JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL MEDITATIONS
Year:2022 | Volume:11 | Issue:27|Papers Count:14

Abstract: Nowadays, human capital is considered as the most important asset for the development of institutions, organizations and firms. Researchers have found that enhancement of individual authenticity is the base for social improvement of spontaneous innovation, founding significant cultural progress and consequently influential industry, entrepreneurship and economy. Strengthening of human capital is obtained when individuals get enhanced spiritually. Indeed, virtue and moral ethics of the authentic individual is the most important factor for the emergence of idea novelty and pragmatic potentials of innovative forces. Applied approach to the authenticity of the creative individuals and ethics create competitive advantages in the institution, because it reduces moral vices and ensures the health of the administrative apparatus. In this article, we discuss (descriptively and interpretively) how an authentic individual, in the bed of institutions and by playing a role in the implementation of top-down and bottom-up policies, can express his innovative talents in order to achieve major progress. Also, the role of formal institutions in serving, setting disciplines and providing a healthy supportive environment for the activities of the authentic individual as well as the role of informal institutions as facilitators of participation of lower level actors has been described. In the end, it is concluded that innovation, meritocracy, livelihood prosperity and economic justice can prevail through enhancing virtue enrichment of individuals.

The present study uses an analytical-descriptive method to explain the relationship between philosophy and religion in Boethius’ Christology. For this purpose, three things are done in The Theological Treatises as a representative of Boethius’ theological views: 1. Determining and explaining the theological problem that Boethius sought to answer in Christology. 2. Explaining components such as rational explanation of “Trinity” with the help of the category of relation, precise definition of “person” and “nature” in the issue of “Trinity”, emphasizing on the distinction between nature and the person and showing weakness of the views of Euthychius and Nestorius. 3. Boethius’ final answer to this theological question. In The Consolation of Philosophy as the representative of Boethius’ philosophy, we seek to examine two issues; 1. Does this treatise, as some have claimed, lack any Christian symbolism or teaching? 2. Does Boethius explicitly question Christian teachings in this treatise, or does he not merely explicitly refer to Christianity? The study of these cases led to the conclusion that in The Theological Treatises, Boethius seeks a rational explanation that the Trinity is not a triune deity but a monotheism. He considers the common denominator in the three divine persons, that is, the category of substance, as the cause of the unity of the Trinity and the distinction between the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit as the category of relation, which, of course, does not change the substance. He, who saw in The Theological Treatises the Christian faith with a rational explanation in agreement with reason, saw no need for a direct reference to Christian teachings in The Consolation of Philosophy; he seeks the salvation of reason, and this has no conflict with his Christian faith. He first understands faith through The Theological Treatises, and then comes to the salvation of faith through The Consolation of Philosophy. Thus the Consolation of Philosophy can be considered the complement of his The Theological Treatises and Christian faith.

In the “phenomenology of the spirit”, there is evidence of absolute Identify as divine order. For Hegel, the divine order has a rational essence; therefore, the infinite divine order must be present in a finite being in order for the spirit to realize itself in the world. This movement of the spirit appears in “natural religion” and in parallel in symbolic art. “Plant Sculptures” are the first embodied form of the divine order. This primitive form is first shown as simple “columns” on which the least “work” has been done. These columns are mainly architectural components. Independent plant Sculptures are rarely found, because at this step the spirit is not free and its knowledge of itself is limited to the knowledge of plants. There are innocent in “plants religion” who lost with the onset of animal life and the resulting struggle and dynamism. With the end of natural religion and symbolic art, plant sculpture continue to repeal “Aufhebung” form in religions and the art of later periods. Plant religion is the beginning of the expression of the divine commandment embodied in religions

: The development of computer science – especially in the field of artificial intelligence – has led to the formation of digital theology. Digital theology saw all the phenomena of the universe from the perspective of computer science. Frank Tippler explains the bodily resurrection by presenting Omega Point theory and a digital definition of humans and tries to reconcile it with religious teachings –Christianity in particular. This article explains and evaluates the Omega Point theory according to the basics. We conclude that this is not based on solid foundations. Fundamentals such as the singularity of technology are flawed and the final principle of entropy is not scientific. This theory – contrary to Christian teachings – is atheistic and leads to incorrect results and supplies such as the negation of divine attributes. The Omega Point in justifying the wisdom of the resurrection and explanation of the purgatory world, the reward and the eagle of the hereafter are powerless.

Considering the correspondence between the levels of existence and the levels of perception in Suhrawardi’s thought, a new definition of science can be presented, the validity of which is generally different from other theories in the field of knowledge. In the school of enlightenment, “intuition” is considered as a great support for understanding the deep degrees of truth, which can be achieved through the world of imagination and the promotion of the realm of human enlightenment. The present article intends to study the coordinates of this type of scientology in the wisdom of illumination with a descriptive-analytical method, and through this it can explain its educational results in accordance with the results of this research “Gradual evolution” The degree of “perception” and, consequently, the “recognition of different understandings of a single truth” in such a way that it does not lead to skepticism and reprehensible relativism. There are two main consequences of the theory of intensity science, the realization of which depends on the implementation of the definition and dimensions of the theory of intensity science and the adoption of appropriate solutions in the educational system; therefore, it seems that the vast capacity of the wisdom of enlightenment in inferring the various dimensions of education and improving the components of the educational system, such as the principles, results and strategies of education, is undeniable.

The Humean theory of motivation maintains that cognitive states like beliefs lack motivating force. If an agent were to be motivated to perform an action, s/he would necessarily have a preceding desire Φ and a means-end belief that by Ψ-ing she would be able to satisfy Φ. Although different accounts of this theory have been provided so far, in this paper we will examine the account according to which satisfying the preceding desire is the only basis for motivating someone to choose actions. This paper attempts to show that although the Humean theory of motivation as described above is considered a standard view in explaining intentional actions, it may encounter considerable difficulties to make plausible distinctions between the right and wrong kinds of motivations. In order to demonstrate that, we will first explain Bernard Williams’ Humean view and then discuss that ordinary people not only draw distinctions between de re and de dicto motivations, and between self-regarding and other-regarding motivations, but also think that moral agents normally have reasons to be motivated according to the right kind of these motivations in the relevant circumstances. Finally, we shall design a thought experiment to illustrate the point more strikingly. It seems that a plausible theory of motivation in meta-ethics should accommodate these intuitive and common-sensical sorts of distinctions, while the Humean theory of motivation lacks this feature.

The world's population is growing exponentially, and people are facing significant problems such as hunger and extreme malnutrition. According to some people, the production of genetically modified foods can be a good solution to provide healthy and adequate food and, thus, solve global hunger. The production of genetically modified foods has faced much opposition. A group of opponents, by presenting theological reasons, consider the production of genetically modified foods to be immoral and disgusting on their own, regardless of the consequences. This paper seeks to examine and critique the most important theological reasons for opposing the production of genetically modified foods, such as playing the role of God, crossing species boundaries, violating the intrinsic value of plants and animals, and changing creation. The results show that these reasons are not sufficiently convincing and cannot prove the immorality of the production of genetically modified foods, although this is not necessarily the case.

As Kierkegaard has explained, humankind’s pain is recognized with its individuality. But, what happens for the pain during a prevalent disaster, and what changes does it go through? Can generality of a disaster always help anyone to endure the pain? Does the generality leave any room for helping those who are all affected? Is there no difference among all kinds of pains in terms of their requirements for enduring or overcoming the individual pain? Such questions lead us to reconsider the relationship between the individuality of pain and the generality of calamity based on Kierkegaard’s meditations, especially because he himself did not engage with this issue exactly. In his book, Sickness unto death, signed by a pseudonym called Anti-Climacus, as a representative of a special existential condition, he takes a look at the meaning of pain that is deeply related to concept of despair, which is the basis of our analysis. In this article, by using an approach we call “Anti-Climacian”, we conclude that the individuality of pain in the context of a general disaster may prevent the lonely person form pursuing a three-staged dialectical movement to set free from despair.

During the twentieth century, the theological tradition of eschatology was adversely affected by the outcomes of World Wars and social and political catastrophes, according to Protestant Jürgen Moltmann. In his view, God the Father sent His Son to transform the current order of the world radically, but powerful enemies crucified Him. God, however, thwarted their plan with the resurrection of Christ. Using the New Testament as a basis, Moltmann supports taking into account the promised order for the world that would allow the Christian hope to be realized. The new order contains dimensions that are applicable to contemporary problems. Moltmann’s eschatology is thus temporal, contextual, and inclusive. His eschatology has unique innovations in twentieth-century Christian theology, particularly in the way that he approaches the critique of traditional eschatology, the inclusion of hope, the social formulation of hope praxis, as well as the conceptualization of the future in his historical hope. Nevertheless, this eschatology is confronted with problems such as how psychological hope can be established, the inconsistency of his Pneumatology and the extraordinary nature of Christian hope, doubts about the methodological success of theological imagination, and ambiguity in the interaction between linear time and eternal time.

Among the arguments for God's Existence in the Islamic philosophy and kalam, the proof of the truthful (Burhān-i ṣiddīqīn) has a unique position due to its merits. Invented by Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), it soon received a noticeable reception from his followers who tried to present new versions of the proof. Among the post-Avicennian Imāmī theologians, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) set forth an important, new version of the proof of the truthful in his theological treatise entitled Fūṣūl, which is known by some of later Imāmī theologians as an innovative version of the proof. The gist of his argument is that since contingent beings are not beings in themselves, nor can be by themselves the cause for something to exist, there must be a necessary existence among the beings of the universe. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s innovative version of proof of the truthful and its effects on and reception by the later theological and philosophical works has not received much attention in the recent researches so far. Present article, discussing and analyzing al-Ṭūsī’s innovative version of the proof, points out that some of the Muslim theologians paid considerable attention to it and set out various versions of the proof in their writings.

The relation between film and philosophy is not so easy that firstly seems. On the one hand, philosophers discuss the nature of film and, for example, ask: what makes a recording a work of art? And, on the other hand, some filmmakers attempt to utilize philosophical themes in their works and produce philosophical movies. But it is not the whole story, and a third claim has been proposed in recent dedicates: Some movies can philosophize. This new approach usually is called “film as philosophy”, “film-philosophy”, or “filmosophy”. Several arguments have been advanced in defense of this hypothesis, and every defender of this claim has proposed their own explanations. In this essay, we try to show from a different position, that movies can do philosophy in six ways. That is, there are movies that make an account of a philosophical point, movies that ask some philosophical questions, movies that defend or deny a philosophical position, movies that propose a philosophical thesis, and movies that remind us important things.

The purity of the ‘Pure Theory’ demands the separation of law from morality. Therefore, Kelsen tries to offer the ideal form of legal statements which are distinguishable from morality. In his traditional theory, with its substantial normativity, he sustains this independency by proposing the category of imputation as a conditional statement, as opposed to imperatives of morality. Here, norm addressees are authorities, not legal subjects. Nonetheless, the normativity of his positivism leads to deontic form of obligation which is univocal in both law and morality. It means that the basis of ‘ought’ in both fields is the rational necessitation which gives the basic norm – as a source of normativity of any legal system – a moral character. Kelsen was aware of the problem; hence his theory of empowerment. In the second theory, ‘ought’ has a meaning of competency to exercise power. Now, obligation is not more a first-hand concept in legal theory. Therefore, the ideal form of law is neither deontic nor imperative and norm addresses are authorities. Therefore, the form is the purest.

In this essay, we intend, in the first place, to seek out a theory of the meaning of life from the view of the first Wittgenstein with a focus on Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. However, exegetical works on Tractatus Logico-philosophicus have culminated in the impossibility of speaking about a theory of the meaning of life from the view of Wittgenstein because all of them, in one way or another, accepted the face value of the article 6.54 and 7, that is, to leave meta-scientific propositions. Hence, the first part of the essay delves into the analysis of this problem and suggests an interpretation of Tractatus which resolves this issue. This is done by adopting a grammatical-transcendental reading. After this, different possible Wittgensteinian answers to the problem of life, Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, are offered and scrutinized. Finally, the best answer is offered based on Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophicus for a theory of the meaning of life. He believes the meaning of life requires a kind of eternity which does not last a very long time but is neither timeless.

In the peripatetic philosophy, there are two views on self-awareness: the idea that claims self-awareness depends on the cognition of other things (cognition-dependent self-awareness) and the views that state self-awareness is a permanent phenomenon and can be directly accessed through introspection. The former idea is often attributed to Aristotle and the latter opinion stated by Avicenna who believed in the inseparability of human nature and self-awareness. Although Aquinas was a proponent of cognition-dependent self-awareness, he tried to preserve the benefits of the opponent view (eg. Preserving first person perspective, our introspective intuitions and ontological self-identity) and reduce deficiencies and ambiguities of Aristotle’s theory by proposing Habitual and actual self-awareness. In my view, he was somehow successful in the second task, but he couldn’t pass some objections on cognition-dependent self-awareness and benefit from the consequences of the first one due to the purported gap between the unconscious habitual self-awareness and the conscious actual one.