JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC ECONOMIC STUDIES
Year:2012 | Volume:4 | Issue:2 (8) |Papers Count:6

This study examines the outcomes of deleting interest of deposits in banking system on welfare cost of inflation. Using neoclassical approach and dynamic optimization, shows that interest-free banking not only leads to zero welfare cost of inflation, but also is consistent with Friedman's rule about optimum quantity of money.

The successfulness of the progress and justice, as one goal, depends on paying attention to the details of different places and different times and this has made the highest authority of the Islamic state to focus on the Islamic-Iranian model of progress. In addition, one of the important axes of this model is its spatial characteristics. This research tries to provide an introduction to the concept, process and planning framework for the planning regional Islamic-Iranian model of progress. It tries to answer two questions; which are: what is the role of the regional development in the Islamic-Iranian model of progress? And, what are the principals of planning for the regional Islamic-Iranian model of progress? The results show that: 1- The Islamic- Iranian model of progress defines a framework for development of the different parts of the country and its base is the theory of regional economic justice. In addition, the criterion for the regional Islamic-Iranian model of progress is the fulfillment of the distributional justice in the regional and inter-regional levels.2- The goals of the regional development can be considered as: production enhancement, productivity enlargement, technology superiority and finally the increase of the social welfare.3- The goals of the regional economic justice can be reexamined in the context of the regional welfare which, in different levels. 4- The components of the Islamic-Iranian model of progress can be found by the study of the current status of each region, regarding the presented welfare criteria. In this regards, the challenges available in each region, including the lack of facilities and the inefficiency of processes, are important as well.

By comparing the experience of Sharia supervision in different countries, this paper tries to analyze their similarities and dissimilarities. In addition, after reexamining the interest-free banking system in Iran, it tries to provide a short-run, middle-run and long-run plan for the application of the Sharia supervision in Iranian Islamic banking system. Finally, the merits and demerits of the establishment of the Sharia supervision in Iranian banks are highlighted and solutions for probable challenges are provided. The results show that the Sharia supervision is possible and can help the Iranian Islamic banks and financial institutions to strengthen the accordance of their activity with Islamic rules and principals. In addition, the establishment of Sharia supervision in banks can be considered as part of the banking system evolution plan which is to be put in action in near future.

The purpose of this research is surveying the pathology of education and research in Islamic Economics in Iran. The method of research is survey-applied approach and the population comprises all post-graduate, M.A, PhD students and researchers in Economics; totally 2648 in 2009.For stratified random sampling, 336 people were selected. The researcher-made questionnaire is the instrument of gathering data which contains 41 closed questions in 1-5 Leichardt scale in 3 criteria for developing Islamic Economics. Stability in pre-test was calculated with 0.949 Cronb-ach's alpha coefficient and reliability was done according to the opinion of experts in Islamic Economics. The findings were analyzed in two sections; descriptive and inferential. Multivariable Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) was used in inferential analysis. According to the results, from 41 items in 3 criteria (public education, specialized education and research method) for Islamic Economics, “Holding educational workshops in Islamic transactions before economic activity permission”, “Developing mixed-fields in Islamic studies and Economics”, “Publishing Methodology in Islamic Economics” and “Holding national conferences on Islamic Economics” had the most average in analysis. In P<0.05 were a meaning difference between 3 criteria for Islamic Economics by sexuality and degrees.

The scope of this paper is justice in micro level and particularly market justice from three different but related paradigms: The ancient Greek philosophical paradigms (by emphasis on Aristotle's thought), Christian scholastic paradigm in medieval era (by emphasis on St. Thomas Aquinas thoughts) and jurisprudence paradigm in Islamic civilization (by emphasis on Allame Helli and Ibn Taimiyah' s attitude). Based on their ethical approach, Aristotle and scholastic scholars considered justice virtue as an essential principle that dominates all the social and economic relations. Scholastic's just price doctrine had three main sources: Aristotle theoretical approach to justice, Romanists practical approach to exchange, and moral approach of Christianity. Based on these sources, Scholastics concluded that because necessity (nassesitas) determines both market price and commodity value, the values that are exchanged in common (competitive) market are equivalent and thus the market price is just. Though Muslim jurisprudent had not an independent doctrine about the just price, in the problems such as pricing (Tas' eir) and usurpation (Ghasb) studied price and value implicitly. The hypothesis of this paper is that Muslim jurisprudent and specifically Allameh Helli and Ibn Taimiyah consider "the price of the equivalent" (gheimat-ul-mesl) is just and this price is determined in common market (a market without intervention and manipulation such as hoarding and monopoly and asymmetric information); that is, this price reflects common collective evaluation of commodities.

The paper tries to provide a new methodology for the analysis of the Musharekah contract as an Islamic finance instrument. For this sake, the Musharekah contract is comparatively analyzed using the game theory (principle agent). Considering the fact that the information set between principle (bank) and the agent (customer) might be symmetric or asymmetric, the Musharekah Contract is analyzed in two different cases in the extended form of the games and the best strategy which leads to the maximum profit is shown. It should be noted that in the case of symmetric information, the cost of contract is low and information rent is not available. In this context, the Musharekah Contract becomes operational just by considering the condition of Musharekah. However, in the case of asymmetric information, the provision of the Musharekah contract gets complex and if the bank faces the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, the condition for satisfaction of Musharekah Contract will be different. This paper discuses different situations using the extended form of games.