Philosophy and Kalam
Year:2015 | Volume:48 | Issue:1 |Papers Count:8

This paper addresses the differences between the two terms, “existence” and “existent”, in the framework of “indirect reference theory” and tries to answer whether or not the proposition “Existence is existent” is an analytical one. The research shows that on the vocabulary level, none of the two has any additional presentation to the other. Also, when by “existence” we mean “nominal existence”, their two referents are the same. But, on the sense level, i.e., the mode of presentation or grasping the referent, “existence” and “existent” are different, and, so, the proposition “Existence is existent” cannot not be an analytical one. But, when “existence” refers to “the necessary existence”, the senses are the same, and the proposition is an analytic one. Moreover, we also show that the “existent” sense in Mulla Sadra’s philosophical system is different from the Tabatabaei’s one.

The present paper, through the linguistic analysis of Mulla Sadra's philosophical views, has shown that a single linguistic model can be applied to the analysis of all his philosophical views. To this end, based on two linguistic theories regarding the semantic structure of derivation, it is illustrated that Mulla Sadra’s philosophical views conform to the linguistic model of semantic simplicity of derivation when he expresses his philosophical system, and it conforms to the linguistic model of semantic complexity of derivation when he defends his theories based on dominant majority views. We have applied the linguistic model proposed in this study to some Mulla Sadra’s philosophical views, namely, answering the problem of the contingency of existence, the subject of motion, and the unity of intelligent and intelligible (ittihad al-aqil wa al-ma' qoul). It is also argued that if we presume the linguistic model of semantic simplicity of derivation, we need no reason to approve the philosophical theories of Mulla Sadra. But, to object his philosophical theories, we should presume the linguistic model of semantic complexity of derivation.

Since Molla Sadra’s era, various exegeses have been made of the principality of existence (isalat al-wujoud) and non-principality of quiddity which can be placed in three distinct groups: 1) common-sense exegeses, 2) philosophical exegeses, and 3) mystical exegeses. Common-sense exegesis is the one derived from a common sense viewpoint of the universe, which presupposes the quiddities external. Philosophical exegesis is due to a rational and exact viewpoint of the quiddity. In this view, quiddity is considered something that is derived from the limitation of the existence of the entities. Finally, mystical exegesis is one derived from the direct knowledge of the entities and in which quiddity is simply some mental appearance. The article shows that philosophical and mystical exegeses are correct exegeses of principality, whereas common-sense exegesis is an incorrect one that is the result of an inexact view of the quiddity.

The kind of attitude to Mulla Sadra’s works is important in deducing his views accurately. Here, there are two types of attitudes. First, the real Sadra’s views are what we understand literally from his assertions. The second is that the deduction of his final ideas needs some philosophical independent judgment (Ijtihad) in addition to what is understood literally from his assertions and other various evidences. In this paper, the second attitude is defended, and we show that the real Mulla Sadra’s views cannot be understood, but through understanding the conditions governing his lifetime in addition to confirming the consistency of his philosophical system.

The paper claims that the meaning of life in the philosophy of Mulla Sadra is equivocal (moshakik) and diverse not univocal (motawati). This diversity has its root in Mulla Sadra’s anthropological view, which states that man is not a single univocal species, but is an equivocal one or a genus including disparate species. The central issue in this paper is to study the influence of gradual and oppositional difference of human being on the diversity of meaning of life in Mulla sadra’s philosophy. The results are: supplying three explanations for gradual and oppositional differences of human being in the framework of different nominal manifestation of God and the trilogical immateriality of the human’s soul. The other result is showing that the diversity of meanings of life occurs in the interior of the species of man, and nihilism occurs at the border of it.

According to Mulla Sadra in his famous work, al-Asfar, God’s pre-knowledge is a set of epistemic forms which are (1) inseparable from His essence, (2) uncreated, (3) beyond the universe, (4) devoid of real possibility, (5) eternal per se, and (6) extant by His extance. Tabatabayi in Nihayat al-Hilmah believes that the term, “inseparable”, in (1) does not mean “out of essence”; otherwise, (1) would contradict (2) - (6). Furthermore, if the epistemic forms were out of God’s essence, then if they were known by presence, the theory of Ideas would be true, and if they were known by acquisition, the theory of “depicted Forms” would be true, while both of them are rejected by Mulla Sadra. Tabatabayi, therefore, says that these epistemic forms are identical with God’s essence, and that pre-knowledge in Mulla Sadra’s view is the same as God’s essential knowledge of the details of creature. In my opinion, but, this claim and its arguments, both, are incorrect, because the mentioned epistemic forms, in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, are identical with abstract intellects which have all six properties without any contradiction. Again, Mulla Sadra, in contrary to Tabatabayi’s strange claim, believes in the existence of Ideas as thesauruses of divine pre-knowledge.

Allamah Tabatabaei classifies the sciences based on his theory, “idrakat I’tibari” (Conventional Perceptions). According to this theory, the nature of the two perceptions, actual and conventional, are completely different. Based on this theory, Ethics is a conventional science; so, ethical propositions are described by the characteristics of conventional perception. In this essay, we have shown the most important characteristics of conventional perception and have addressed the epistemological issues regarding ethical propositions, such as lack of reality representation of these propositions, the criteria of their truth and falsity, their relation to sentiments and emotions and its consequence, etc.

The topic of “trilogical denotations” (al-dalalat al-thalath) appears in Avicenna logic system following the development of the discourse on “terms subject” (al-mabahith al-alfad) in his system. It was Avicenna, who, for the first time, paid more attention to this subject and was responsible for its extended discussion. Among the issues to which he addresses is the one on trilogical denotations (implicit, implied, and metaphorical). Implicit denotation, to which the logicians were more concerned, in that it denotes some meaning different from its original referent, was similar to some kinds of metaphorical denotations, and this similarity leads to some misconceptions in differentiating between the two denotations, metaphorical and implied. In this research we have shown that metaphorical denotation differs from implicit and implied ones in three respects: first, in implicit and implied denotation, the denotation is the result of coining words, but in metaphorical one, it is through some evidence. Second, in differentiating between real and metaphorical meaning we do not need “evident mutual implication in its restricted meaning” (bayyen bi al- ma’na al-akhas). Third, there are not any mutual implications between metaphorical meaning and real meaning, but both implicit and implied meanings imply the real meaning.