In each one of the well-known Abrahamic religions, notably Islam, Christianity and Judaism, there are two important doctrines which seem to be inconsistent, but nonetheless some religious philosophers like Plantinga try to show that there is no conflict between them. The first doctrine is that God is Omniscient and He has FOREKNOWLEDGE of all that will happen in the future and thus all human actions are determined in His knowledge. The second doctrine is that human beings have free will and they are responsible for all of their voluntary actions. The problem is that if all future actions of a person are determined in divine knowledge, it is impossible for him to change his future and so he is not free. This article will assess some of the solutions given to the problem and it will focus on Plantinga's solution to the problem and then it will unravel some defects of his solution. At the end of this article, a new solution to the problem will be given, in which the free will of human being is confirmed while the nature of divine knowledge is regarded ambiguous to the extent that its changeability or unchangeability is left unknown.

FOREKNOWLEDGE of the theological issues that have long attracted the attention of scientists with different approaches, including Islamic philosophers and commented on the analysis focused.This article titled "representation FOREKNOWLEDGE of philosophy at the School of Illumination," going on to explore the philosophical school, founder Sheykh Shahabuddin Al Sohrevrdy-Ashraq-explained his philosophy about FOREKNOWLEDGE of reach.It is clear that the philosophy and epistemology of Sheikh illumination varies according to the oriental principles of illumination, light, intuition is based, according to his own philosophical presuppositions person knows the attainment of knowledge, especially in the realm of Education unseen imparted becomes a matter of not physical So that he may know according to the principles of the unseen kingdom, it may be obvious, that the Shia belief system is of the utmost importance.

The issue of God's FOREKNOWLEDGE and its relation with Human being's freewill is one of the main subjects that from the beginning have been controversial among Christian and Judaic theologians and philosophers. So in Islamic and western world have proponed many solutions for solving this problem.In this article our purpose is taking into consideration some of these solutions that each of which has strong and weak points. At the end, we will defend of the solution that, in comparison with others, is more reliable and sufficient.

According to most Muslim philosophers, Divine FOREKNOWLEDGE, on one hand, is so inclusive that encompasses each and every minor and timed action of moral agents and because of the perfection of God in essence and attributes, any defects in His essence and attributes including any errors in His FOREKNOWLEDGE are impossible. On the other hand, these philosophers, like other defenders of free will, claim that significance of any kind of free will and responsibility of a moral agent depends on their access to alternate possibilities (PAP) and, consequently, their ability to refrain from or do an action simultaneously. This paper aims to deal with this highly debated and fundamental question that whether these two views are essentially in conflict with each other. To answer this pivotal question, based on a modified version of Frankfurt cases and Muslim philosophers’ definition of free will, we attempt to defend their initial approach to eliminating the conflict between Divine FOREKNOWLEDGE and free will or moral responsibility and show that, firstly, this infallible knowledge is contingent on the agent’ s voluntary action, and secondly, despite the principle of alternate possibilities, the agent’ s moral responsibility does not depend on the person’ s avoidance of the forthcoming action.

The way how the owners of FOREKNOWLEDGE about future events have dealt with the events related to their own or others' futures has long been a matter of question and doubt. One of the most common criticisms is that why those who knew about the future dangers through their prescience, didn't makage those dangers in advance to avoid harm from themselves or other people involved? With a descriptive, analytical and library research method, this paper has examined the responses of believers of the Infallibles’ FOREKNOWLEDGE. The conclusion is that some responses have, in fact, accepted and surrendered to the criticisms and limited the scope and quality of the Imam's FOREKNOWLEDGE. Others are based on an exclusive and disputed basis, and others lack clear criteria and sufficient evidence. The correct answer is based on paying attention to the nature of the incident the prescience informs about. In unchangeable events, expecting change (through human voluntary action) is contrary to the assumption that this event is fixed, and is an example of the coexistence of contradictions. In some cases, however, such events, in the course of their occurrence, lead to the reaction of the infallible Imam who deals with the event using his FOREKNOWLEDGE in line with the guidance of the Ummah, as one of the duties of the Imamate.

Mulla Sadra, on the one hand, proves detailed FOREKNOWLEDGE of God based on the rule of “simple reality is whole things” and using the rule of particular gradation in existence. On the other hand, from his standpoint, sometimes freedom is coextensive with willingness and sometimes relying on the same rule of "simple reality is whole things" – that analyzes causality in the form of epiphany – is equivalent to the subjectivity of God. In this philosophical system, the conflict between divine FOREKNOWLEDGE and human freedom is resolved with regard to activity of divine knowledge–rather than passivity of divine knowledge–and, also, belonging of divine knowledge to the voluntary human action gets resolved. But it seems that Mulla Sadra's antecedents and favorite solution is not very effective.

This paper seeks to explain and study a new approach by Fischer in solving the possible conflict between God’ s fore and infallible knowledge with the moral responsibility of the agent. Even though, on one hand, Fischer considers attributes such as knowledge to be essential and infallible Divine characteristics and also attributes temporal non-Thomistic eternity to God within the temporal framework of material existents and ultimately accepts the Fixity of the Past Principle and man’ s lack of control over temporally expired events and at first glance is faced with the conflict between such FOREKNOWLEDGE with man’ s free will in his actions; however, his type of view regarding the essence of man’ s free will frees him from this challenge. In Fischer’ s Frankfurter explanation, free will is not a factor preceded by man’ s ability to attempt an alternative act in the opposite course and therefore, even if Divine knowledge is synonymous with the one-sidedness of action, such a consequence would not be equal to man’ s loss of volition and free will. In this article, after presenting a short explanation for Fischer’ s view regarding Divine FOREKNOWLEDGE and addressing the Fixity of the Past Principle and the possibilities of alternatives and Fischer’ s Frankfurter approach in encountering that, we will assess Fischer’ s solution and observe that, anyway, envisioning the existence of an alternative for actions to actualize the free will of the agent is unavoidable.

The problem of divine FOREKNOWLEDGE and its conflict with the human free will is one of the oldest issues in Abrahamic religions. Solutions proposed so far for the problem have deployed an absolutist approach to concepts. This paper aims to solve the old problem by drawing on modern sciences, particularly the findings of Einstein’s theory of relativity with its relativistic approach. This research has been carried out with an analytic-critical method after collection of data from available sources. In the theory of relativity, an incident occurring in the future from the perspective of a temporal observer occurs at present from the perspective of an atemporal observer. Given this, we conclude that what is called ‘FOREKNOWLEDGE’ is indeed FOREKNOWLEDGE from the perspective of a human observer, but from the viewpoint of an atemporal observer, it qualifies as knowledge of the present, whether or not the observer is a material essentially temporal being, which has—given the theory of relativity incidentally been atemporal or an immaterial essentially atemporal being like God. As a conSEquence, an atemporal present piece of knowledge does not conflict the human will just because it always knowledge of the present.

The problem of divine FOREKNOWLEDGE and the human free will is one of the important issues of philosophy of religion. According to this problem, since the divine Omniscience requires its infallibility; therefore, if at a time t1 God knows that subject (S) will have an action A at a time t3, then S cannot do anything other than this action at time t3. So, divine FOREKNOWLEDGE is in an apparent contradiction to the human free will. This article tries to compare the views of Linda Zagzebski (the contemporary religion philosopher) with those of Mortaza Mutahhari on this topic. We first address the classic triple responses to this issue (Bothiusism, Ockhamism, Mollinism) from the viewpoint of ZagzEbski. Then we show that Zagzebski, while admitting parts of the elements of these viewpoints and integrating them, presents three novel solutions. Then the article addresses the viewpoints of Mutahhari in the fields of determination, free will and predestination. Finally we show the similarities and differences of these two views. The research findings are that both intellectuals admit the compatibility of divine FOREKNOWLEDGE and human free will, but Thomistic Ockhamism and two other solutions of Zagzebski, in spite of their positive and admissible points, are not successful in demonstrating this compatibility, while the solution of Mutahhri is successful.