MORAL REALISM AND REASON-GIVINGNESS OF MORALITY

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SANEI MANOOCHEHR; ASGHARI SEYED ALI

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Journal: KNOWLEDGE (JOURNAL OF HUMAN SCIENCES) Year:2012 | Volume:- | Issue:66/1 Page(s): 77-107

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Information Journal Paper

Title

MORAL REALISM AND REASON-GIVINGNESS OF MORALITY

Author(s)

SANEI MANOOCHEHR | ASGHARI SEYED ALI | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

MORAL REALISMQ2

MORAL FACTQ2

NORMATIVITYQ2

ATTITUDESQ2

NATURALISMQ2

NON-NATURALISMQ2

Abstract

The contemporary debate about MORAL REALISM, a century after it began with G. E. Moore, has many complexities. In large part this is because those who have written about MORAL REALISM, have obvious differences about its subject matter: The fundamental problem is that there is no agreement as to the meaning of realism in ethics. MORAL REALISM is a kind of ‘metaethical’ position which covers a variety of theories and it is hardly possible to give a description of it that is both comprehensive and included all its content. If we wanted to bring different metaethical views which have been considered ‘realist’ in one single description, we would be able just to say ‘all of them claim that morality is somehow independent of people’s “attitudes” or behaviours. However the important issue is exactly this ‘somehow’: in which way is moral reality is independent of non-moral reality? In response to this question, a moral realist can opt for different levels of MORAL REALISM (provided that s/he be able to defend her/his position). In this paper, I have recognized four levels to being a realist about morality, and contend that a robust moral realist (who accept all its implications) has no other option than to be a realist on all levels.

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APA: Copy

SANEI, MANOOCHEHR, & ASGHARI, SEYED ALI. (2012). MORAL REALISM AND REASON-GIVINGNESS OF MORALITY. KNOWLEDGE (JOURNAL OF HUMAN SCIENCES), -(66/1), 77-107. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/248246/en

Vancouver: Copy

SANEI MANOOCHEHR, ASGHARI SEYED ALI. MORAL REALISM AND REASON-GIVINGNESS OF MORALITY. KNOWLEDGE (JOURNAL OF HUMAN SCIENCES)[Internet]. 2012;-(66/1):77-107. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/248246/en

IEEE: Copy

MANOOCHEHR SANEI, and SEYED ALI ASGHARI, “MORAL REALISM AND REASON-GIVINGNESS OF MORALITY,” KNOWLEDGE (JOURNAL OF HUMAN SCIENCES), vol. -, no. 66/1, pp. 77–107, 2012, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/248246/en

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