FALSAFEH (THE IRANIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY)
Year:2011 | Volume:38 | Issue:2|Papers Count:7

The essay claims that logic and the philosophy of logic owe to Plato and that some logical issues marvelously are analyzed in his works.In the history of philosophy Plato is known as a philosopher that has prominence and authority in metaphysics and epistemology, but he almost is not taken into account in logical issues. However, Plato has considered deliberately some most important logical issues in his writings by a method of his own.The reason of such attitude is not so much any philosopher obliges to applying logic to Philosophical subjects as he profoundly is attentive to these subjects. Possibly, since Plato hasn't formulated systematically logical subjects, they are not to be considered as logic. But, undoubtedly, the logical point was noticed by Plato.

For a long time, philosophers have considered contemplative knowledge and thinking to be the specific perfection of the human species.From this point of view, philosophers such as Aristotle and Avicenna thought that the act of thinking was the highest activity leading to man's happiness. On the contrary, illuminative philosophers and gnostics in the Islamic world only considered speculative philosophy to be a preliminary to the attainment of noble qualities of character and moral virtues; in other words, they thought that practical philosophy was the only necessary criteria leading to practical happiness.This article presents the different theories of Islamic philosophers which aimat justifying the development of the human soul through knowledge and speculative sciences. The main justificatory theory in this field is the theory of the unity of the intellect and the intelligible which is a legacy of Neoplatonic philosophy and was revived by Mulla Sadra. In addition to the theory of the mental existence, this theory may be considered to be the basis of the theory of the soul’s development. However, this article will show that Mulla Sadra's statements on this matter are not clear and are subject to serious criticism. Finally, through the reorganization of the sadrian pattern, Gnostic theory and transcendental philosophy will remarkably get closer to each other.

In his many works about aesthetics, morality and philosophy, Schiller always has a unique concern: radical separation or contrast that can be seen in culture, society and politics. The basis of this contrast is the same with the old metaphysical contrast between matter and form. On the other hand, he thinks that the basis of all these contrasts should be searched in human being. Modern man, opposing ancient Greek's, is a broken one since some parts of him is always dominating over his other parts. As Schiller believes, we have two drives: sense drive and form drive. The first represents man’s materialistic dimension and the second represents intellectual and moral dimension. But there is a third drive, the play drive, that with which Schiller tries to solve the problem of contrast between matter and form or sense and reason. It is this that is our question here: How can Schiller solve this big problem of contrast with the concept of play? With this concept, he goes beyond that duality. The human being can be a human being only when he goes beyond these two drives and reaches to the third. This third drive is play drive and the perfect man is a man who plays. The play drive is not the equilibrium of those two drives but is that which goes beyond them. It is with this drive that a man can go beyond sense and reason and instead of feeling or thinking can play. It is beauty that leads human being to play drive; man plays only with beauty and this beauty is nothing except "freedom of semblance".

In his Critique of Purge Reason, Kant insists that the human understanding is only able to know phenomena. However, in Critique of Practical Reason, he proves the objective reality of God, freedom and immortality of soul. At first, the result of the two critiques seems to be at odds with each other, with Kant himself calling the problem, the dilemma of philosophy of critiquing. By putting forward and solving the problem, he asserts that the transcendental idealism of phenomena and the supposition of the intelligible world constitute two fundamental pillars of a single philosophy.Based on that, having proved God as a requirement of practical reason in the second critique, he goes on to assign understanding, will and creativity to God as three fundamental determinations. Later, he connects the three fundamental determinations with another determination, which is spontaneity.Kant is on the belief that assigning the determinations to God and proving its existence do not contradict the results of the first critique, resorting occasionally to analogy and to the different applications of categories in the first and second critiques in order to remove the contradiction. Yet, Kant seems unable to remove the contradiction between the two critiques in this way.

Deviding both the subjects and the predicates of the categorical propositions into actuality and verity, Afzal Al-Din Khunaji states the actuality-parts as adjectives, but verity-parts in three forms: as simple, as relational and as conditional. Since the adjectives are formulated in Modern Logic by conjunction, we can formulate actuality-parts as conjunctions. Verity-parts can be formulated at least in three forms: simple, truth-functional conditional and relevant conditional. The relations Khunaji has stated between the kinds of the verity- and actuality-propositions correspond, in most of the cases, to the analysis of verity-parts in simple form and, in some other cases, to their analysis by material conditional and, in few cases, to their analysis by relevant conditional. He, also, in some cases, takes as granted the existential import of universal affirmatives and, in some cases, ignores it. I conclude that Khunaji does not stand on a firm point and confus.

Within the linguistic paradigm, there is a problem that was always connected with coherence conceptions of truth: how we may, in light of the evidence available to us, raise an unconditional truth claim that aims beyond what is justified. In other words, within the linguistic paradigm, if the truth of a proposition can no longer be conceived as correspondence with something in the world, then how truth is to be distinguished from justification. In responding to this question, there are two major doctrines. On the one hand, from the pragmatic radicalization of the linguistic turn Richard Rorty obtains a nonrealist understanding of knowledge and assimilates truth to justification. For Rorty, because there is nothing apart from justification, and because there is no way to get outside our beliefs and our language so as to find some test other than coherence, the concept of truth is superfluous. On the other hand, others, including Jurgen Habermas, attempt to take account of realist intuitions. For Habermas, there is internal connection between justification and truth, and a justification successful in our justificatory context points in favor of the context –independent truth of the justified belief. To account for internal relation between justification and truth, Habermas only appeals to the interaction between actions and discourses. Only the entwining of the two different pragmatic roles played by the concept of truth in action contexts and in rational discourses can why a successful justification of a belief according to our standards points in favor of the truth of that belief.

In Suhrawardi philosophy–like any philosophy which seeks to explain the general facts of being–the issuance of plurality is an important element in the Cosmology and defers with Mashsha basis in this regard. The Issuance of plurality contains several stages in Suhrawardi's main works: Agreement with Mashsha’ on the emanation of the first caused, criticizing them for the Issuance of underneath spheres, establishing new theory using the principles such as permitting Issuance of simple caused from combined cause, formation of the universe from light and darkness, being no veil between lights, the lights resulted of viewing superior levels, the lights resulted of radiation of superior levels on low levels, prevail and dignity of predominant lights into low lights and vice versa, humiliation and love of low lights toward superior ones. With these principles, he shows the necessary points of plurality in longitudinal intellects in order to prove the issuance of multiple lateral intellects (Platonic ideas).Suhrawardi also, by citing some affairs in the nature such as vegetable forces, duration of species and existence of low types for each species, considers them as proof for intellectual ideas.