What Are the Criteria of Personality in Artificial Intelligence in Relation to Moral Status?

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Karimi Saeid; Tabatabaie Morteza; Javadi Mohsen; Momtazi Saeedeh

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Journal Paper

Paper Information

Journal: JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS Year:2026 | Volume:20 | Issue:54 Page(s): 521-542

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Information Journal Paper

Title

What Are the Criteria of Personality in Artificial Intelligence in Relation to Moral Status?

Author(s)

Karimi Saeid | Tabatabaie Morteza | Javadi Mohsen | Momtazi Saeedeh | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

personhood

moral status

Artificial intelligence

Kantian Deontology

Virtue Ethics

consciousness

Abstract

The present article examines the possibility of attributing personhood to artificial intelligence agents, a concept central to determining moral status. The debate on personhood has long been central in applied ethics, particularly in discussions on abortion, where philosophers such as Mary Anne Warren proposed five criteria—consciousness, reasoning, self-motivated activity, capacity for communication, and self-awareness—as key indicators of personhood. The present study applies these criteria to artificial intelligence systems and asks whether their cognitive and functional capacities are sufficient for moral consideration. While certain features such as memory, goal-directed behavior, and limited moral interaction are identifiable in some AI systems, the absence of self-awareness and subjective experience remains a fundamental obstacle to full personhood. The article further engages with the views of Kant, Locke, DeGrazia, and Searle, assessing the possibility of AI’s moral standing—whether direct or indirect—through ethical frameworks such as deontology and virtue ethics. It concludes that although attributing personhood to AI remains highly problematic in its current state, addressing this issue is an urgent necessity for contemporary moral philosophy.

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