The Right and Wrong Kinds of Motivations: An Argument against the Humean Theory of Motivation

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Heydarpour Muhammad; Dabbagh Hossein

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Paper Information

Journal: JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL MEDITATIONS Year:2022 | Volume:11 | Issue:27 Page(s): 171-202

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Title

The Right and Wrong Kinds of Motivations: An Argument against the Humean Theory of Motivation

Author(s)

Heydarpour Muhammad | Dabbagh Hossein | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

de re and de dicto motivationsQ4

self-regarding and other-regarding motivationsQ4

sincere actsQ4

reasons for the right kind of motivationsQ4

Abstract

The Humean theory of motivation maintains that cognitive states like beliefs lack motivating force. If an agent were to be motivated to perform an action, s/he would necessarily have a preceding desire Φ and a means-end belief that by Ψ-ing she would be able to satisfy Φ. Although different accounts of this theory have been provided so far, in this paper we will examine the account according to which satisfying the preceding desire is the only basis for motivating someone to choose actions. This paper attempts to show that although the Humean theory of motivation as described above is considered a standard view in explaining intentional actions, it may encounter considerable difficulties to make plausible distinctions between the right and wrong kinds of motivations. In order to demonstrate that, we will first explain Bernard Williams’ Humean view and then discuss that ordinary people not only draw distinctions between de re and de dicto motivations, and between self-regarding and other-regarding motivations, but also think that moral agents normally have reasons to be motivated according to the right kind of these motivations in the relevant circumstances. Finally, we shall design a thought experiment to illustrate the point more strikingly. It seems that a plausible theory of motivation in meta-ethics should accommodate these intuitive and common-sensical sorts of distinctions, while the Humean theory of motivation lacks this feature.

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