Ayeneh Ma‘refat
Year:2010 | Volume:8 | Issue:24|Papers Count:8

One of the unwarranted charges raised against Islamic philosophy is that what we call Islamic philosophy, if it is legitimate to call it philosophy and modify it by the attribute Islamic, is similar to what pioneer philosophers such as Ibn-e Sina, Sheikh Eshragh and Mulla Sadra have presented, and even if we ignore the problem of inefficacy, there is no space for its development.Therefore, all efforts to invest money and time on its education and research are in vain. The present article argues that, first, Islamic philosophy is not limited to these three philosophers and, second, Islamic philosophy can be developed and extended in different ways catching the attention of philosophers for many years to come.

The present article is an attempt at examining one of the most important issues in ontology from the perspective of two philosophers: Fakhr-e-Razi and Athir al-Din-e-Abhari. The importance of Fakhr-e-Razi in detecting the history of issues and their origins is clear to everyone. Razi’s attempts in this regard can be considered as a supplementary-corrective project. His works, especially al-Mabahith al-Mashrighiyya, provides strong evidence for this claim. In his works, Razi has made an attempt to borrow the topic of univocity and equivocity of being from the works of past authors and to provide arguments for it.The issue itself can be interpreted and understood in the context of his main thought in the above-mentioned project. Razi’s corrective arguments have been embraced by his successors although the bases of this issue can be traced back in the works of his predecessors. Abhari who has also been influenced by Razi’s ideas has adopted an approach similar to Razi’s. In his works, Razi has expressed different views on univocity and equivocity of being and it is interesting to note that Abhari has adopted a similar approach. The present article intends to collect and present the arguments using both scholars’ views and to discuss function of this issue in theology.

Ibn-e Arabi’s universal concept of personal unity means that being has an objective concrete reality and that its objective denotation is God and all beings are His true manifestations. This view has its own requirements, which are discussed in the present article.

According to most interpreters, Wittgenstein’s private language argument contained in pp.243-315 of his Philosophical Investigations shows that the speaker of this language would be left with no way to distinguish between ‘seeming right’ and ‘being right’; i.e. nobody other than the speaker could understand it and nothing could be recognized as a word of such a language to refer to a thing. However, Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s private language argument is that the ‘real private language argument’ is indeed expressed in pp.143-242 instead of pp.243-315 and the result of this argument is expressed in p.202.According to Kripe’s interpretation, Wittgenstein propounds a skeptical paradox concerning‘ rule-following’ and offers a skeptical solution of a Humean form to his skeptical problem and indeed the argument against the against the impossibility of private language is the result of this skeptical solution. Kripke’s views have come under heavy criticism.According to the critics, Kripke’s view is not compatible with historical facts concerning the development and completion of Philosophical Investigations.It is also incorrect concerning the interpretation he offers of Wittgenstein’s skepticism and his comparison with Hume and also his sociological approach in analyzing Wittgenstein’s views.

The theory of Fitrah (inborn disposition), as a philosophical or theological issue, has not been mentioned in the works of Kendi, Farabi, Ibn Sina and Sheikh Al-eshragh. It is in Ikhvan Al-safa’s works that for the first time in Islamic philosophy the issue of the innate knowledge of god has been mentioned in a philosophical work. This can be justified by the multiplicity of their sources in compilation of their treaties. Ibn Arabi can be considered a turning point in the evolutionary process of this theory because he was the first to study the concept of Fitrah as an independent issue. It was in Shah Abadi’s works that this theory made great strides.Providing proof for the existence of God, Prophecy and Imamat, and resurrection by making references to the requirements of inborn disposition are among his innovations.In the works of Allameh Tabatabai, the theory’s functions have remarkably increased and in the works of Ayatollah Motahari they have reached the highest point. Motahari’s theorization can be considered a great leap in the history of the evolution of the theory of Fitrah. The scope of his innovations in this respect extends to almost all the major issues. The appearance of rival views, his educational records, and the variety of his studies can be the factors influencing the realization of his innovations.

The importance of Quran’s legislative miracle (E’jaz-e Tashrii) can be estimated from its widespread presence in and influence on human society. With the ever-increasing development of sciences, the investigation and explanation of Quran’s legislative miracle is considered a necessity. Despite the fact that an extensive literature has developed around the miracle of Quran, very few studies have been conducted on Quran’s legislative miracle. Given the interdisciplinary nature of the subject, the present article intends to survey the ways through which Quran’s legislative miracle can be proved. First, Quran’s legislations are of ultra-terrestrial and miraculous nature. Second, Quran’s legislations are not influenced by the Old Testament but are rather superior to those of the Old Testament.Finally, Quran’s legislations are free of the caveats of ordinary legislations. The fact that these legislations were spelled out by Prophet Muhammad who was illiterate is clear evidence for the miraculous nature of Quran.

The Shiite and Sunni Muslims have been engaged in an extensive argumentation and theoretical discussion with regard to the chastity of Imam. S unni Moslems are unanimous in rejecting chastity as a necessary condition for Imam and often consider it unnecessary to provide arguments for their position. However, Shiite Moslems are unanimous in their stipulation of chastity condition and they try to prove it by providing intellectual and narrated arguments. The present article intends to reconsider the arguments raised for chastity and by a comparative study of the original texts investigates the Shiite arguments for the chastity of Imam and criticisms raised by Sunni Moslems against chastity, reveal their strength and weaknesses and aspires to expose the knowledgeable just reader to the truth value of the issue.