NAMEH-YE-MOFID
Year:2007 | Volume:13 | Issue:1 (59 PHILOSOPHY)|Papers Count:10

The article seeks to deliver a short comment of Heidegger's irnterpretation of Kant's "Transcendental Logic". Unlike most of current interpretations, Heidegger holds that Kant's transcendental logic is by no means "logic' " in ordinary sense, i.e., an inquiry into understanding and the formal rules of thinking; rather it must be conceived as a kind of ontology and an investigation on the existential-ontological structures of human being in respect to the possibility of his confrontation to the being of entities or, more simply, as an effort in order to pass beyond Cartesian subjectivism and demonstration of the possibility of transcendence.

This paper reflects on Wilhelm Dithey's theory on hermeneutics. Dilthey has had a significant and continuing influence on twentieth-century philosophy and in an extensive range of scholarly disciplines. In addition to his landmark works on the theories of history and human sciences, Dilthey made important contributions to hermeneutics and the methodology of the social sciences. Therefore, this paper begins with a reflection on the concept, fundamentals of hermeneutics and, in the light of the theory, makes the major principles of hermeneutical methodology in human sciences.

Among the most pressing questions that the philosopher and the student of the foundations of mathematics confront are "what are the objects of mathematics" and "what is our knowledge of mathematics based on". The history of mathematics has shown us a number of answers to these questions. Intutionism as the foundation of mathematics was sketched by the Dutch mathematician-philosopher Luitzen Egbergtus Jan Brouwer (1881-1966). Brouwer's thoughts are complex compositions of mathematical and philosophical ideas. Others, like Poincare, Borel and Kronecker become "fore-runners of Intuitionism". Analysing Brouwer's philosophical views one meets striking resemblances with Fichte's extreme solipsistic interepretation of Kant's subjectivism, to Schopenhauer's pessimism and Bergson's intuitionism. But these mathematicians and philosophers belonged to the era of Romanticism which reached its apogee between the last decades of the eighteenth century and about 1830 or 1840. It mainly represented a revolt against the rational culture of Enlightenment. I investigate the origin of Brouwer's intuitionism, that it was deeply rooted in the cultural and social milieu of Romanticism.

By rejecting the pre-givenness of the sociopolitical order, modernity presented itself as the concrete combination of the human mind and actions in history. The amount of control and the degree of manipulation that could be inserted into the activity became the yardstick by which the rationality of any action or group of actions could be measured. The critique of counter modernism advocates an alternative to modernity, either as a return to tradition and the pre-modern social formation or as a creation of a new social order. On the contrary, the pathological study of modernity which Habermas follows still believes in the power of reason to deal with historical problems, particularly in their sociopolitical aspect.By reconsidering the role of human reasoning as the core of the new age, in the life of human beings, it tries to redefine modernity. By considering modernity as the offshoot of de-centered human inter-subjectivism, which emerges from a particular life-context, Habermas delivers the concept of modernity from Euro-centrism, dominant in the debates on modernization.The study believes that Habermas' normative attitude provides us with a value-based view of modernity and therefore rejects all inhumanities which may be committed in the name of modernity in society. Defining rationality as the outcome of communicative interaction of a community which is saddled on a particular context, does not allow us to describe modernity as a mere offshoot of Western rationality. Hence, it does not necessitate the equalization of modernization with Westernization. This study believes that Habermas' explanation of modernity as an "unfinished project" opens new opportunities to our particular situation. The situation in which our societies are swinging between tradition and modernity, while neither can be considered traditional nor modern.

It has been said that the basis of modem aesthetics should be sought in Kant's critical philosophy. Though, in works of thinkers prior to him such as Baumgarten, Hutchson or Shaftesbury, traces of aesthetic reflections may be found. In this field as other fields of Kant's thinking we observe some sort of evolution; but, taking into account Kant's third Critique, it is of paramount importance to introduce and explain his main questions, his approach to the transcendental issues or necessary and universal principles of aesthetic statements. In the field of Kant's aesthetics, forms of statements- i.e. aesthetic statements- are considered under four categories-quality, quantity, relation, and modality-; and thus, Kant's innovation does not seem to be of much importance; Kant's approach to discuss and investigate the "transcendent", find its principles as related to the cognitive faculties, and justify its conditions and attendants is preceded by reflections of some thinkers such as Longenius; results of Kant's reflection and distinctions made by him in this field are completely innovative, and of course disputable. In this article, while making a brief review of the issue and introducing considerations of some commentator's of Kant's works, the author tries to have a look at results of his analysis.

Principality of Cogitant in Descartes' Philosophy reduced "God" from "I am that exist" to a philosophical principle. Therefore, "the creator of nature" replaced the God of religions. This result was the origin of a metaphisycal problem for the followers of Descartes.Malebranch, in solving the problem, counted God as the only true cause, both in the human epistemologic system and in natural causal system; and tried to establish a strong relation between God and the universe by his "occasionalism".The solution of Spinoza was the belief in the unity of substance. When there is nothing other than one substance there will not be other than one nature; and its other name is God. The meaning of one substance contains every thing, God or nature: from two points of view both natura naturans and natura naturata. Thus, he left the traditional meaning of God.The philosophy of Leibniz, like that of Malebranch, was God centered; not only in the meaning has that God, in his view, has central importance but also in the meaning that "all the universe is in a center and the spirit of this center is God".In spite of accurate attempts of these rationalists to explain God, "the infinitely complete being" of Malebranch, natura naturans" of Spinoza and "monad of monads" of Lebnitz, like "infinite substance" of Descartes differ from God of religions.

Plato's Theory of forms is one of the most controversial philosophical theories. With this theory Plato tries to establish a rigid and solid basis for intellectual knowledge. But his theory leads to an implausible gap and separation between the intelligible and sensible worlds. Aristotle, as the first critic of Plato's theory, disagrees with different aspects of his theory, especially the separation it leads to.Mulla Sadra in the history of philosophy is the first philosopher who could remove the separation and gap between the sensible and intelligible world. According to his philosophical bases, the intelligible and sensible entities are two levels of one reality which is the reality of existence. He also denies the Platonic theory of preexistence of human soul. Hence, unlike Plato, he interprets human knowledge as a kind of establishment not remembrance.

Is there any domain beyond reason that is paradoxical and the oppositeof reason?This question always makes mysticism face philosophy. Therefore the two domains of reason and beyond reason and the relation between them have been always attended to by the Gnostics and students of gnosis and religion in both the Christian West and Islamic East. W.T. Stace maintained that the judgments of the domain of reason are paradoxical, interpreting a phrase of Meister Eckhart.Mulla Sadra has offered an interesting thesis in this field interpreting Aynolgozat and Ghazalis words. This thesis reveals minute details that have been ignored. In this paper we have used comparative method to show the depth of his view.

One of Mulla Sadra's thoughts on the subject of perception is that the subsistence of sensible and imaginal perceived forms by the mind is a subsistence of issuing (qiyam-e-soduri) and not subsistence of inhering (qiam-e-holuli). According to this idea our minds do not accept forms, but bring them to existence. To begin with, what's the position of this idea in his theory of knowledge, and how does this thought cohere with his principles and philosophy? Secondly, he rejects innate knowledge for humans and acknowledges that we gain it. Therefore how can our mind that is to come by intelligible forms, creat them? In this article, by giving a different and not quite new account of Mulla Sadra's theory of knowledge, I deal with the problem of subsistence of issuing.