JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
Year:2026 | Volume:20 | Issue:54|Papers Count:37

While one version of belief in inspiration, for which the inspired human passively receives inspired deliverances, precludes human creativity, another, for which inspired compositions reflect human agency and ingenuity, presupposes it. Margaret Boden, however, suggests (in The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms (2004)) that creativity is continuous with generic human powers, and also arises through infringing recognised rules. While the former suggestion (about continuity) is argued to be readily acceptable, problems are raised for the rule-breaking account of creativity. Accounts of creativity need to be supplemented with awareness that creativity commonly involves participation in traditions of skill or craftsmanship, and in a creative community, whether rules are broken or not. Further, the continuity approach is argued to be consistent with at least one particular variant of belief in inspiration, according to which God, as the universal Creator, can communicate through the imagination of receptive minds that reflect his/her creative imagination, as suggested by Austin Farrer in ‘Inspiration: Poetical and Divine’ (1963). Other faculties as well as the imagination are held to be involved, in a manner consistent with the continuity approach: perception, memory, reflectiveness, historical awareness and artistic ingenuity.

For Edmund Husserl, the crisis of the modern sciences consists in the reduction of beings and the world to the mathematically measurable. Yet the lifeworld with its things that we fashion and use with our hands is no less real than the objects of science, and the scientific attitude is always nested within this lived world. Martin Heidegger by contrast finds the major source of our crisis in the Cartesian conception of subject and world. This has culminated in Nietzschean theory of the will to power, which in its unity with technology has despoiled our environment. In all of this Heidegger retains a tenderness for the small-scale products of human handiwork, which are preferable to machines and machine tools. In his own philosophy of technology Gilbert Simondon shares some of these concerns, whilst contending that technological objects have untapped potentials in relation to those who invent, use and develop them. Common to all these philosophies is a worry about abstract theory and mechanization reducing our direct engagement with things. This worry is compounded by a sociocultural tendency identified by Matthew Crawford, a tendency to denigrate a career in the practical trades. Drawing on Crawford’s experience of manual engagement in the world, I argue that a revalorization of such skilled work and of caring and repairing would help to ameliorate the climate and pollution crises and improve our lives. Many of our problems come from the discarding of things through our carelessness or through planned obsolescence by their makers.

The theoretical vagueness of a concept such as genius loci (spirit of the place) makes often feel unsatisfied. To avoid the widespread more rhetorical trend to attributing a spirit to every place - a trend already discernible in the progressive secularisation from the Greek world (an uncanny daimon) to the Roman world (a familiar genius) – and/or to explaining it as the outcome of creative human planning (especially architectural-urban), my paper states that a place has its specific genius only if it radiates a specific and particularly intense-authoritative atmosphere. That is, when the place is pervaded by a quasi-objective feeling that affects the perceiver and finds in their felt (or lived) body its precise sounding board. Just as there are different types of atmospheres (prototypic, derivative, spurious) and atmospheric encounters, there are therefore different types of genius loci, also depending on one's conception of space, here always understood as lived space, i.e. qualitative-anisotropic, and not in a physical-geometric (isotropic) sense. Contrary to the today’s prevailing projectivist-constructionist explanation (culturalist as well as neuroscientific) and the tendency to explain every affective quality inherent in the external world as a subjective projection, i.e. according to an hydraulic model following the Platonic “invention” of the soul, a “pathic aesthetics” based on a neo-phenomenological approach means with genius loci, in the authentic and original sense of the term, a lifewordly qualitative-emotional experience: in brief a spatialised atmospheric feeling that can sometimes be protected, maybe also improved but never arbitrarily created.

In this essay, I argue (i) for the thesis I call dignitarian neo-luddism with respect to digital technology, which says not all digital technology is bad and wrong, but instead all and only the digital technology that harms and oppresses ordinary people (i.e., people other than digital technocrats), by either failing to respect our human dignity sufficiently or by outright violating our human dignity, is bad and wrong, and therefore all and only this bad and wrong digital technology should be rejected but not—except in extreme cases of digital technology whose coercive use is actually violently harming and oppressing ordinary people, for example, digitally-driven weapons or weapons-systems being used for mass destruction or mass murder—destroyed, rather only either simply refused, non-violently dismantled, or radically transformed into its moral opposite, also (ii) that the members of what I call “the military-industrial-digital complex” are systematically harming and oppressing ordinary people like us by not only enabling but also effectively mandating our excessive use of and addiction to digital technology, which in turn systematically undermines our innate capacities for thinking, caring, and acting for ourselves, and therefore undermines our human real personhood, and thereby violates our human dignity—therefore, we ought to ban all giant AI experiments and LLM/chatbot technology while they are still in their infancy, just as we ought to have banned all atomic bomb experiments and nuclear weapons technology while they were still in their infancy.

This study aims to compare the ethical systems of Aristotle and Al-Biruni. The former was built in the ‘West’, but the latter was on the ‘Middle’ toward the ‘East’. Reviewing their literature and introducing the new concepts, this study found that while Aristotle’s system influenced Al-Biruni’s in the application of a scientific frame to ethical issues, the two systems shared a concern not for the moral judgment but for the moral agent. However, they differ from each other in the conceptualization of the agents. Aristotle’s model is the person of virtue evaluated by the golden mean, but Al-Biruni’s is the person of manliness rated by the reversibility of others. This comparison advanced the differentiation that the moral pragmatic is devoted to Aristotle’s and the moral practical to Al-Bruni’s. The study would contribute to resolving the current moral confusion and would demonstrate a model to integrate the systems of the western and eastern worlds.

In this paper, I take for granted the view of a long tradition tracing back to Kant that the content of perception is nonconceptual, nonpropositional, and iconic. However, I challenge the idea that this content is either an existentially quantified proposition (the existential view), an object-involving proposition (the particularist view), both (the pluralist view), or still that there is no fact of the matter about the elusive content of perception (Block). Instead, I propose an alternative hybrid model as the most suitable for perception, namely a mix of the representation of properties (relativistic content) and acquaintance with whatever causes the relevant token experience. Although this format is iconic or map-like, the best semantic model for understanding this relativistic content of perception is an open sentence with predicates and free variables. Since this content is neither particular nor existential, it is incomplete (at least in the light of Fregean semantics). That is, it is neither accurate nor inaccurate per se. Perceptions do not represent particulars, let alone the causal relationship between particulars or environmental conditions and the token experience. In other words, neither particulars nor causal relations belong to the content of the experience. Instead, particulars and causal relations belong to the evaluative circumstances of the content (Lewis's context-index pairs). Perceptions represent "de re" properties as accurate or inaccurate attributions to what is causally responsible for the relevant token experience.

Contemporary critical reflections of violence immensely focus on an `ever war-like condition’ that makes the state of exception a permanent possibility. Most popular perspectives of western political philosophy seem to look at a bigger picture; a bird’s eye-view of the world – looking at violence as violence of war and genocides. Every reflection is directed toward war, violence, here and there, and its effects on various human societies. Having a bigger picture is imminent. Besides this big picture we cannot overlook several micro-pictures. The bigger picture will lose its moral and political justification, this paper commits to argue, unless the claim of a permanent emergency locates itself in the manifold normalizations of everyday life that not just distort political objectivity, corrupt human nature, and create intolerant internal civic culture[s]. These instill in the civil society a dangerous indifference to the pain of the socially/politically vulnerable that greatly threatens the latter’s political sense. The single line of argument here is only when the pathologies of everyday lives is grasped only then we can comprehend more deeply the reality of war and/or violence as a permanent condition.

The emergence of the universe from "Nothing" continues to be one of the most challenging questions in both physics and philosophy. Lawrence Krauss, in his theory, identifies the quantum vacuum with "Nothing" and attempts to explain the Cosmogenesis without invoking a metaphysical cause. This study, drawing on the Fundamentality of Existence (FOE) in Mulla Sadra’s Transcendent Philosophy (al-hikmah al-muta‘āliyah), shows that the quantum vacuum possesses an ontological reality rather than being absolute Nothingness. According to Sadrian ontology, the quantum vacuum may be considered the weakest level of Existence within the gradational hierarchy of Existence (However, one may also argue—based on its proximity to immateriality and potentiality—that it paradoxically resembles a higher ontological intensity closer to Divine Simplicity. This dual reading remains open to further exploration). Furthermore, this paper critically examines Krauss’s assertion that physical laws alone suffice to account for the Cosmogenesis. From the perspective of the Fundamentality of Existence, physical laws are merely descriptive and contingent rather than self-sufficient causes. Thus, the Sadrian framework provides a deeper metaphysical foundation, revealing the limitations of Krauss’s scientific explanation and affirming that the cosmogenesis ultimately necessitates a cause beyond physical laws.

Today, it is very difficult to talk about the past and its history, let alone talk about the future, especially the philosophical future. However, since the futures studies movement has been formed in non-philosophical fields and has achieved relative success, it now seems that the time has come to address futures studies in the field of philosophy and test it in this area. This article acknowledges and addresses the availability of the objective ground and scientific background for the possibility of forming and developing a philosophical branch called the philosophy of life (of course, in a general sense and not solely focused on the purpose and meaning of life). The article's view is that life has gone beyond the limits of a scientific, social, economic, and cultural concept and has reached the level of a theoretical and philosophical concept. Also, due to the emergence of specific fields and the existence of a specific philosophical background in the last century, life has gone beyond the problematic level and has found the capacity to be at the level of a philosophical problem. Therefore, in the world of philosophy and philosophical discussion of life, it should be written with a capital L, meaning: Life, and we should wait for the emergence of a philosophical branch called philosophy of Life and also a tendency called Lifeism for it. Philosophy of Life is a reflection on life for the philosophical interpretation and expression of my life or I of life (my life/ego-life) or the subject of life, which in a way can be considered an idea for the sum of subject and Dasein. Philosophy of Life/Lifeism is distinct from realism, subjectivism, philosophy of life, vitalism, pragmatism, and existentialism. Philosophy of Life is philosophizing in the form of topics and categories such as understanding/defining life, distinguishing the subject of life from the pure subject and the dissolved Dasein in the world, important levels of life: “states”, situations, conditions”, my life among lives, interaction, language, the embodiment of life, acting and spectating in life, the authenticity and inauthenticity of life, ethics, meaning, success, model, health, livelihood, death, happiness, pleasure, style, consumption, well-being, life as a perspective, etc.

A Reviving Rationality Theory offers a knowledge-based and practical framework to rebuild rational thinking in response to the complex crisis of our time. This crisis comes from the limits of traditional rationality, modern instrumental rationality, and postmodern relativism, which have led to stagnation, alienation, environmental destruction, and theoretical paralysis. Reviving Rationality defines rationality as an evolving system of knowledge and action based on three principles: coherent epistemic pluralism, constructive criticism, and evolutionary responsibility. Using multilayered critical realism, it examines reality at four levels (empirical, event-based, structural, and evolutionary) and draws knowledge from five sources (logical reasoning, empirical experience, practical intuition, social dialogue, and historical wisdom). By solving the paradox of fallibilism through distinguishing between the content, method, and purpose of knowledge, and emphasizing human dignity as a core principle for both knowledge and action, this theory moves beyond classic dualities like structure versus freedom or individual versus society. It systematically critiques instrumental rationality, postmodern relativism, and static traditionalism, proposing a three-stage process (analysis, synthesis, decision) and four criteria (logical coherence, alignment with evidence, practical effectiveness, and ethical consistency) to evaluate beliefs and decisions. Reviving Rationality is not a return to traditional or modern rationality, nor a full acceptance of postmodern critiques; instead, it provides an evolutionary, responsible, and inclusive framework that combines the strengths of scientific methods and logical analysis with diverse knowledge sources and ethical considerations to tackle complex issues like climate change and social inequality. This framework is a theoretical tool for rational and humane thinking, open to critique and improvement.

Science seeks to discover the order present in nature and describes this order in the form of laws. Religion is a response to a Transcendent Being Who transforms our lives and gives it a meaning. Traditionally, spirituality was regarded as an integral aspect of religious experience, and spirituality and religion were inseparable.  But, the decline of organized religions and the growth of secularism in the western world have given rise to a broader view of spirituality which includes reference to those aspects of human experience which go beyond a purely materialist view of the world, without necessarily bringing in a supernatural reality. Scientific revolution started in the seventeenth century with the works of F. Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, Newton, Boyle, etc. and gave rise to the promotion of empiricism by Bacon and Galileo and the propagation of mechanical worldview by Descartes, Galileo and Newton. Gradually the power of Newtonian system impressed the scientists, and the role of God was first reduced to the initiator of the universe and with the French enlightenment it was eliminated. With the appearance of Philosophers and scientists  like Hume ,Kant ,August Comte, Marx, Darwin , Durkhim , Freud and logical positivists, empiricism became the dominant philosophy and with that metaphysics ,religion and spirituality went into the sideline.Several important currents started during the second half of the twentieth century which had a revival effect on religion and spirituality and some eminent scientists of our era –including some non-theists – have emphasized the necessity of going beyond the material features of life and paying attention to its spiritual aspects (values, meanings, etc.).

Subject: The purpose of this research is to explain the philosophical implementation of research and education simultaneously in teaching geography. Research Method: This study is fundamental research that uses a descriptive-analytical method and is based on collecting data through library and documentary-based research. This research uses philosophical thoughts, experimental backgrounds, teaching experiences, and theoretical articles and documents. Findings and Results: The findings indicate that in geography education, the philosophical foundations of geographical thoughts are not well explained to learners. This is because the use of research alongside geography education is very fragmentary. It is necessary to use political philosophies, political economy, and social theories derived from exploratory methods, which are now the elements of modern geography knowledge, as well as using analyses of geographical schools and transferring them to the new generation with appropriate research approaches.

This paper explores the philosophical relationship between Immanuel Kant's transcendental idealism and Ludwig Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy, particularly focusing on the echoes of Kant's ideas in Wittgenstein's work. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason argues that human cognition is shaped by a priori categories, which structure our experience of phenomena but leave the noumenal realm unknowable. Wittgenstein, in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, similarly examines the limits of what can be known; suggesting that language mirrors reality but also has its limits in expressing what lies beyond logic. In his later work, Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein emphasizes the social and contextual nature of meaning, developed through "language games" and "forms of life". This paper argues that while Wittgenstein shifts from Kant’s universal transcendental structures to a more pragmatic view of language, both philosophers share a concern with the limits of human knowledge and expression. Furthermore, both thinkers acknowledge the ineffable about Kant’s noumenal world and Wittgenstein’s mystical realm as crucial yet unreachable domains. This comparative analysis contributes to contemporary discussions in epistemology and philosophy of language, demonstrating the enduring relevance of Kant’s transcendental insights in Wittgenstein’s linguistic turn.

This paper explores the structure of time and the possibility of the future within it, challenging conventional linear representations of temporality. The central thesis argues that the future does not lie on a vertical line above or to the eternally far right of a horizontal timeline; rather, the it emerges logically, not merely sequentially, following the past and present. For the future to fully manifest, the past and present must be thoroughly processed and, in some sense, exhausted. However, catastrophes, which have occurred and will presumably continue to occur, disrupt the flow of time by halting the past and indicating future occurrences in unpredictable ways. Therefore, to truly engage with the future, it is sometimes necessary to revisit the past, much like in psychoanalysis, where exploring repressed experiences helps illuminate present and future trajectories. This brings us to a crucial idea of this article: history and historiography are not solely concerned with understanding past events but also with anticipating and shaping future possibilities. In this light, many future catastrophes have their roots in the past. Recognizing this dynamic allows us to see that many future catastrophes have their origins in unresolved past events, reinforcing the necessity of engaging with history not only as retrospective analysis but as a mode of future-oriented thinking.

This paper examines the question of whether artificial intelligence (AI) could ever possess consciousness or soul. While rapid advances in machine learning, neural networks, and large language models have generated speculation about machine sentience, we argue that AI remains confined to the limits of language and computation, incapable of attaining the lived, experiential dimension that defines human subjectivity. Drawing upon both Western and Indian philosophical traditions, the paper explores the ontological and phenomenological nature of consciousness, the relation between language and experience, and the metaphysical concept of soul. Through engagement with Wittgenstein, Bhartṛhari, Descartes, Husserl, Nagel, Chalmers, and classical Indian systems such as Vedānta and Sāṅkhya, we demonstrate why AI cannot transcend simulation into embodiment. Critical responses to strong AI, functionalism, transhumanism, and emergentist theories are considered, yet all fail to address the irreducibility of subjectivity and the ontological distinctiveness of soul. The conclusion reaffirms that AI’s boundaries are linguistic and computational, whereas human consciousness transcends language through lived experience, making the notion of a soulful AI both metaphysically impossible and philosophically incoherent.

The term “island disease” refers to the isolation and fragmentation of academic disciplines, a phenomenon prevalent in Iranian universities and research institutions. Specialization, while enhancing precision and depth within individual fields, often results in limited interdisciplinary interaction, leaving each discipline functioning as an isolated “island.” This fragmentation manifests in curricula that separate related subjects, minimal collaboration among faculty, and disciplinary languages that hinder cross-field understanding. Philosophical perspectives from Rumi, Jaspers, Heidegger, and Ortega y Gasset highlight the importance of holistic knowledge and the university’s role in integrating education, research, and culture. Globally, universities increasingly adopt interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary, and transdisciplinary approaches to address complex societal problems, foster innovation, and prepare students for the demands of the twenty-first century. In Iran, recent initiatives—including the University of Tehran’s College of Interdisciplinary Sciences and Technologies, interdisciplinary engineering programs at Amirkabir University, and national interdisciplinary journals—illustrate growing efforts to overcome the “island disease.” This study examines the origins, manifestations, and consequences of academic isolation in Iranian higher education and argues that interdisciplinary thinking is a necessary remedy for cultivating integrated knowledge, collaboration, and problem-oriented education.

The aim of this paper is to examine both the potential and limitations of Hegelianism in contemporary epistemology. To achieve this, the paper first explores Robert Brandom's interpretation of Phenomenology of Spirit in his 2019 work, Spirit of Trust. In this context, Hegel is positioned as a precursor to the holistic, historical, and social dimensions of belief, as well as a critic of the empiricist intuitions prevalent in modernity, aligning with the framework of American inferentialism. This section demonstrates that it is possible to discuss the constitution of concepts without invoking sensations or immediate knowledge. The paper then turns to the reception of Brandom’s proposal by scholars such as Richard Rorty and Slavoj Žižek, who concurs that Brandom falls short in maintaining a radical stance toward empiricism, and highlight the ethical and political challenges inherent in Brandom’s neo-Hegelian inferentialism. In this section, it becomes evident that Brandom’s concept of the Hegelian absolute and his notion of remembrance cannot be reconciled with a conception of reality as negative and contingent, a view that assumes progressiveness—something Žižek, in contrast, succeeds in recognizing within Hegel's philosophy.

The emergence of postmodernism has noticeably redefined the notion of the “self,” presenting it as a deconstructed postmodern subject. In this context, the postmodern self appears polysemic and decentered, embodying prominent characteristics of postmodernism. Donna Haraway’s concept of the “cyborg,” characterized by its synthetic and hybrid nature, offers a framework for understanding this postmodern self. Haraway portrays the cyborg as a distinctly female figure which is constructed from a collage of fragments. The goal of this article is to explore the construction of the postmodern self in the context of cyborg feminism to illustrate how technology and cybernetics serve as tools for women’s empowerment and to demonstrate how women can confront patriarchal systems and restore their rights by embracing the hybrid and synthetic aspects of the postmodern female identity. Succinctly, this article aims to exemplify how redefining female identity through the notion of the cyborg allows women to transcend male dominance and reject binary oppositions characterizing them as “the Other” and to surpass a society that has consistently endeavored to marginalize them. Thus, this essay maintains that cyborg feminism serves as an insightful lens for examining the construction of postmodern selves, challenging traditional distinctions between gender, technology, and identity.

In Hegel’s Philosophy of History, one encounters the idea of the “cunning of reason” [List der Vernunft], which describes the unintended (universal) consequences of (particular) individual actions. However, the Philosophy of History is one of the most (if not the most) maligned of Hegel’s works, attacked by non-specialists and anti-Hegelians who use it to easily stereotype and dismiss Hegel, for instance, as a teleological anti-individualist, while most serious Hegel interpreters avoid this work at all costs. To redress the lack of serious attention to Hegel’s Philosophy of History, this paper aims to offer the strongest possible reading of Hegel’s weakest “text,” reading it alongside his strongest, the Science of Logic, thereby bringing together two seemingly contradictory instances of the cunning of reason in Hegel’s corpus. In the Logic, the cunning of reason shows how the universal emerges through the means which individuals use toward their particular ends. However, in the Philosophy of History, the cunning of reason describes how the universal acts through individuals, as it were, behind their backs and, problematically, Hegel goes on to claim that the universal (spirit [Geist]) ultimately sacrifices individuals on the “slaughter bench” of history to advance its own purpose(s). This paper’s two-part thesis is: (1) the cunning of reason in the Philosophy of History is an internal illusion of the structure of cunning of reason in the Logic, and (2) this illusion is absolutely necessary. In particular, this paper builds upon the Hegel interpretations of Todd McGowan and Slavoj Žižek.

South Asian ethnic minorities (SAEMs) represent a growing population in Hong Kong public education. However, schools struggle to offer them fair and equitable education. One frequently mentioned, but rarely studied component in their performance is teachers’ lower expectations. This article reports on a qualitative case study to examine ethnically Chinese teachers’ expectations of South Asian students in a public primary school in Hong Kong. Five Chinese teachers were interviewed, with observations in three of these teachers’ classrooms. Results indicate teachers have lower expectations. Several influencing factors were identified, including perceptions of cultural differences between Chinese teachers and South Asian ethnic minorities’ families and inadequate training of teachers in Chinese as a second language and incorporating diversified learning strategies into the curriculum. This is one of the first studies specifically focused on exploring in greater details primary teachers’ expectations about South Asian students in Hong Kong.

This study examines the convergence of law, beauty standards, and feminist-Foucauldian theory, emphasising the influence of beauty myths on cultural norms and legal frameworks. Beauty standards, shaped by media, commercial, and legal structures, establish a restrictive and exclusive notion of beauty, frequently favouring lighter complexion, thinner physiques, and straight hair. These norms, devoid of a biological foundation, originate from social constructs that perpetuate patriarchal and capitalist ideologies. The law significantly reinforces these standars by normalizing certain physical traita and marginalising those who differ. Utilising Foucault’s notion of “disciplinary power,” the examination emphasises how individuals internalise societal norms and consciously modify their bodies to conform to these standards. It also attacks the legal system’s inadequacy in addressing body image discrimination, which exacerbates the marginalisation of individuals who diverge from conventional beauty standards. This study underscores the significance of intersectionality, asserting how beauty myths intersect with race, gender, and class, while urging legal frameworks that accommodate diverse body types to strengthen equality and protect against appearance-based discrimination.

Today, we encounter a question that has rarely been treated as a serious or provocative issue: women and sexuality as a philosophical problem. This theme now acts as a critical marker—an axis that divides entire fields of thought into a before and after. The beginning of this epistemic shift can be traced back to a Freudian question: What does a woman really want? In this article, we follow this question through the lens of Lacanian theory, in which he introduces the concept of sexuation and illuminates the foggy, ambiguous terrain of femininity through the formulation of the hysterical discourse. Moving beyond a purely hysterical approach to womanhood, the French psychoanalyst carved a path for the re-inscription of her historically ambivalent and fragmented image. For Lacan, woman is a symptom—an embodiment of the fundamental contradiction and rupture within the symbolic order. The Woman does not exist; rather, la femme is a rebel who struggles to exist

This paper revisits the famous 1922 debate between Einstein and Bergson on the nature of time, outlining its central philosophical and scientific points of contention and re-evaluating them in light of developments in quantum physics. Einstein’s conception of time is that of an objective, measurable, and relative dimension within a static four-dimensional “block universe.” In contrast, Bergson conceives of time (durée) as a qualitative, continuous, and creative flow of consciousness that resists reduction to quantitative measurement. The emergence of quantum mechanics, particularly the Heisenberg time–energy uncertainty principle, introduces new complexities that challenge this dichotomy. Quantum features of time, such as intrinsic uncertainty, the indeterminacy of precise moments, and the relational role of the observer, undermine the deterministic framework of classical and relativistic physics and appear, at least superficially, to resonate with Bergson’s critique of spatialized, discrete conceptions of time. However, a closer examination reveals that quantum time remains a quantitative, physical construct distinct from Bergson’s qualitative durée. Drawing upon modern theories such as loop quantum gravity (as articulated by Carlo Rovelli and Lee Smolin) and the insights of contemporary philosophers, this study argues that neither a purely physical nor a purely philosophical approach can, in isolation, account for the multifaceted nature of time. Rather, a comprehensive understanding requires a synthesis of both, recognizing them as complementary perspectives on a single underlying reality.

This study aims to provide a comprehensive philosophical critique of warfare in the contemporary era, focusing on ethical justifications and competing theoretical frameworks. It examines the extent to which classical just war theory remains applicable and explores how contemporary philosophers contribute to the redefinition of the ethics of war. Employing an applied, descriptive-analytical, qualitative approach, the study gathers data from library sources, theoretical literature, previous research, and scholarly articles. It reviews such sources to critically analyze the philosophical and ethical foundations of war. The findings show that states resort to war for reasons including the defense of human rights, protection of sovereignty, and response to significant threats. Just war theory distinguishes between conflicts that are ethically justified and those that are not. Although ethical principles invariably influence warfare, some conflicts can be justified on grounds of justice, rendering absolute pacifism impractical. Also the analysis reveals that classical frameworks, while foundational, are insufficient for addressing the moral complexities of contemporary warfare. Emerging forms of conflict challenge traditional notions of legitimacy and moral accountability, highlighting significant gaps in existing theories. Contemporary warfare necessitates a revised and integrative philosophical framework capable of accommodating new modes of violence and global security concerns. Such a framework should synthesize insights from just war theory, pacifism, and political realism to provide a robust basis for evaluating the morality of modern conflicts and international bodies must prioritize disarmament and ethically based legislation to safeguard human rights and dignity.

The aim of this study is to examine Allama Tabatabai’s account on faith and analyze it within the framework of Daniel Howard-Snyder’s non-doxastic approach. Faith is one of the key concepts in the epistemology of religion, and recent analytic approaches has increasingly distinguished it from belief. Allama Tabatabai describes faith as being based on two main components: "al- i'tiqad" and "tamakkun fi al-qalb“. This paper employs a comparative method to evaluate Allama’s account, interpreted as a form of doxastic faith, with the core components of Howard-Snyder’s non-doxastic model, in order to address the ambiguities in the concept of faith and the challenges associated with doxastic faith. Based on Howard-Snyder’s non-doxastic analysis of faith, the upshots show that the concept of "al- i'tiqad" in Allama’s account, as a cognitive attitude, is ambiguous and lacks the essential characteristic which is constituent for belief. Additionally, the failure to explicitly define the conative and evaluative components of faith in Allama’s account is another challenge. Drawing on Howard-Snyder’s model, which emphasizes faith amid doubt, this article argues that the non-doxastic framework provides conceptual resources for clarifying these ambiguities and for constructing a meaningful bridge between classical Islamic thought and contemporary discussions in the epistemology of religion.

Moral responsibility is a fundamental component of ethics, shaping our understanding of accountability, blame, and praise. Responsibility-internalism, which holds that moral responsibility is grounded in some internal mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and intentions, represents a novel yet radical departure from traditional frameworks that focus on the outcome, circumstances, and interpersonal relationships to draw the moral line. While this theory presents a simple, self-contained picture of moral responsibility, it faces serious theoretical problems that challenge its coherence and practical utility. It specifically cannot adequately explain cases of negligence, culpable ignorance, and the relational aspects of moral responsibility that are central to human interactions. This paper offers a critical-analytic examination of responsibility-internalism and its theoretical and practical shortcomings. It examines positions that would incorporate both internalist assumptions, emphasizing the control agents possess over their actions, and externalist and interpersonal factors, aiming to offer a more complete and nuanced conception of moral liability. Some of the paper is devoted to discussing case studies in which the limitations of responsibility-internalism relative to its alternatives are illustrated. And it concludes that although responsibility-internalism offers a novel take and a new tool in the discussions of moral responsibility, such an internalist approach ultimately fails to provide a full and usable theory of moral responsibility.

Gilles Deleuze argues that in Samuel Beckett’s Film the perception of self by self, though agonizing, opens onto a promising vision: for one confined to the personal reduction of life, it discloses a transcendental expansion of LIFE. In cinematic perception, this transformation marks the shift from the classical cinema of movement, where protagonists made films, to a modern cinema of time, where the camera becomes the protagonist, inviting actors, like the audience, to watch the film enriched by its transcendental perspective. This article shows what appears in Deleuzian time-cinema as a proliferation of life, by sustaining the audience’s belief in transcendental time as a horizon of perpetually emerging life-events, is, in fact, an entropic eventization of the audience’s memory, a process that, according to Bernard Stiegler, entails the loss of savoir-faire. Thus, the revelatory shock-images in Beckett’s Film signify an entropic loss of memory’s ground, becoming pathological shocks that require therapeutic care and invention of new life-therapies, anticipating a negentropic reinvention of time the transcendental camera must watch and read its film from. Here, E is seen as a therapeutic camera, healed out of transcendental time through O’s analysing the pharmacological shock.

This paper examines the political philosophy of Artificial Intelligence (AI) through three distinct approaches: optimistic positivist scientism, critical middle ground, and phenomenological pessimism. The central issue addressed is the ethical and political implications of AI, specifically how it influences governance, social structures, and human autonomy. The research questions explore how AI can be understood in terms of its potential and risks, how different political philosophies interpret its role, and what governance models can mitigate its negative consequences. The methodology adopted is a comparative analysis of key thinkers and their contributions to the debate on AI. The framework includes positivist, critical theory, and phenomenological perspectives, with a focus on how these paradigms inform the understanding of technology and its societal impact. Key theorists discussed include Francis Bacon, Karl Marx, Yuval Harari, Jürgen Habermas, Martin Heidegger, and Hannah Arendt, each offering a unique viewpoint on the nature of AI and its implications for governance and human existence. The findings highlight three divergent views: the optimistic positivist approach sees AI as a tool for progress, advocating for technological innovation and global governance; the critical middle ground emphasizes ethical oversight and regulation to prevent social inequality; and the phenomenological pessimism warns of AI’s potential to undermine human freedom and autonomy, leading to a dystopian, technocratic society. The study concludes that while AI offers significant potential for improving human life, it also raises profound challenges that require careful regulation, ethical consideration, and a commitment to preserving democratic freedoms.

In the contemporary world, education is recognized as a fundamental tool for fostering active, responsible, and capable citizens who require processes that strengthen participation, mutual understanding, and rational dialogue. The present study aims to examine the application of Rousseau’s participatory democracy and Habermas’ communicative action in the teaching of spatial sciences, with a particular focus on geography. The research adopts an action research design with an applied orientation. The study population consisted of 24 undergraduate geography students enrolled in the course Urban Geography of Iran. Data were collected and analyzed across 14 instructional sessions through observation, evaluation, and the interpretation of lived experiences within an interpretive framework. The research process followed a cyclical pattern, including problem identification, theoretical review, formation of focus groups, and dialogue-oriented consensus building. Findings indicate that democratic, participatory, and communicative approaches to spatial education emerge gradually and require a process-oriented foundation. Accordingly, the integration of Rousseau’s participatory democracy with Habermas’ communicative action demands active facilitation by instructors and the reinforcement of intra- and inter-group interactions. The results further reveal that combining these two approaches in geography education—particularly in spatially oriented courses—creates a pathway for transitioning from teacher-centered learning to participatory–discursive learning. This shift enhances skills of spatial analysis, critique, collaboration, and debate, thereby deepening learning and understanding of spatial concepts. Ultimately, the study proposes a practical framework for democratic, interactive, and active education, serving as an illustrative example of implementing these philosophical approaches in higher education.

This study explores the concept of brain rot and its correlation with Avicenna’s four stages of intellect, offering a philosophical and normative perspective on cognitive decline in the digital age. By mapping the stages of brain rot—excessive exposure to digital content, mediating factors, cognitive dysfunction, and chronic cognitive decline—onto Avicenna’s hierarchy, this study reveals how digital overstimulation hinders intellectual progression. The research highlights the stagnation of cognitive faculties, from the passive, unactualized state of ʿAql Hayūlānī (potential intellect) to the irreversible decline seen in ʿAql Mustafād (acquired intellect). Mediating factors such as digital addiction, information overload, and mental fatigue exacerbate this stagnation, preventing the activation of higher cognitive functions and reflective reasoning. The study also integrates recent literature on brain rot and digital dementia to provide empirical support for the mapping process, demonstrating how excessive digital exposure disrupts intellectual growth and rational autonomy. These findings suggest the need for philosophical reflection on cognitive decline and underscore the importance of addressing the challenges posed by digital media in fostering intellectual engagement and development.

The present article examines the possibility of attributing personhood to artificial intelligence agents, a concept central to determining moral status. The debate on personhood has long been central in applied ethics, particularly in discussions on abortion, where philosophers such as Mary Anne Warren proposed five criteria—consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, capacity for communication, and self-awareness—as key indicators of personhood. The present study applies these criteria to artificial intelligence systems and asks whether their cognitive and functional capacities are sufficient for moral consideration. While certain features such as memory, goal-directed behavior, and limited moral interaction are identifiable in some AI systems, the absence of self-awareness and subjective experience remains a fundamental obstacle to full personhood. The article further engages with the views of Kant, Locke, DeGrazia, and Searle, assessing the possibility of AI’s moral standing—whether direct or indirect—through ethical frameworks such as deontology and virtue ethics. It concludes that although attributing personhood to AI remains highly problematic in its current state, addressing this issue is an urgent necessity for contemporary moral philosophy.

Good governance and efficiency have long been important and central topics in philosophical and political discussions around the world. This study examined philosophical theories related to good and efficient governance, as well as their importance in government structure and performance. Among Western philosophers Plato in his book considers good governance as a government based on justice and the common good, while Aristotle considers it based on good people and citizens. On the other hand, Islamic philosophers such as Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi consider justice to be the basis of government, and Al-Farabi likens good government to the utopian city. This study shows that philosophical concepts in good governance should go beyond abstract theories and be effectively implemented at executive levels. In particular, the emphasis on justice and fairness, freedom and authority, equality and equity in good governance are considered as fundamental pillars in resource management and fair distribution in order to achieve social welfare and democracy. Ultimately, good and efficient governance not only contributes to justice but also to strengthening the relationship between the government and citizens a well as promoting social capabilities to achieve a dynamic and stable government.

This study develops the Affective Ethical Model of Conceptual Engineering (AEMCE), a framework we introduce to address a critical and underexplored gap in conceptual engineering: the emotional dimension of concepts. While traditional normative conceptual engineering has focused on the application of concepts to moral and social applications, it has largely overlooked the overwhelming emotional impact a concept may have on individuals. These emotional resonances, whether harmful, isolating, or manipulative, are often ignored, creating ethical blind spots. The Affective Ethical Model of Conceptual Engineering rectifies this by introducing affective accountability and ethical adequacy as foundational criteria for conceptual success. This model is structured around four iterative and interdependent stages: Diagnosis, Design, Circulation, and Evaluation, which are operationalized through the Affective Performance Test. These rigorous mixed methods protocol empirically assesses both emotional engagement and harm reduction. The Affective Ethical Model of Conceptual Engineering demonstrates how concept revision, such as reframing the term “illegitimate child” in Algeria, can promote linguistic justice and social integration, transforming harmful labels into more neutral, inclusive language. This redesigns Conceptual Engineering not as an instrument of intellectual clarity but as a moral technology that has the capacity to transform the moral and emotional infrastructure of society. As a blend of emotional intelligence and philosophical accuracy, the Affective Ethical Model of Conceptual Engineering will provide a new concept of engineering, which improves the sense of moral quality in social life.

This paper shows how Hegel’s misconception of truth and knowledge misled his ideas of Absolute spirit, dialectically reinforced dogmatism and irrational historicism toward his disastrous conclusion of a “totalitarian playbook”. Analysis by Hegel scholars is presented and contrasted with Popper’s Critical Rationalism-based critiques. Hegel held a version of Correspondence for everyday truth plus a deeper “philosophical” truth, similar to essence, which could be unified with consciousness. This is compared to Popper’s anti-essentialism. Hegel’s dialectical theory is contrasted to Popper’s falsificationism. Popper showed that dialectical method produced historical relativism. Hegel’s Philosophy of Identity, yielding the dialectical Idealism of “what is reasonable must be real”, led to “might is right” with emergence of nations by fighting for domination on the stage of history. Popper credited Hegel with formulating the “playbook of totalitarianism”, used lethally by followers of Hegelian Left and Right. Inversion Theory claims the word “true”, implying completeness, certainty, and self-consistency, is applicable only to the objective world. Perception of it, acquired by an evolved biological process (Active Subjectivism), incorporates essential falsehood, yielding “best knowledge” of reality. It solves problems related to the regulatory, statistical, evidentiary, inconstant and even indexical nature of knowledge. Only the Inversion theory exposes the errors of dialecticism: since it involves subjective concepts, it is impossible for a true synthesis plus its negative antithesis to give a true synthesis. The historical process of the Zeitgeist contains falsehood, the cunning of reason to move the spirit forward is uncertain, and nobody can perform the truth for their time.

This study aims to examine the philosophical foundations of governance paradigms reflected in the election discourses of Iranian presidential candidates between 2005 and 2025, highlighting how these paradigms shape governance styles. The research employed a qualitative document analysis approach, focusing on primary sources such as campaign statements, election manifestos, interviews, and media reports. A comparative method was used to evaluate the ontological, epistemological, and methodological dimensions of each presidential discourse. Theoretical frameworks from the philosophy of science, particularly regarding positivist, interpretivist, and critical paradigms, provided the lens for analysis.  The study found that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s discourse embodied an interpretivist paradigm with positivist elements, emphasizing cultural narratives and measurable developmental policies. Hassan Rouhani’s discourse reflected a hybrid of critical and positivist paradigms, balancing structural reforms with evidence-based governance. Ebrahim Raisi’s approach was primarily interpretivist with critical elements, focusing on revolutionary ideals and social justice. Masoud Pezeshkian’s emerging discourse aligned most closely with the critical paradigm while incorporating positivist techniques for policy development. Across the period from 2005 to 2025, a gradual philosophical shift was observed, moving from symbolic mobilization toward structural critique and pragmatic governance strategies. These evolving paradigms significantly influenced policymaking priorities, citizen participation models, and governance structures in Iran.  The philosophical roots embedded in election discourses play a decisive role in shaping governance approaches in Iran. Understanding these paradigmatic orientations offers deeper insights into the evolution of political practices and state-citizen relations. Future studies should further explore the relationship between electoral rhetoric, governance implementation, and the broader socio-political transformations within Iran.

Form meaning typical form in philosophy is proved under the title of " total reality of an object" through a logical method. Modern sciences since 17th A.D. century have been formulated by the ideas of elites like Newton, Galileo, and Descartes via factors like alteration in academic tradition methodology, consolidation of mechanical look at nature and establishment of originality of evolution. Nowadays these sciences diminish the position of form and changethat high position of to a quantifiable accident or storable information or a cause of unification among organs of a living creature. Islamic philosophers though disagree each other regarding explanation of its truth and its combination with matter and how the essence of flesh is formed, in fact, they do not raise doubt in its truth. Some by denying matter regard flesh identical withform and some by accepting matter regard their combination concrete and MullaSadra regards its combination with form unifying and by introduction of substance theory brings a tremendous revolution in the explanation of its position and how it evolves.

This paper presents a systematic comparative and historical analysis of the concepts of agency and entanglement within ecological thought, arguing that contemporary new materialist approaches articulate a distinctly posthuman ecology. This ecology is fundamentally grounded in ontological entanglement, distributed agency across human and nonhuman entities, and an immanent, relational form of response-ability that emerges from intra-active becoming rather than individual intention. Drawing primarily on Karen Barad’s agential realism, Jane Bennett’s vital materialism, Rosi Braidotti’s zoe-centred posthuman ethics, and Stacy Alaimo’s trans-corporeality—while remaining critically attentive to recent decolonial, feminist, and Indigenous critiques that challenge universalized notions of entanglement—the paper meticulously traces a pivotal epistemic and ontological shift. It charts the movement away from earlier representational and managerial paradigms, such as systems ecology and deep ecology, which often preserved anthropocentric hierarchies despite their holistic rhetoric, toward a performative ontology of material-discursive intra-action. Through this transition, ethical and political responsibility is radically relocated: no longer vested in a sovereign, detached human subject issuing commands to passive Nature, but enacted performatively within the entangled phenomena themselves. The consequences are far-reaching, reshaping environmental theory, political ecology, climate justice frameworks, and praxis-oriented struggles in an era of planetary crisis.