THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL RESEARCH (AFAGHE HEKMAT)
Year:2012 | Volume:1 | Issue:1|Papers Count:7

From Avicenna’s viewpoint, the contingency is the cause of effect’s need for a cause. But he has not meant the contingency which is equally related to existence and non-existence. Instead, by the contingency he has meant the contingent whose existence becomes necessary upon the existence of its cause. So he believed that not only inception (huduth) is not able to justify effect’s need for a cause in the continuance, but it cannot make clear its need in coming to existence. Therefore, he insists on existence strictly as an essential factor of effect’s need for a cause, the existence which acquires its necessity through its cause. This expression is very close to Mulla Sadra’s viewpoint on existential contingency even both are the same.

Bada’ or the mutability of God’s will, is one of the major teachings of the Shi’ite theology. This concept from the earliest times has drawn Muslim scholars’ attention to itself. Because of its opposition to divine omniscience some scholars have hesitated over it and tried to reject it and the others have tried to analyze and support it. In this respect, paying attention to the usage of this expression in the Divine Book and the Transmitted Traditions is very critical for analyzing it, because its understanding depends on the deep recognition of religious teachings. By quoting valid opinions, this essay tries to survey and criticize the views of Muslim scholars about Bada’.

From Suhrawardi’s viewpoint, what is actualized in the external reality is called ipseity (huwiyya). The ipseity is the same as individuation. When these things come to mind they will be divided into two intellectual concepts, i.e. existence (wudjud) and quiddity (mahiyya). Suhrawardi believes that existence, quiddity and other philosophical concepts are intellectual abstractions. In the actual world there is no otherness or distinction between these philosophical concepts and ipseity, and all of these philosophical concepts are the means of intellectual analysis of reality, so any distinction leads to infinite regress. Therefore, Suhrawardi believes in realism or fundamental reality of ipseity and from his viewpoint ipseity is a relative concept, just like existence.

This article is going to discuss the different meanings and usages of the word metaphysics in the Kant’s philosophy. Kant’s definition of metaphysics is one of the most controversial issues in his philosophy. Generally, according to Kant, this word has three different meanings:1. The unattributive meaning or the substantive meaning.2. The genitive meaning.3. The meaning of the participle or qualificative meaning.The first meaning consists merely of the word metaphysics as a noun. The second meaning includes genitive terms such as metaphysics of morality, metaphysics of rights, metaphysics of nature and etc. The third meaning includes qualificative terms such as metaphysical exposition, metaphysical dogmatism, and etc. Among these meanings Kant only criticizes the first one.

In this article the consistency of proving the absurdity of metempsychosis (tanasukh) and believing in metamorphosis (maskh) will be surveyed. So, after defining the metempsychosis and mentioning its divisions, we collect all reasons why the transcendent theosophists reject the idea of metempsychosis as absurd. Then, regarding the opinions of these philosophers about the nature and reality of the metamorphosis, we show that those reasons are not fit for rejecting the metamorphosis. Finally we come to this result that proving the absurdity of metempsychosis and believing in metamorphosis are completely consistent.

Human spirit in his trans-substantial and intensifying motion toward ascending ark (qaws su‘udi) goes up to a level in which he deserves to receive some kinds of internal impulses (khawatir). These internal impulses are divided into two types: some of them come from God which are revealed to man’s heart and are called divine inspiration (ilham) and others come from evil sources and are called evil inspiration or temptation (ilqa’). Divine inspiration occurs either through a mediator or directly and without mediator. Therefore, the mediated inspiration are mediated or explained by a mediator, usually an angel. Ilqa’, the exact opposite of ilham, is a demonic inspiration. The straggle between angelic and demonic forces, in man’s heart, is an unending straggle. Dhikr (reciting the names of God) pushes the demonic forces away so the angelic ones will become dominant. It happens when all forces of man’s soul completely cooperate with each other, under the dominance of Divine Power (quwwa qudsiya). But when man’s soul engages in sensual desires and ignores God’s remembering the estimative faculty (quwwa wahmiya) will become dominant and it provides an opportunity for demonic forces. This straggle will continue until one side triumph over the other. However, in most people, because of the dominance of sensual desires, evil forces will become victorious.

According to the Rumi’s words, death is a two-sided concept which is described either as unpleasant thing or pleasant and sweet. From his viewpoint, soul is the true nature of man which is imprisoned in the body for a while. One who ignores this fact, and recognize the physical body as the true self, is a dead person. Therefore, men who become attached to this world are like the dead to whom the dark and tight atmosphere of the grave seems bright and wide. In this sense, life and death are equivocal concepts and their gradations are determined by the closeness and remoteness of man toward God. Knowledge which has its own gradations brings closeness. So, one who has more knowledge is more close to God and more alive. However, for Rumi death has another meaning and this is what the mystics are eager to achieve. He describes this kind of death as the mystical union and removing the veil. By quoting Rumi’s words and analyzing them according to his mystical views, this essay tries to become close to the Rumi’s vision of life and death.