JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC DENOMINATIONS
Year:2020 | Volume:6 | Issue:12|Papers Count:15

An important theory regarding the language of the Qur’an is the argot view. Generally speaking, there are two versions of the theory mainly held by Bāṭinī esoteric interpreters of the Qur’an and Akhbārīs. On this theory, the Qur’an is addressed to, and understood by, only a certain group of people. The two intellectual currents cite Quranic verses and hadiths in order to substantiate their claim as the only correct and predominant understanding of the Qur’an. The main challenge for the two intellectual currents was their treatment of reason and its place in Quranic exegesis. Both currents ignore the place of reason in Quranic understanding and knowledge, dismissing it as limited and unreliable. This paper is an inquiry into their treatment of Quranic exegesis, particularly their focus on reason’s source; the inquiry deploys a descriptive and analytic method. The two influential exegetical strands hold an exclusivist view of Quranic understanding, and despite differences in their history and goals, they both agree over the rejection of reason in face of explicit text.

For over a century now, the idea of approximation has been propounded by reformers of Islamic denominations in scholarly, cultural, social, and political milieus. This paper aims to account for legitimacy of the relation of the idea of approximation of denominations with religious facts and realities. The idea of approximation can serve as a legitimate and appropriate path for followers of Islamic denominations to knowledge of religious facts and realities. Thus, we deploy a library-documentary method with a descriptive-analytic approach in order to interpret and analyze Quranic verses that seem to be concerned with the issue, and then verses that imply the permissibility of approximation in general and by way of priority. The investigation requires an accurate understanding of the function of approximation of denominations, which might serve as a right ground for inquiring into, and discovering, religious facts and realities among followers of the denominations. Lack of such understanding might lead followers of Islamic denominations to extremes of excess and negligence concerning religious matters— which are at odds with the true mission of the religion. Thus, it has been emphasized that the idea of approximation is not an end in itself, although it is a rational necessity as a preparation and as a right bedrock for the discovery of religious truths and realities and the discourse of peaceful coexistence of Muslims in accordance with religious brotherhood as opposed to the discourse of division, enmity, and excommunication.

Since early centuries AH in the Islamic world, various interpretations were proposed for certain Quranic verses and the Prophet’s hadiths—attributes in these texts were later dubbed as “transmitted attributes” (al-ṣifāt al-khabariyya): attributes ascribed to God in religious texts, although it rationally seems impossible to ascribe them to Him in their literal meanings. Various accounts have been proposed of how they should be ascribed to God: anthropomorphism, interpretivism, and relegationism. In their analysis of such attributes, Salafis have adopted relegationism: ascription of the attributes to God, without interpreting them away. They do ascribe transmitted attributes to God in their literal meanings, although they acknowledge their failure to understand their quality. The Salafi semantics of transmitted attributes implies divesting God of His attributes, the denial of linguistic miracles of the Qur’an, and the impossibility of self-knowledge. This paper adopts an analytic-critical approach to consider the Salafi semantics of transmitted attributes. Their account contradicts the connotations and even apparent denotations of verses in which people are commanded to reflect and reason. Furthermore, the denial of the linguistic miracle of the Qur’an is not compatible with its eloquence.

Salafism as a school is based on a particular conception of foundations and methods of kalām. It was founded by Ibn Taymiyya al-Ḥarrānī. In our time, the advent of neo-Salafism has presented profound challenges to certain traditional Salafi beliefs. Neo-Salafists have adopted different strategies as a consequence of their encounters with traditional Salafi theology and the requirements of the modern world. Some of these strategies include: interpreting away the transmitted attributes as far as attribute-monotheism is concerned (Sayyid Qutb); taking the traditional Salafi reflection on attributes as fruitless; negligence of attribute monotheism on part of prominent traditional Salafists such as Muhammad Qutb and al-‘Awda; rejection of the tripartite division of monotheism to which traditional Salafists generally adhered; providing a reinterpretation of lordly and divine monotheism; replacing inner beliefs and inner permissivism with bodily actions (neo-Salafists such as Sayyid Qutb and Mas‘ari); pervasiveness of excommunications in their interpretations and explanations of certain religious concepts, such as the definition of faith and disbelief as well as some problems of monotheism, government, and legislation; propounding the permissibility of rise against the ruler or legitimacy of peaceful protests by people such as al-‘Awda and al-Qarani; permitting the practice of ijtihad and disputes over the reliability of khabar al-wāḥid (a hadith transmitted by one person).

Since the Wahhabi current has flourished in the Sunni world and has led to violence against other Muslims, particularly Shi‘ as, it is of great importance to study abnormalities of this sect. The Wahhabi current has several dimensions, including beliefs, social behavior, jurisprudential rulings, and political approaches. In this paper, we deploy an analytic-descriptive method to consider norms governing Wahhabism in terms of three models: intellectual, doctrinal, and social. We do so by analyzing Wahhabi beliefs, rulings, and practices. We then identify the roots and grounds of pessimism through a description of how the three models affect each other. Moreover, we consider the Prophet’ s practice in order to elicit his favored social behavior, and then we contrast the model to the norms governing Wahhabism in order to uncover the fundamental difference between the two. Thus, Wahhabis’ deviation from the Prophet’ s behavioral model has paved the path for their irrational behaviors, which has resulted in pessimism toward the whole Islamic community. Furthermore, we analyze the social model underlying the Prophet’ s practice in order to consider global popularity as a significant factor in Islam, and then we evaluate Wahhabis’ socialpolitical behaviors.

Throughout different times and places as well as audiences, some sermons and talks of Sayyid al-Shuhada’ (Imam al-Husayn the Master of the Martyrs) has undergone changes in certain accounts of Ashura. Reliable Zaydi sources were not immune from such changes. Such hadiths in Zaydi sources can be divided into two categories: first, those that are not solely cited in Zaydi sources, and can indeed be found in Imami and Sunni sources as well, such as Imam al-Husayn’s letter to Banū Hāshim, his sermon in Dhū Ḥusam’s house, and his conversation with Ṭirimmāḥ ibn ‘Adiyy; second, those that are merely cited in Zaydi sources. Indeed, if they are to be found in Imami sources, they must have been transmitted from Zaydi sources: examples of this include the “death is inscribed” (khuṭṭ al-mawt) sermon. This paper deploys a descriptive-analytic method to compare accounts of Ashura in both categories of reliable Zaydi, Imami, and Sunni sources, showing that audiences or times and places have changed through changes in these accounts. We argue that negligence of these changes might occasion inaccurate analyses of these accounts.

Aside from some of their roots and tendencies, it is right to consider People of the Truth (Ahl al-Ḥ aqq) as an old strand of Islam, some of whose thoughts and practices have Shiite traces. Although all of their groups of families have been similarly considered and judged as “ People of the Truth” and are said to have affinities with other religions, a reading of their written thoughts reveals deeper findings, indeed. This paper seeks to show that Ā tashbaygī s are one of the eleven families of the People of the Truth: while they believe in doctrines traditionally held by the People of the Truth, their fundamental beliefs are based on Twelver Shiism. They seek to obtain the truth by surveying the layers of ethics and mysticism via reflections on Imam ‘ Ali’ s teachings. Moreover, the inquiry indicates their naming, origin, and connection with the People of the Truth and Musha‘ sha‘ iyya. The paper deploys a descriptive-analytic approach to show who they are, where they are, and what they believe.

Throughout Islamic territories, mysticism and Sufism have manifested in a variety of orders in accordance with demands of time, place, and characters. In southern parts of Razavi Khorasan, the Sufi heritage has been preserved in the form of two Sufi orders: Naqshbandiyya and Chishtiyya. The present research is done in order to learn more about the condition, masters, practices, and dhikrs of the two orders in the contemporary period in southern parts of Razavi Khorasan. The two orders are influenced by Dīvbandī doctrines in eastern Islamic world, and are strongly tied with the religion and Sharia. Masters of these Sufi orders try hard to preserve the Prophet Muhammad’s tradition, and public appearances of their followers are in compliance with the tradition. Their major ritual practice consists in collective assemblies of dhikr. Moreover, theoretical aspects of the Naqshbandī order seem to be stronger than those of the Chishtī order.

Permissivism (ibāḥa) is a threat to religious communities. It originates from several factors, including ghuluww (exaggeration). A brief consideration of the history of permissivism reveals that wherever there was exaggeration, it was followed by permissivism. In other words, without exaggeration, there will be no ground for permissivism. In this paper, we will begin by providing an account of permissivism exhibited by exaggerators, and then criticize their justifications for permissivism. Since their arguments for avoiding their religious obligations are very weak, we refer to them as “justification” in the negative sense of the term. What is surprising is their tendency to such thought, which arises in turn from their indolence, ignorance, and lack of insight, as well as misuses on part of leading exaggerators and distortions by deviated rulers and statesmen. The present paper deploys an analytic approach to discover the relation between exaggeration and permissivism.

Whether the Prophet of Islam Muhammad was bewitched by Lubayd ibn A‘sam the Jewish—as narrated in some hadiths—is a conversial issue among Muslim scholars. Since it is an essential Islamic belief that the Prophet is pure from any flaws, including impacts of magic, we should see how scholars of Islamic denominations have offered theological responses to the story. Those who accept the story as plausible make resort to certain hadiths to show that the impact of magic on the Prophet’s body does not contradict his status as a prophet. On the other hand, others believe that such stories are contrary to the Qur’an, and thus, they count as khabar al-wāḥid (a hadith transmitted only by one person or very few people), which is not reliable as a ground for beliefs. In this paper, we introduce the views of Shiite and Sunni scholars concerning the story, and criticize proponents of the Prophet’s bewitchment. Thus, it is hard to demonstrate that the Prophet was bewitched, because it is incompatible with the Qur’an and the Prophet’s infallibility (‘iṣma). Moreover, Mu‘wwadhatayn (verses of refuge according to which the Prophet was immune from spells) were revealed in Mecca.

Wilāya (Sainthood) is the servant’s dependence on his Lord when his ego is annihilated, and this is by God’s supervision over him in order to take him to the ultimate position of proximity and annihilation of his particularities. The seal of sainthood (khatam al-wilāya) is someone who accomplishes the happiness of this world and the afterlife—and someone whose death disrupts the world’s order. Ibn ‘Arabī’s words about the seal of sainthood are confused and vague. He sometimes refers to Jesus as the seal of absolute sainthood, and sometimes he praises ‘Ali so much that he seems to see him as the seal. He sometimes refers to al-Mahdī as the seal of Muḥammadī sainthood, and at some points, he explicitly refers to others as such. Moreover, there are cases in which he refers to himself as the seal of sainthood. As confused as his words might be, Imam Khomeini clearly states that ‘Alī is the seal of absolute sainthood, because of the union of his bright reality with the Prophet Muhammad. He also identifies al-mahdi as the seal of Muhammadi sainthood. This paper seeks to articulate agreements and disagreements between Imam Khomeini and Ibn ‘Arabī over the seal of sainthood. We analyze and compare their views.

Shaykh al-Ishrāq’s reasons for the belief in the World of Image (‘ālam al-mithāl) include arguments such as the “impossibility of the incorporation of the big in the small” (inṭiba‘ al-kabīr fi-l-ṣaghīr) and “images of dream.” Since the World of Image serves as an intermediate between the material world and the world of intellects, he takes many ontological and epistemological realities to the World of Image. These realities include the formal Heaven and the Hell, formal devils and jinn, pleasant songs and smells experienced by spiritual travelers, forms of angels, origins of supernatural acts and miracles, images of dream, as well as the revelation and inspiration. Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn endorses the existence of the World of Suspended Images (al-muthul al-mu‘allaqa), but he elaborates the concept and its functions by further explaining and elaborating the thesis, on the one hand, and on the other, by considering objections to Shaykh al-Ishrāq: failure to distinguish “attached imagination” (al-khayāl al-muttaṣil) and “detached imagination” (al-khayāl al-munfaṣil), mirror images not counting as imaginal substances, and dependence of forms of sensory perceptions on attached imagination. This paper deploys an analytic-critical approach to consider Shaykh al-Ishrāq’s arguments and Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn’s objections, and then it brings their agreements and disagreements to light.

The problem of soul (or its equivalents in other languages, such as “nafs” in Arabic and “jān” in Persian) is an important issue considered by people since very old times. Philosophers and intellectuals have tried to account for it in their ontologies, and have offered different theories. For Muslim intellectuals, the problem of soul has had a special place, and a variety of remarkable theories were proposed by prominent Muslim philosophers with an eye to Quranic doctrines. This paper considers two great philosophers of the Islamic world—Ibn Sīnā (or Avicenna) and Ibn Kammūna—in order to deal with an issue concerning the soul: its “eternity or incipience.” These two philosophers had different views of the matter. In this paper, we challenge these two views: Peripatetic and Illuminationist Peripatetic. We finally criticize Ibn Kammūna’s theory of the soul’s incipience and survival.

Deficit or lack of necessary financial resources might pose a challenge to the legitimacy of a political system. Thus, every governmental system seeks to find a way out of this predicament. A common solution is to charge taxes in order to be able to afford governmental tasks. It might be claimed that this has been accepted by all communities, including the Islamic political system, as evidenced by Sharia taxes. Now if these Sharia resources fail to fulfil the needs of the Islamic government, then Islamic taxes (such as zakat and khums) should be supplemented by governmental taxes. Indeed, a tax consists in paying part of one’ s incomes to the government. With such a religious approach, taxes might be imbued with piety— in addition to their material aspects, they might lead to one’ s happiness in afterlife. Then, in order to make an optimal planning for tax collection, we need to refer to the axiological and religious system. This paper deploys a descriptive-analytic method to consider the role of taxes in the Islamic system. The findings reveal that taxes are strategic needs of governments, and the emphasis on their pious aspects facilitates their collection and ensures their enforcement.

According to Muslim mystics, monotheism is compatible with the theory of unity of existence (waḥdat al-wujūd). Some Muslim jurists believe that this amounts to the disbelief in Islam, considering its advocates as disbelievers and impure. In order to elucidate the problem, this paper seeks to elaborate the theory of “personal unity of existence” in Islamic mysticism, as well as the ruling of some jurists to the effect that advocates of such theory are disbelievers and impure. This paper shows that, from the perspective of Islamic mysticism, existence qua existence is necessary by itself. Therefore, existence is in the true sense of the term only applicable to God. This is not to say that mystics deny the existence of creatures; instead, they attribute existence to creatures figuratively and symbolically, rather than literally. We conclude that, first of all, this contradicts the jurists’ conception of unity of existence, and second, given our explanation of unity of existence, it turns out that the theory does not imply the denial of any essential religious doctrine—indeed, mystics do not deny any essential doctrine.