’s heart. The essay goes on to consider how Wainwright deals with issues surrounding religious diversity: he rejects all of the standard methods by which it has been argued that differences in belief between traditions either do not really exist or do not ultimately matter. Special attention is given to religious pluralism, as advocated by John Hick and Peter Byrne. This leads to a consideration of exclusivism, in which it is held that the fundamental doctrines of one religion are true, and those of other religions, insofar as they differ from those of the favored religion, are false. Wainwright finds the standard objections against exclusivism to be ineffective or inconclusive. Finally, the essay addresses a question suggested but not resolved by Wainwright’s work: Does religious diversity have the consequence that truth in religion is not accessible to us?

Among the views on Imam Hosein’s purpose in his great movement, that of Ibn Tawoos in Lohuf has been well-known and common to such an extent that today many groups of scholars and all people believe that Imam went to Karbala to be killed for supporting Divine religion of Islam. In the paper, the documents given in Ibn Tawoos’ famous book, al-Lohuf, as one of the leading works in the field, have been critically studied. As is shown, of the documents some may be agreed with yet some are scientifically exposed to doubt.

One of the rules that usually be argued in the Islamic theology is the rule of lotf (favor). This rule is a kind of behavior and action that gets the obedient close to obedience and simultaneously takes him far from the disobedience despite of emergency and obligation. The rule of lotf is defined as the eligibility and its necessity and importance for Allah. The importance of this rule is so valuable that after the rule of rational goodness and enormity it is known as the most important kalami rule of Adliyyah.One of the complicated problems in this subject is the criterion of distinguishing confirmation and its conformity with the rule of Lotf. This subject caused disagreements among scholars. Molla Ahmad Naraghi is one of the most almighty scholars and theologians in Shi’a. He claimed it is impossible that we can distinguish certainly of this rule because of the loss of humane power. Whereas Jafar Sobhani the contemporary scholar and contemporary theologians declares that it is feasible to distinguish because of authority of humane certainty. In this paper, after an exact studying on the rule of Lotf, we study the introductions of argument and conclusions of these two theologians’viewpoints.

This paper has focused on the arguements of those agreeing with epistemological validity of religious experience and studied them in five groups: 1. arguing as if religious experiences are the same as visible experiences; 2. arguing on the principle of credulity and testimony; 3. arguing by inferring the best explanation; 4. reformed argument of Gutting; 5. arguing on the basis of knowledge by persistence. As is described in the paper, all the arguments are exposed to failures. In the paper, general authenticity of religious experience has been argued against; yet a limited authenticity for religious experience has been argued in the field.

One of the important features of many of Ibn Taymiyyah’s works is their polemical nature, that is, he composed these works in the form of intense theological or jurisprudential polemics against his opponents. In these disputes, Ibn Taymiyyah has used arguments to defeat his opponents. This research aims to show that these arguments of Ibn Taymiyyah can sometimes turn into measures against himself and challenge some of his own most basic intellectual foundations. Our research method in this article is such that we follow a pattern of comparative study in Ibn Taymiyyah’s works and examine four examples of his polemical arguments against his opponents: arguing with Christians over their oral tradition arguing with Sunni jurists on the subject and instances of consensus, the issue of criticism and praise (jarḥ wa taʿdīl) of Abū Ḥanīfah, and finally the punishment of heretics. In the end, as research findings, we will show the contradictions in some of the issues Ibn Taymiyyah has argued over.

The Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) is a relatively young field that explores the intersection between science and religion. Some argue that CSR, by employing purely explanatory methods and presupposing methodological naturalism, has materialized religion. Others believe that explanatory methods are not the sole approach in CSR, and the use of other methods is permissible. I aim to show how CSR has influenced the entire philosophy of religion. The paper examines various perspectives on the extent of CSR's influence on the philosophy of religion, particularly analyzing its effect on the proofs of natural theology. Contrary to the dominant literature, the impact of CSR can extend beyond merely strengthening or weakening theological arguments and can be used to argue for the reform of religious beliefs. This view is pursued from four different perspectives: first, the concept of God, arguing that weakening classic proofs does not imply weakening belief in God; second, the methodology of studying religion, advocating for methodological pluralism; third, the revelation and the role of humans in religion, suggesting that a behavioral shift desirable in economics is also preferable in religious studies; and fourth, religious pluralism and interfaith relations, arguing against the exclusivity produced by textualism and foundationalism.

To The Editor We thank the authors for arguing our article and it is so worthful for us that they found this study interesting. We have closely reconsidered the mentioned points and this letter is in response to the comments of Zakeri et al in this issue. In following our responses are given point-by-point...

In this commentary, we endorse concerns about the health impact of the trans-pacific partnership (TPP), paying particular attention to its mechanisms for investor state dispute settlement. We then describe the different, judge-led approach being advocated by the European Commission team negotiating the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, arguing that, while not perfect, it offers significant advantages.