According to Donald Davidson's causal theory of actions, an action is an event that an agent performs for reasons, and thus explanation by appeal to the agent's reasons is a rational explanation as well as a causal explanation. Against Davidson's theory there have been raised a number of objections, one of which is called "normativity". The roots of this objection are that, on one hand, causal account is relative to things existing outside the mind but, on the other hand, normative things are things existing in the realm of mind; therefore we can not use causal explanation to mental things. The present article first refers the basic concepts of Davidson's theory; then, it accounts his theory of action; and finally it deals in detail with the objection "normativity".

Alvin Goldman offered the theory of process reliablism as one of the criteria for justification in extroverted epistemology. This theory was basically offered in relation to psychology, cognitive sciences, and philosophy of mind. After the objections offered by Gautier on the theory of traditional epistemology, new theories entered the world of epistemology most of which in two groups: extroverted and introverted. The theory of process reliablism is one of the famous theories in extroverted epistemology and a subdivision of naturalistic approaches. The important point is that the naturalistic approaches (among which is the theory of process reliablism) are more apt to non-religious interpretations compared to other common approaches in epistemology. However, the question arises as follows: "is the reliablism theory in opposition to the normative, moral and religious issues and in opposition to behavioral theories like other naturalistic theories or it can be shown that – despite the common idea – the theories inside the naturalistic and extroverted framework are able to be reconciled with normative foundations?" This is a question dealt with in this article to be answered properly. In this article, we will see that among the various theories offered, Goldman attempts to explain normativity in a different way in his extroverted epistemology.

In Persian, there are several processes for word formation. The construction of various words is based on accepted linguistic criteria and standards. Deviation from these standards breaks the norms of language. In Sabk-e-Hindi (Indian school of poetry), many new words were coined. One of the most important word-building processes in the school, which has also enriched the language, is derivation. In the Indian style, in addition to the fact that new derivative words were created according to the common rules of word formation, a kind of derivative words were created that deviated from the rules and system governing word construction. This type of word structure better illustrates the far-sightedness of the imagination and the will to the creation of new meaning. Talib Amoli, one of the most famous poets of Sabk-e-Hindi, has created a variety of new words. Among these, there are meta-normative derivative words in which, in the process of combining morphemes with affixes, transgression and deviation has occured. The present article examines and analyzes these types of words in Talib Amoli's poems. It is suggested that by using the flexibility of Persian language and innovation in the rule of derivation, Talib Amoli has promoted both the development of Persian language and the prominence of his words to show that Persian language is not pooor in terms of morphology.

Inspired by linguistic and pragmatic turn, Richard Rorty suggests a contextualist interpretation of relation between truth and justification, and refuses any substantive function of such concepts as reality, truth, and justification beyond justificatory practices which are totally contextbounded. In contrast, in spite of coming to terms with Rorty’, s neopragmatism in general, Hilary Putnam believes his naturalistic approach is uncapable to explain the transcendent character of such important concepts as truth and justification. He also questions Rorty’, s exclusively sociological attitude toward justification which makes a nonsense of any reform or progress in the transformation of justificatory practices. In this essay, I would try to show that how Putnam’, s criticisms, founded on irreducibility of the normative to the natural, leads Rorty to leave his overtly fervent naturalism found in his early work, and persuades him to insist on a vocabulary pluralism. As a result of this debate, Rorty attempts to make a contextualist reinterpretation of such necessary concepts as “, transcendence”,and “, idealization”,to recover normative connotation of “, reform”,and “, progress”, , without relying on such metaphysical concepts as objectivity or truth.

Artificial intelligence (AL) is advancing without any predictions in technological development and scope. Meanwhile, some legal issues related to the avatar of a real person in Metaverse are discussed here. Considering, the emergence of the metaverse is developing, and all are members Gravatar, therefore, the inclusion of rights and duties in the relationship between them is undeniable, which includes the rights related to Gravatar in the regulation of relationships between them. The first part of the article deals with what rights and duties the metaverse and avatars face in artificial intelligence and basically why the rights of such avatars should be protected. In addition, the integration techniques for giving legal personality to avatars in the metaverse and some damages Such as committing crimes of theft, forgery and abuse of rights in the meantime are criticized. In addition, with an analytical and descriptive approach, imposing responsibility and liabilities on a real person by applying the rule of piercing veil" in the form of corporate law regarding avatars in terms of identifying the real natural person behind the avatar and through the criminalization of predictable actions and activities as the final result in applying the company's rights and the punishment applicable to the legal personality has been reviewed.

The normativity of mental content thesis appears to have been influential in contemporary philosophy of mind. Paul Boghossian (2003, 2005) has developed an argument for the normativity of mental content on the basis of two premises, i.e. firstly, the normativity of the notion of belief and secondly, the priority of the notion of belief to the notion of desire. In his recent article Alexander Miller (2008) has criticised Boghossian’s argument for the normativity of mental content. To make the objection against the normativity of content, Miller has argued that the second premise of Boghossian’s argument is mistaken since belief and desire are conceptually interdependent. My purpose in this paper is to show that content normativity thesis prevails Miller's attack. In order to establish the claim I will argue that content is normative even if belief and desire are conceptually interdependent.

In his so-called Open Question Argument, Moore (1903) argues that the concept of "good" cannot be defined on the basis of natural concepts as well as non-natural ones. Following Darwall, Gibbard and Railton (1992), Paul Bloomfield has explained the non-reducibility of the concept of good based on its normativity. Moreover, he claims that the normativity is commensurable and similar to the so called normativity of meaning. According to Wittgenstein's rule following argument, meaning is normative, namely, expressions' meaning have action-guiding role; in other words, meaning normatively constrains an expression's use in language. Our aim in this paper is to consider Bloomfield's claim and compare normativity in ethics with the normativity of meaning. In order to do so, we will elucidate the open question argument and the normativity of meaning. We will then reconstruct Bloomfield's argument, and finally argue that, contra Bloomfield, the normativity in ethics and the normativity of meaning are not similar.

In this article, on the basis of Habermas’ universal pragmatics, we have tried to indicate that empirical pragmatics in linguistics, suffers from ‘normativity deficit’ in the field of foreign language education. What we mean by ‘normativity deficit’, is the lack of normative resources required for judging the validity claims inherent in social interactions. Since agreement on the validity claims is fundamental for reaching mutual understanding and establishing linguistic communications, empirical-pragmatic approach, due to its ‘normativity deficit’ would not be able to give proper moral-educational thread to the field of foreign language education.

On the basis of the normativity of belief thesis in epistemology, belief is a normative mental state. There are various versions of the thesis in the literature, which two of the most well-known versions will be considered in this paper. The first version concerns the so-called “ truth norm” holds that “ one ought to believe that p iff p is true” (Shah 2003, 2009). On the basis of the other one, known as “ knowledge norm” , “ one ought to believe that p iff one knows that p” (Williamson 2000, Brown 2010). A complete consideration of the theses is typically extraneous to the purpose of this short paper. Our focus in this paper concerns Shackel’ s criticisms, according to which, there are selfreferral sentences which render the norms into contradiction. In this paper we will consider and defuse the criticisms.