Avicennian Philosophy Journal
Year:2008 | Volume:12 | Issue:39|Papers Count:7

The explanation of revelation and prophecy has a special place in the view of Muslim philosophers. The ideas Farabi as the first Muslim philosopher who dealt with the prophecy and Ibn Sina in view of his original and precise conceptualization about prophecy and its foundations deserve inverstigation and have always been the subject of different commentaries. Some critics have found faults with Farabi that by introducing the concept of imagination in the process of revelation he has subordinated the place of prophet to that of philosophers and some have objected to Ibn Sina that by introducing the concept of guess in the process of revelation he is unable to account for revelation's knowledge to particular things and only universal knowledge of revelation in his theory are explicable, wheras Farabi recognizes the rational faculty of prophet as perceiving all the intelligible and separate substances and Ibn Sina as well has paid attention to the role of imaginative faculties in revelation and prophecy and has succeeded in explaining the knowledge to particulars things.

The present article consists of two main sections. In the first section the writer tries to deal with. the topics which in contemporary epistemology has been advanced about tradional foundationalism, anq in the meantime to show both the weaknesses and strengths of these theories briefly. Following this preliminary discussion, in the second section besides the review of Ibn Sina's point of view about the problem of foundation and principles of knowledge, it has been shown that this theory can be included in the foundationalist theories but with a special reading. This theory, with its characteristic features (including, its being foundation of higher beings in relation to lower beings in all kinds of knowledge from observation to certainty, foundational mode of concept for assertion, foundational mode of axioms of every science for the problems of that science, foundational mode of higher sciences in relation to lower sciences and also foundational mode of immediate perceptions for other kinds of knowledge and at the top of immediate perceptions foundational mode of basic self - evident propositions both potentially and, complementary for all kinds of indirect knowledge) neither follows the present-day traditional foundationalism that we deal with in the first section nor is susceptible to the many difficullies of traditional foundationalism of today.

The concept of necessity and its conceptual relation to pennanence in modal logic is one of the most difficult topics to understand. Sometimes Ibn Sina regards necessity as pennanence which is a part of necessity and sometimes regards it as more special than pennanence. But necessity in Aristotle's view is the way a thing is as it is and cannot be otherwise.The concept of immanance is the endurance of predicate in subject during the time, whereas necessity means the impossibility of separation of predicate from subject in certain conditions. By this analysis necessity is subordinate to permanence, is conditioned by continuity and is equivalent to the conditionsof existing thing.'According to Ibn Sina only necessary propositions have a special usage in exact sciences. Also, Aristotles considers the propositions which the relation between their subject and predicate is based on possibility as lacking scientific value. Later the separation of necessary and scientific in possible statements as the separation of analytic and synthetic propositions (in Kant's tenn) and the kinds of predication (in Sadra terminology) was propounded. Suhravardi regards. necessity as the genus of a threefold modalities. In this view all logical propositions are self-evident. Spinoza in a similar way by stressing the identification of necessity and permanence regards the necessity as the condition of existence and considers possibility the result of nonrecognition of necessary system of the world.

The existence of imagination and imaginative perceptions in cognitive system of human being is a topic all philosophers agree about it, but they disagree about the explanation the way the individual alquire imaginary forms as well as the nature of imagination and imaginative perceptions. Ibn Sina considers human soul as having various faculties and considers the imaginative faculty as an intermediate stage in the actualization and acquisition of perceptual forms.In his different books he propounds arguments for the material nature of imagination and in consequence of imaginal forms, but apparently such arguments are based on the principles of Islamic tradition, because he ultimately changes his position and in his "Mubahithat" offers a detailed argument on the abstract nature of imagination and imagnitive perceptions, although he finds it difficut to justify such a notion on the basis of prepatetic principles. His saying on the different degrees of -intellect, immortality of souls, children's souls and immortal souls on the stage of material intellect is justifiable with belief in the abstract nature of imagination and perceptual forms.Suhravardi refuses to accept the multiple inner faculties of Ibn Sina, and refers all faculties to an entity (Nur al- Muddaber) and regards these faculties as a shadow of what is in the Nur Esphahbad. For the explanation of acquisition of imaginative perception, he resorts to imaginal world and suspended ideas.

Ibn Sina is a philosopher who in the domain of Islamic Philosophy has presented a new reading of Aristotelian doctrines and therefore not only he is Aristotle's commentator but also is a great and prominent philosopher in his own right. The attempt to show the consistency of religious beliefs with rational perception has been one of the mental concerns of Ibn Sina Although this problem in many cases has not been stated in his writings, but considering his whole writings. support this claim. At the same time, in some of the philosophical topics such as the problem prophet hood, bodily resurrection, as well as in the area of ethics, we are witnessing that shaykh tries to show the supremacy of religious teachings over rational perceptions and inability of intellect in some of these areas. This fact shows that Ibn Sina is not merely a retionalist Philosopher but he is a rationalist- fideist Philosopher.

In his investigation of the concept of "Being" Aristotle relates the question of "existence" to the question "essence" (ousia) and considers essence as "whatness" and quiddity. Although in his logical discussions he treats the concepts of "existence" and "whatness" separately and makes a distinction between them, but does not extend this distinction to the area of philosophical topics.But in the prepatetic Islamic system of Philosophy, explanation and distinction between "Being" and liquidity" is without doubt one of the most fundamental philosophical doctrines and beliefs. In the history of Islamic philosophy, the theory of metaphysical distinction between being and essence has been attributed to Ibn Sina, but it is Farabi who for the first time has propounded clearly and decisively a two-part division between "being" and "quiddity" and has prepared the way for Avecinian philosophy. In addition to his logical distinction between "existence" and "whatness" of things he has stressed on a metaphysical distinction between them and has made this distinction the foundation of his metaphysical system. From Farabi's view, being is an inherent accident of quiddity.In this article we try to explain the concepts of "existence" and "whatness" of things and their relation as one of the most fundamental topics in prepatetic philosophy in the philosophical thought of these two great prepatetic philosophers, ie Aristotle and Farabi, with specific stress on comparing their views.

In the history of Islamic Philosophy Ibn Sina and Farabi are known to be originator of the distinction between existence and quiddity. In the philosophy of these two philosophers the distinction of existence and quiddity is used as a proof for the existence of God who is the end of the fIrst philosophy.According to Ibn Sina positively this distinction is based on essential possibility and necessity by something else and this is also is based on a division of existent into necessary and possible being. It is here that the discussion about occurance of existence to quiddity is propounded. Shayh by anticipating what later his predecessors including Ibn Rushed have propounded sometimes has considered this occurrence in view of conception the opposite of essential in the chapter of Isagogue and sometimes has also regarded the connection between existence and quiddity of the kind of relation. But in view of instance (in outside) has considered existence and quiddity as a unifIed thing.The distinction between existence and quiddity is not propounded in illuminist philosophy in relation to the distinction between necessary and possible being and effective in proving the existence of the Most High. Suhravardi by his own explicit assertion considers the prepatetic philosophers as holding to a distinction between external existence and essence and for this reason has objected to them. But what he has in mind of existence, unlike what prepatetic philosophers have in view, is the concept of existence not the truth of existence.