Quṭb al-Dīn Abū Jaʿfar Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥasan Muqriʾ Nīshābūrī was one of the prominent Imāmī theologians in the 6th century AH, and one of the followers of Sharīf Murtaḍā’s theological school (d: 436 A.H.) known as “the later Imāmī school of Baghdad”. Among his theological works are two valuable writings entitled al-Ḥudūd and al-Taʿlīlq, each of which is highly significant in various aspects. al-Ḥudūd is a theological glossary in which Nīshābūrī defines and explains the common theological terms found in the Muʿtazilite theological texts based on the teachings of the Baḥshamī Muʿtazilite school. In this article, having discussed some general primary notes on glossaries and their role in helping readers understand the expressions and statements of authors in various Islamic sciences, the life and theological works of Muqriʾ Nīshābūrī are examined. Additionally, the structure and content of the book al-Ḥudūd are discussed, and its unique edition is evaluated and criticized. This evaluation reveals that the edition of al-Ḥudūd contains significant mistakes, errors and omissions, emphasizing the necessity of providing a new revised, critical edition of the work.

According to the Jurisprudential texts and subsequently dealt with by the Shiite juristsis the prohibition rule of the Ḥ udū d execution in enemy’ s territory. This rule is shaped in two parts: Absolute and Qualified Terms. In absolute terms, the Ḥ udū d execution in enemy’ s territory is unquestionably prohibited; but, as a qualified meaning, the prohibition of the Ḥ udū d execution in enemy’ s territory) is the subject to the fear of joining condemned to the Enemy. Concerning “ the fear of joining to the enemy, ” some jurists consid-er it as the ʿ Illat (cause)of ruling, and the others consider it as the Ḥ ikmat (philosophy) of Ruling. There is, however, a third group who believe that the combination of ʿ Illat and Ḥ ikmat is possible. Accepting the recent view, this study believes that since the fear of joining to the enemy capable to extend to the similar sentences, such as flogging as Taʿ zī rī or Qiṣ ā ṣ (Retaliation) is the ʿ Illat of ruling and since the absence of this fear and existence of other ramifications the Ḥ ad sentence and other similar Punishments should not be carried out in enemy’ s territory this fear can be considered as the Ḥ ikmat. According to this writing, formation of international human rights organizations and the advent of technology, make joining to the enemy is much easier than Imam’ s era. The consequences of application of these punishments for the Islamic society became more widespread. Also, the development of cyberspace in the age of globalization has reduced the importance of geographical boundaries and has also obscured the meaning of the enemy’ s territory. Therefore, rethinking and generalization of this provision (Prohibition the Hudud execution in Enemy’ s Territory) to other punishments running in Islamic countries seems essential.

A key challenge facing modern hadith scholars engaged in contemporary hadith studies is the lack of explicit reference by Sheikh Ṭūsī to the content and substance of the hadith-based evidences underlying his rulings in Kitāb al-Ḥudūd of Al-Khilāf. Specifically, in Issue 18 of this work, it remains unclear which traditions he relied upon, as he merely employs the vague and generalized expression wa-akhbāruhum ("and their reports") without citing the sources of these hadiths. This issue is not unique to Issue 18 but is present in several other rulings throughout Al-Khilāf, creating a broader challenge for textual interpretation. Thus, it is imperative to adopt a scientific approach and establish a methodologically sound and justifiable framework for addressing this challenge. The primary objective of this research is to elucidate the principles and systematic process for retrieving, analyzing, and deducing the probable hadith-based evidences for this specific issue. The model developed here serves as a test case, offering a methodology that can be applied to similar issues within Al-Khilāf and other early Imāmī legal compendia.

Personal Surety (Kifālat) is a legal and juridical contract that comes in two forms: optional and compulsory. The inquest and judicial inquiry, pronouncement and enforcement of a judgment, and infliction of punishment on the perpetrator may be prolonged for reasons such as a pardon granted by some blood heirs and lack of pardon by others, or the accused or perpetrator being a minor, and so on. Therefore, to prevent the imprisonment of the accused or perpetrator pending the court's final decision or the avengers of blood, they can be released upon providing a surety, provided the blood heirs or the victim accept. This study examined the issue from jurisprudential and legal perspectives, using a descriptive-analytical method. There are two opinions among jurists regarding personal surety in criminal cases. Some believe that personal surety in retaliation cases is invalid. This group views retaliation as one of the Ḥudūd and cites the "Lā Kifālat fi al-Ḥudūd" rule and also cites the "Vizr" rule (the Doctrine of Personal Punishment). In contrast, some others consider Qiṣāṣ to be an independent punishment of Ḥudūd and believe that Kifālat in retaliation cases is valid. Considering the distinctions between Allah's right and people's right, and general and absolute evidence regarding contracts and agreements, the legitimacy of personal surety in retaliation cases has been chosen.

Based on some hadith and historical texts, in a few cases of meting out jurisprudentially fixed punishments (ḥudūd) to exaggerators in veneration of the Muslim Prophet and his family (ghulāt), apostates, and infidels, Imam Ali (PBUH) ordered that some criminal individuals be burned, and at times he personally exerted the punishment. Shiite and Sunni sources have disagreements over some details and themes of, and facts related to the hadiths. Hadiths about burning of human beings in Imam Ali (PBUH)’s conduct include both immolation and cremation, but being choked to death by smoke from the fire should also be considered due to confusions in the texts of the hadiths. In the present study, an attempt has been made to extract all the relevant hadiths from the historical and hadith sources, and to examine and analyze their documentation. To this aim, all those hadiths with their different chain of narrators will be quoted and then critiqued

The Principle of Divine Grace (qāʿidat al-luṭf) is a pivotal theological rule in the ʿAdlīyyah (justice-oriented) theology, employed to substantiate core religious doctrines such as the obligation of religious duties, the necessity of prophetic missions, the infallibility of prophets, and the obligation of appointing an Imam. This study examines how ʿAdlīyyah exegetes applied this principle in their Qur'anic commentaries, focusing on its two primary dimensions: ontological and exemplificatory. Ontologically, the commentaries address themes such as the existence of Divine Grace (wujūd al-luṭf), its obligatory nature (wujūb al-luṭf), its scope (ḥudūd al-luṭf), its relationship with free will (ikhtiyār) and divine power (qudrah), and the interplay between divine punishment and grace. Exemplificatory discussions focus on Qur'anic concepts like reward and punishment, prophets, miracles, the Quran’s inimitability, infallibility, angels, prayer, and trials. The findings demonstrate that ʿAdlīyyah exegetes utilized the Principle of Divine Grace to elucidate the wisdom underlying Qur'anic injunctions, emphasizing its role in reconciling divine justice with human agency.

Iranian Legislature has recognized the rule of darʼ (not enforcing punishments (ḥudūd) in cases of doubt) in articles 120, 121 of the Islamic penal code (1392) and has removed any criminality, responsibility and punishment due to this rule in doubtful cases. However, the legislature in other articles of this code, especially the articles 307, 308, 311, 114 ,115 has passed regulations on the basis of istiṣḥāb principle (legal presumption of continuity of the status quo in doubtful cases), some of which contrast with the necessities of darʼ rule, such as considering the crime intentional at the time of doubt about the perpetrator’s not having free will while committing the crime, providing retaliation for the perpetrator at the time of doubt about his insanity while committing the crime and considering the criminal entitled to punishment at the time of doubt about his repentance before the crime is proved. This article analyses these contradictory regulations and their resolutions.

The series of articles published under the title “ Ishārāt wa Tanbīhāt “ is an opportunity to present various critical, bibliographic, and historical research essays, each of which is serves as a brief and independent essay on a specific and distinguished topic. This seventh installment includes three critical articles on entries found in the Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam and The Great Islamic Encyclopedia. The first two notes highlight some inaccuracies and deficiencies in three entries from The Great Islamic Encyclopedia, while the third article addresses the same corrupted phrase in both the Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam and the Encyclopedia of Persian Language and Literature, emphasizing the need for correction.

Article 287 of the Islamic Penal Code (2013) prescribes the death penalty absolutely for perpetrators of the crime of armed rebellion, without distinguishing between the existence or absence of a central organization. Conversely, Article 114 restricts the Leader’s right to pardon in Ḥudūd offenses to cases involving the offender’s confession and repentance. This legal approach conflicts with the predominant view of Imami jurisprudence, which rejects execution, or at least recognizes unconditional pardon, for rebels who have lost their organizational structure. The research highlights this tension between statutory law and authoritative juristic opinions. Using reliable library sources and a descriptive–analytical method, the study examines relevant religious evidence, particularly the established conduct of Imam ʿAlī (AS) in pardoning the rebels of the Battle of Jamal. The findings show that enforcing the death penalty against disorganized rebels lacks valid religious justification and that the Leader, based on expediency, holds absolute authority to pardon even without confession or repentance. Consequently, restricting the Leader’s pardoning power in the current Penal Code contradicts fundamental jurisprudential principles and the practice of Imam ʿAlī (AS). It is recommended that Article 114 be amended to allow unconditional pardon in cases of rebellion where no central organization exists,It is also proposed that a Note be added under Article 287, allowing the court, with the permission of the Supreme Leader, to impose a lighter punishment for such rebels.

This study aims to reconstruct, analyze, and critically hypothesize the Imāmī ḥadīth-based sources underlying Issue Eighteen of the “Ḥudūd” section in al-Khilāf by Shaykh Ṭūsī, where the jurist merely refers to “their reports” (akhbāruhum) without citing specific traditions. Through a circular, multi-step methodology—ranging from textual analysis to conceptual hypothesis—the researcher first engaged deeply with the legal formulation of the issue, its ruling, and Shaykh Ṭūsī’s reasoning, extracting key concepts and reconstructing the conceptual structure of his jurisprudential mindset. Using a specialized methodology of interpretive recovery (istidrāk), combining lexical and conceptual analysis, the study performs takhrīj (source tracing) to identify primary textual roots. This iterative process involves cross-referencing the conceptual elements of the issue with early ḥadīth sources, analyzing textual evolution from early compilations to al-Khilāf, and exploring the causes behind changes in narrative formulation. Ultimately, the author proposes two likely ḥadīth sources: (a) the ḥadīth of ʿAbbād al-Makkī and (b) the ḥadīth of Zurārah. Although the latter aligns with Shaykh Ṭūsī’s fatwā and appears in al-Kāfī and the works of Shaykh Ṣadūq, its absence in Ṭūsī’s own ḥadīth collections disqualifies it as his likely source. In contrast, the ḥadīth of ʿAbbād al-Makkī—transmitted via three distinct chains and conceptually aligned with the Qurʾānic rationale of the fatwā—is posited as the more plausible basis for Ṭūsī’s reference to akhbāruhum.