Ayeneh Ma‘refat
Year:2017 | Volume:17 | Issue:51 |Papers Count:11

One of the most important theories in relation to the methodology of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is the distinction between collection and judgment. It is argued that, in the collection position, Mulla Sadra draws on mystical intuitions. While in the judgment position, he relies on reasoning as the real method of philosophical deliberations. The present paper demonstrates that, in contrast with the claim made by the proponents of the distinction theory, Mulla Sadra makes use of mystical intuitions along side reasoning in his position as the judge of the collected evidence. He not only confirms this point but he also considers it as the strong point of his philosophy. This paper argues that drawing on mystical intuitions in making judgments on philosophical issues suffers from serious flaws that can be presented in terms of ineffability, lack of transferability of mystical intuitions and the fact that they do not lend themselves to criticism.

The simplicity of the necessary-by-itself is one of the most important issues discussed by Islamic philosophers and theologians. It has also a prominent position in transcendental wisdom (Hikmat e Motaaliyeh). Allameh Tabatabai, as a transcendental philosopher, puts emphasis on the real simplicity of the divine nature and provides a lot of arguments for it. With the analysis of the foundations of his arguments, it is demonstrated that two different views are expressed on this issue: one is the simplicity of the necessary-by-itself and the arguments for its affirmation based on the positive attitude to quiddity; the other is the simplicity of the necessary-by-itself and the arguments for its affirmation based on the negative attitude to quiddity. It seems that Allameh Tabatabai assumes the second view which is free from the first view’s difficulties as it proves simplicity in a direct way. The present article aims at delineating the second view and demonstrating its superiority to the first one.

Although al-Ghazali is known as a critic of philosophers, his intellectual approach is full of rational and philosophical argumentations. That is why, some scholars have taken the view that al-Ghazali has had a big contribution to the rationalization of the Islamic culture and especially in transferring Avicenna's thoughts to his successors. He has also used Avicenna' s thought foundations in his religious and mystical theorizations. The present article is an attempt to analyze the relationship between the rational knowledge and the heart-knowledge based on al-Ghazali’s rational mysticism and the main pillars of the new approaches to his works in the last two decades. Based on these bases, it will be argued that the achievement of the highest level of knowledge, which is associated to the heart in al-Ghazali’s thought, is made possible after rational preliminaries. Even the heart knowledge itself is in principle equal to the perfection of the rational knowledge.

One of the constitutive elements of the Salafist School is its approach to God’s attributes. The Salafist unique interpretation which is presented as the school of proof for attributes lacks compatibility with forefathers’ views in addition to its being extremely dogmatic. Extreme dogmatism has provided opportunities for the opponents to satirize Salafist views. The present article aims at examining Alusi’s approach to interpretation in terms of its adherence to the Salafi School. In his opposition to the Salafist School of proof, Alusi takes side with the approach of delegating the meaning of attributes to the forefathers’ generally accepted views and rejects the manifest meanings due to the corrupted requirements like incarnation. He also agrees with the popular interpretation of attribute verses upon which there is unanimous agreement. The authors take the view that Alusi’s interpretation of narrated attributes do not show any affinities with the Salafist interpretations but they are rather in agreement with the latest Ash’ariyyah theological school of thought. However, it should be mentioned that his liberalistic theology and jurisprudence has had a minor effect on the distinctions in this field.

“Shakelah” or disposition is an issue in relation to Islamic anthropology and the issue of destiny. The question of whether man is in control of his destiny or not has attracted the attention of Islamic thinkers since the early stages of history of thought in Islam. The proponents and opponents have tried to refer to the Quranic verses in their efforts to support their position. One of the verses, which has been used by the supporters of determinism is verse 84, Surah Al-Isra which reads “everyone acts according to his own disposition”. Here disposition means the God-given human nature. The opponents of this view believe that the meanings proposed for shakelah such as nature, inner state, temperament, behavior, habits, intention and whatever one believes in its truth indicate that man is in direct relation with shakelah and behaves under its effect. So it makes no difference whether we take a deterministic view or non-deterministic one. According to the second view, shakelah pertains to human personality and identity; it is a profound Quranic doctorine concerning man and his identity as well as an Islamic foundation for education. Thus, this issue has wider signification than the issue of determinism and freedom. Human action, therefore, plays an important role in shakelah, and so identity depends on man’s efforts. Furthermore, whatever intent one has for his actions, they would affect shakelah. It is also important to note that believing in the divine realm, just as denying it, also forms the shakelah of every believer and non-believer. The conclusion is that three levels of identity are realized: manifest identity, real identity and true identity.

Tuma`nina is a mystical station by which man can reach constant tranquility. But the word “Tuma' nina” has been used in relation to different objects in the holy Quran and sophistic writings. One of those objects mentioned in the holy Quran is the world where the possibility of reaching tranquility is confirmed (Surah Yunus / 7). Of course the Sufis’ view is that any tranquility acquired other than the one acquired by reaching “vatan” (homeland or existential origin of mankind) is not constant and original. The kind of tranquility that one acquires before reaching their homeland (their existential origin) is tranquility in a foreign land and therefore it is transitory. In his mystical Tafsir, Tustari, with reference to Surah Haj/11 which reads “if good reaches him, then he is content therewith”, believes that for an individual who behaves based on his instincts as not achieved absolute tranquility, any perception which brings him heartfelt satisfaction can be a means to tranquility. But is it possible to reach constant and absolute tranquility. What does vatan (homeland/ existential origin) mean in sufi words? What is the status of tranquility in the Islamic practical and theoretical mysticism? The present article is an attempt to discuss the answers to these questions based on Sufis' works from the earliest years of Sufism to Ibn Arabi.

The issue of a single solid base for personality is of significance as it is tied to the ontological and epistemological discussions. Meanwhile, although the criteria put forward for a single solid base can be helpful from an epistemological point of view, they seem dubious and controversial from an ontological perspective. Ontologically speaking, some philosophers have denied the existence of personality and a single solid base for it; and therefore, they have freed themselves from the need to discuss it. While those who support the idea have put forward three criteria- body, memory and immaterial soul- as the basis for sticking to a single solid base for personality. However, among these philosophers, Molla Sadra denies the body and memory as criteria and considers the immaterial soul as the sole criterion for a single solid base for personality. As he believes in the transsubstantial motion of the immaterial soul, the question may arise as how a moving soul can be the criterion for a single solid base for personality. Are these apparently opposing views inconsistent? The present paper concludes that this dilemma can be solved through a deeper understanding of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy and the different kinds of transsubstantial motion he has proposed.