KNOWLEDGE (JOURNAL OF HUMAN SCIENCES)
Year:2012 | Volume:- | Issue:66/1|Papers Count:7

Illuminationist philosophy or Oriental wisdom is a kind of theosophical philosophy that Suhrawardi describes methodically in his work. Shaikh al-Ishraq saw him as a focal point of wisdom, that two branches of legal heritage (Hermes) was found to have reached that point again. Principles in his book ‘Hikmat-iishraq’ are three-steps in which a philosopher achieves enlightenment. In the first step, he must avoid from the world, the second step is to see the divine light path (specific experience), and in the final one, he attained the illumination for his unlimited knowledge. At this level he seems to know the degrees of all levels of existence and evolution of light. This Light always considered by religions including Judaism, Christianity and Islam that mysticism, is also presented. Islamic philosophy of Farabi, Ibn Sina and Ghazali have more than others due to light, but none so much that Suhrawardi did mean to do any of these ideas. So knowledge among all ranks and degrees of existence is the light of evolution. Light concept is a logical axiom, light consistency and appearance is represented others.

Derrida wants to challenge western’s philosophical basis by deconstruction method, althouth the deconstruction does not mean concrete and not an independent entity. In Derrida’s words, it is like a dead virus with the host body that is in motion. He believes foundations of western’s thought is based on double concepts, so that always rely on concept of presence; decent, honest, good, man, speech.... the deep bond with each other, means the central figure of the Logos sweep paradigm. One of this double and powerful concepts is speech /writing that speech, on Derrida’s viewpoint, dominate writing. Derrida’s works are stage that writing wants to speak. But Nasir Khosrow has seen relation of writing and speech with epistemological perspective. He believes that speech and writing are the successive and necessary of knowledge process. He notes that speech and writing connect together with dialectical way.

The French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-1984) following Nietzsche, criticized the foundations of western metaphysical. He tried to explain different forms of ‘otherness’- alterity- referring to those who are marginalized and excluded from power positions, through disclosure and subversion of the canons and self-explanatory principles. Madness can be considered one of these forms of otherness as Foucault found it in modern era’s artistic works. Foucault considered Francis Goya’s paintings as leading us out of what the power structure decided. In this study, the relationship and interaction between Foucault’s ideas regarding artistic madness with Nietzsche’s Dionysian principle is analyzed; the interaction of these two views with each other and with the artistic madness depicted in Goya’s works is also studied. By giving evidence from Modern art particularly from Goya’s works, artistic madness form Foucault’s view is explained and considered as a form that make freedom possible out of the dominant power structures.

The influence of the soul on the material world and peculiar topics such as covetousness has always been matters of challenge. Avicenna, through the tenth part of Isharat, tried to prove them possible. He believes that those who consider direct contact, sending parts and creating quality through a mediator as the only exclusive ways of influencing on objects, believe in the unlikeliness of them. Avicenna, however does not accept this limit. According to him, exerting influence on something does not require direct contact with them, or sending parts toward them, or creating qualities in them via a mediator. Isharat Commentators (Khaje Nasir al-din Tousi and Fakhr al-Razi) have not proposed a thorough interpretation of the point. This essay elaborates how Avicenna challenges the point and explains the ways to influence on objects.

The contemporary debate about Moral Realism, a century after it began with G. E. Moore, has many complexities. In large part this is because those who have written about Moral Realism, have obvious differences about its subject matter: The fundamental problem is that there is no agreement as to the meaning of realism in ethics. Moral Realism is a kind of ‘metaethical’ position which covers a variety of theories and it is hardly possible to give a description of it that is both comprehensive and included all its content. If we wanted to bring different metaethical views which have been considered ‘realist’ in one single description, we would be able just to say ‘all of them claim that morality is somehow independent of people’s “attitudes” or behaviours. However the important issue is exactly this ‘somehow’: in which way is moral reality is independent of non-moral reality? In response to this question, a moral realist can opt for different levels of moral realism (provided that s/he be able to defend her/his position). In this paper, I have recognized four levels to being a realist about morality, and contend that a robust moral realist (who accept all its implications) has no other option than to be a realist on all levels.

From Aristotle’s point of view, in ejection adversary movement, the movement is continued through transmitting driving force to the layers of intermediate environments. Yahya Nahvi criticizes Aristotle’s theory and believes that every movement, consisting of natural or adversary movement take place due to internal Dunamis Endotheisa, in addition contrary to Aristotle’s perception, the natural movement of objects is not for reaching a natural place and celestial movement is not being continued due to environmental force but due to the transmission of a non-material force from motive to movable, a spontaneous movement is created in the movable and it causes the continuation of movement. There are many doubts and questions about Yahya Nahvi’s theory of movement: Is this internal force existent in the object before movement? If any, why has not the force not caused movement? If movement is spontaneous why is the movement of object stopped? Does the object consume its internal force spontaneously? After a criticism of Nahvi’s theory of movement, Avicenna propounds his theory which will be discussed in this article.

Hume’s skepticism is funded on two main bases, that is, criticizing the faculties of cognition and criticizing the content of cognition. Hume, on the one hand, critized reason and sense and maintained that these are not able to gain authentic knowledge, on the other hand, he criticized the content of cognition and proposed “No Impression, No Idea” as well as “Hume’s Fork” as indications to recognizing illusionary concepts and statements from the real ones. By applying his principles, Hume employed two strategies i.e argumentative strategy and genetic strategy in order to refute the reality of special concepts and statements such as causality (as an a priori concept). In the former he tried to show that there is no argument attesting the reality of the concept doubted or validity of the statement doubted. In the latter he tried to show how we believe in concepts and statements which do not have rational bases. Hume took advantage of another principle called the “association of ideas” in the second strategy. Applying this principle, Hume explained how some illusionary concepts are formed. In this paper, we elucidate the topics mentioned along with their assessment.