THEOSOPHIA ISLAMICA
Year:2023 | Volume:3 | Issue:2|Papers Count:6

Aristotle considers metaphysics a science that discusses being qua being (or "being insofar as it is being") and its essential attributes. Alongside "being qua being," he also speaks of absolute being. The multiple meanings of "being" in Aristotle's thought have led interpreters to diverse understandings of what Aristotle truly meant by "being qua being? "They would have disagreements. A disagreement that starts from ontology and impacts their theology. Among Muslim philosophers, Avicenna and Averroes (Ibn Rushd), and among Christian philosophers, Albert the Great(Albertus Magnus) and his student Thomas Aquinas, have commented on this matter. In Avicenna's view, what is meant by 'being qua being' is a universal concept that applies to all beings, including the Necessary Existent per se. Consequently, the Necessary Existent is part of the subject matter of philosophy. However, Averroes introduced the highest substance to explain "being qua being" and considered God the subject of philosophy. Consequently, he regarded the proof of God as part of the problems of natural science. In Albert the Great's view, "being qua being" is the simple existence as the first creation of God, and this simple existence is the subject of philosophy. In Thomas Aquinas's perspective, "being qua being," although the subject of philosophy, applies only to contingent beings, and God is the cause of this "being qua being." A comparative study of these disagreements and the reasons behind them forms the framework of this article.

"One of the most crucial philosophical rules and a cornerstone of rational principles is the " Nothing but the One emanates from One." This article, employing a library research method for data collection and an analytical and descriptive approach for data analysis, aims to accurately explain this rule. It also seeks to address the arguments of those who oppose the rule, as they haven't correctly grasped its underlying premises. By carefully considering these premises, we find that the "unity" referred to in the rule is not numerical unity, but rather true, real, and original unity. Furthermore, the "One" signifies a simple entity from all aspects and dimensions. "Emanation " implies direct emanation and illuminative emanation, and "homogeneity " refers to shadowy homogeneity . With these introductions, the meaning of the rule becomes clear: From the One that is simple in all respects (basīṭ min jamī' al-jihāt), by virtue of the principle of shadowy homogeneity (Senkhīyyat ẓillīyyah), and without an intermediary and with an illuminative relation (iḍāfah ishrāqiyyah), nothing but the One emanates.. Indeed, according to the elucidations of Mystics and Transcendent Philosophers (Muta'allihīn), the single effect  that emanates from the utterly simple One (God) is precisely what they call Expanded Existence or Expanded Grace.

A fundamental step in researching the intersection of Islamic mysticism (Irfan) and theology (Kalam), and in bridging these two disciplines regarding the concept of Imamate, is to ascertain if a shared understanding of Imamate's essence exists between them. Only if there's a common conceptualization of Imamate can we effectively explore its various aspects across both fields. The central question of this research is whether the core concept and characteristics of Shi'a Imamate are present within Ibn Arabi's mystical framework. It's important to clarify that this study does not aim to examine the specific linguistic term "Imamate" in mysticism; rather, it seeks to identify the meaning and reality of Imamate, even if it is not explicitly expressed through that particular word in mystical discourse. This article, using an analytical-comparative approach, examines how Khajeh Nasir considers a Perfect Definition (hadd tamm) that it includes the qualifier "by inherent right" (bi'l-aṣālah). He posits that a prerequisite for this definition is divine appointment. Therefore, this can be considered the core characteristic of the Shi'a definition of Imamate. While Ibn Arabi's terminology differs from that of Shi'a theology (kalam), the qualifier "by inherent right") bi'l-aṣālah( can be found in his writings with the same Shi'a meaning. Furthermore, he acknowledges individuals "appointed by God" after the Prophet, which serves as another expression of this very qualifier "by inherent right" )bi'l-aṣālah(. 

Ta'zieh is a national and religious performance that has, in a way, transformed into a ritual in our culture. This performance is inherently rich in elements that demand contemplation regarding their dramatic weight and significance. Ta'zieh is a fully theatrical scene; that is, the staging of a Ta'zieh possesses dramatic characteristics that can be examined from the perspective of the philosophy of theatre, which generally addresses the concepts of performance and staging. Therefore, this article seeks to discuss Ta'zieh from a philosophical perspective, analyzing its different facets and its similarities to and differences from what we commonly call theatre or drama. We aim to analyze Ta'zieh within a new framework, revealing its capacities in light of new theoretical discussions on theatre. In other words, in this article, we are looking for the intersection point of Ta'zieh and the philosophy of theatre, discussions that have largely been neglected in our research literature, all without reducing either domain—Ta'zieh or modern drama—to the other.

The issue of determinism (jabr) and free will (ikhtiyar), and humanity's role in creating its actions, is one of the oldest theological questions. When confronting it, three distinct theological approaches have emerged: determinism (jabr), delegation (Tafwiz), and an affair between two affairs (amr bayn al-amrayn). Following their religious leaders, Imamiyyah theologians have adopted the third approach. To prove and explain it, they've used numerous rational and transmitted proofs, while also critically analyzing the other two viewpoints. Although various books and articles have been written on the critical examination of the concepts of determinism (jabr) and delegation (Tafwiz), what distinguishes this research is its critical analysis of these ideas through an analytical study of the Sahifah Sajjadiyyah's supplications. This approach, in itself, offers innovation in the field of theological discussions. Ultimately, this research concludes that free will (ikhtiyar) and choice are crucial human characteristics that exist within the scope of God's will and power. By utilizing these, humans are considered the direct agents of their actions. This study employs a descriptive-analytical method, with data collected and examined through library and documentary resources.

Moral virtue is a concept that has its roots in ancient Greek philosophy and refers to characteristics or habits considered good and ethical behaviors. Greek philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle extensively discussed moral virtue. Aristotle defines virtue as a "golden mean" between two vices; for example, courage is the middle ground between recklessness and cowardice. Plato considers the soul to be composed of three parts: rational, spirited(or irascible), and appetitive. He believes that only the rational part is simple and immortal, while the other two parts are added when the soul attaches to the body, making them material and perishable. Mulla Sadra, on the other hand, views the soul as possessing faculties, which are the soul's degrees and stations. Due to its inherent simplicity, the soul encompasses all of these faculties. Both Plato and Mulla Sadra consider the principal virtues of the soul to be the four cardinal virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance (self-control), and justice. This article employs a descriptive-comparative method to examine and contrast the viewpoints of Plato and Mulla Sadra regarding virtue and moral dispositions, and their role in human happiness. It demonstrates that both philosophers, firstly, view the soul as having parts or faculties and enumerate wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice as the soul's main virtues. Secondly, it shows that Mulla Sadra's ideas concerning the soul and ethics are influenced by Plato's views.