Sophia Perennis
Year:2009 | Volume:6 | Issue:2|Papers Count:11

This article begins with an examination of Professor Etienne Gilson's analysis of the statement by St. Thomas Aquinas, "Ens per se, is not the definition of substance, as Avicenna stated." Gilson confessed that he was unable to find the source of this claim in Avicenna, and came to the conclusion that Avicenna did not in fact make any such statement. In order to refute this conclusion, this paper proceeds to present a detailed analysis of the history of the term 'substance', focusing on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. The a third nd most important part of the paper is a close reading of the relevant passages of the works of Avicenna himself, revealing the sought for source of Aquinas's statement.

The most important subject in the two fundamental extant works of Imam Muhammad al-Ghazali that is The Alchemy of Happiness and The Revival of the Religious Sciences, is ethics (akhlaq). In those topics in which there is a disagreement between Divine Law (shar') and reason ('aql), Ghazali takes the side of Divine Law. At the same time, he considers ethical virtues (mahasin-i akhlaqi) and the cultivation of ethics/virtues (tahdhib-i akhlaq) to be acquired and to be a matter for education, believing ethics (akhlaq) to be changeable. In this article the author intends, firstly, to clarify the place of ethics in Ghazali's classification of the sciences; and, secondly, to show how, in the thought of Ghazali, the principles of ethics and Divine Law conform with one another, whilst at the same time the cultivation of ethics/virtues on the basis of mysticism is the most fundamental and complete basis of ethics (akhlaq).

One of the most basic concerns of al-Ghazali, which is observable in his shift toward tasawwuf (Sufism) is tawil (esoteric commentary) and its methods. Although he rejected certain sects, such as the Batinis and Ismailis, and criticized their approaches to interpreting the Quran, it is clear from his own rules of interpretation that he was in fact under influence of these sects, an influence which played a major role in Islamic intellectual history up until the time of Mulla Sadra (d. 1640 A.D.). This paper discusses the rules of tawil and its divisions according to al-Ghazali.

According to the Islamic esoteric tradition as it manifests in both Sunni and Shiite Islam, it is through the Universal Man, who is the Imam (ruler and guide) in Shiism and the Qutb (Pole) in Sufism, that God’s Names and Attributes are most clearly reflected, and through whom He controls the spiritual affairs of humanity. This paper will examine how this Axis Mundi is envisaged in Shiism as the Imam, and in Sufism as the Qutb, while comparing these terms to each other, and also to Christ’s function in Christianity, which helps to define the term Axis Mundi. We will look closely at the functions, biographies, and sayings of the Shiite Imams and the poles in Sufism, and examine how these two streams of Islamic esoterism connect through the reality of the Imam and the Qutb, which according to the Shiite Sufi Sayyid Haydar Amuli, “are two expressions possessing the same meaning and referring to the same person.

There is almost no information about Abu Ishaq b. Nizam b. Mansur Shirazi Waiz except that he was a scholar from 9th/15th century who lived in Yazd and wrote a small treatise called Bayan al-farq bayn al-ilhad wa'l-zandaqa wa'l-tatil wa bayn daqa 'iq al-tawhid (An Explanation of the Difference Between the Terms al-ilhad, al-zandaqa and al-tatil and between the precise points of Unity). A manuscript of this treatise in the author's handwriting is extant and is located in Fadil Khansari Library in Khansar (a small city near Isfahan), majmuah 239, (ff. 134b-136b). He gifted his treatise to Jalaloddin siddiq tabasi about whom also there is no information. Just before this treatise, there are two ijazas offered to Jalaloddin siddiq tabasiby Imam b. 'Ala' and Abdolghaffar b. Sa'id b. 'Abdollah who are also unknown to us. Here I have edited these three texts and have found some new information about Abi Ishaq b. Nizam b. Mansur Shirazi Waiz.

At the end of his magnum opus, Hikmat al-ishraq, Suhrawardi, the founder of the Illuminationist school of Islamic philosophy, has alluded to the seven paths in which, upon reaching the seventh path, the salik (spiritual wayfarer) reaches an extraordinary joy. The traditional exegetes of Hikmat al-ishraq have interpreted these seven paths as the five external senses plus the faculties of imagination and reason. However, this article is shows that it is more appropriate to understand the seven paths as symbolising the seven stages of gnosis, in a way similar to that which has been described from the famous Sufi writer, Abu Talib al-Makki.

Physical resurrection is among the principles of Islamic belief to which God has referred explicitly in the Holy Qur'an. Until the 10th century A.H., Islamic scholars appealed to revelation as the only way to verify this doctrine. However, in the 11th century, Sadr al-Muta'allihin Shirazi (d. 1050 A.H. [lunar]) added a philosophical proof for the verification of the idea. His theory was criticized by philosophers following him, including the late Aqa Ali Mudarris Zanuzi Tihrani (d. 1307 A.H. [lunar].). Having criticized Sadr al-Muta'allihin's ideas, he presented his own innovative theory in this regard, which was later approved by some of the outstanding  Islamic philosophers following him, including the late Ayatollah Mirza Abul-Hasan Rafi'i Qazwini (d. 1395 A. H. [lunar]). According to Aqa Ali Mudarris, in contrast to the belief of religious lay-people, the physical resurrection is not a return of the soul after its departure to the same material, worldly body, preserving its worldly status, because this is logically impossible; rather the physical resurrection is an ascent of the body toward the departed soul as a result of substantial motion (harakat-i jawhariyyah) and the qualitative ascent of its essence.In this article, by employing the late Aqa Ali Mudarris's words, we have tried to clarify Ayatollah Rafi'i's theory regarding physical resurrection.

This article begins with a brief presentation of Henry Corbin's important book, En Islam Iranien. We then deal with Corbin's views on the relation of Islam and Iran, considering his belief that the spiritual world of Iran, before and after the advent of Islam, has constituted a whole. On the grounds of the analyses of this section of the article, we conclude that instead of translating the French title into Persian literally, as Andar Islam-i Irani (i.e. On Iranian Islam), it should be translated as Islam dar Sarzamin-i Iran (i.e. Islam in the Iranian world).

One of the issues discussed in Shi‘ite jurisprudence in a comparative way is the question of “misdirection and approval” (takhta’ah wa taswib). On this point, Imamite Shi‘ite jurists held discussions with followers of Sunni schools, and each have taken positions that have become characteristic for both sides. The Ash‘arites and a small number of the Mu‘tazilites held that God has no verdict in this sensible world, but that God’s verdict is identical with the opinio communis reached by the authoritative experts. Hence, the experts in Islamic jurisprudence (the Mujtahids) never fail. This theory is labeled the “theory of approval” (taswib), and its followers are called “the approvers” (musawwibah). The followers of the contrary theory are called “the fallibilists” (mukhatti’ah), i.e. the theory hat holds that God does have verdicts in the real world and that the jurists might or might not find them, so that in the latter case they are indeed fallible.Al-Ghazali, one of the outstanding patrons of the Ash‘arite school, is a stout defender of the “approval” theory. Apparently, this quarrel does not go back to the early centuries of the canonization of Islamic jurisprudence. It rather seems to have resulted from discussions that gained momentum in the circles of theologians, i.e. kalam theorists. Generally, the issue has more of a theological character rather than belonging to judicial discussions. In this regards, this paper discusses questions such as: What was the initial claim? What are the roots of the quarrel? And finally, what was actually troubling the mind of those who pursued the question?

Here I present a critical edition of one of Ibn Sina`s short treatises containing subtle points in logic. So far only half of it, which is not devoid of errors, has been published in the margins of Mulla Sadra`s commentary on the book: al-Hidaya al-Athiriyya, in the lithographic edition. My critical edition is based on three manuscripts from the libraries of Istanbul and a manuscript from the Senate House of Iran library (Majles-e-Sena), in addition to the above mentioned incomplete lithographic edition.Some of the features of this treatise in contrast to Ibn Sina`s other logical writings are: the priority given to 'assertion' (tasdiq) over 'conception' (tasawwur); a brief but comprehensive classification of the four human faculties; a different definition for 'proposition'; and the classification of propositions into 'predicative', 'connective' and 'disjunctive', without mentioning the conditional. Furthermore, it should be noted that in this treatise singular propositions are confined to predicative ones.