The problem of divine foreknowledge and the human free will is one of the important issues of philosophy of religion. According to this problem, since the divine Omniscience requires its infallibility; therefore, if at a time t1 God knows that subject (S) will have an action A at a time t3, then S cannot do anything other than this action at time t3. So, divine foreknowledge is in an apparent contradiction to the human free will. This article tries to compare the views of Linda Zagzebski (the contemporary religion philosopher) with those of Mortaza Mutahhari on this topic. We first address the classic triple responses to this issue (Bothiusism, Ockhamism, Mollinism) from the viewpoint of ZagzEbski. Then we show that Zagzebski, while admitting parts of the elements of these viewpoints and integrating them, presents three novel solutions. Then the article addresses the viewpoints of Mutahhari in the fields of determination, free will and predestination. Finally we show the similarities and differences of these two views. The research findings are that both intellectuals admit the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human free will, but Thomistic Ockhamism and two other solutions of Zagzebski, in spite of their positive and admissible points, are not successful in demonstrating this compatibility, while the solution of Mutahhri is successful.