Optimization of Banking Contract Structure Based on Incomplete Contracting in non interest banking

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NADRI KAMRAN; ASKARI MOHAMMAD MAHDI; ZAHEDI VAFA MOHAMMAD HADI; MOSTAFAVI SANI ALI

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Journal Paper

Paper Information

Journal: Journal of Economic Essays; an Islamic Approach Year:2021 | Volume:17 | Issue:34 Page(s): 9-35

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Title

Optimization of Banking Contract Structure Based on Incomplete Contracting in non interest banking

Author(s)

NADRI KAMRAN | ASKARI MOHAMMAD MAHDI | ZAHEDI VAFA MOHAMMAD HADI | MOSTAFAVI SANI ALI | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

incomplete contract

hold-up problem

opportunistic behavior

banking contract

Relationship banking

Abstract

Contractual incompleteness is essentially related to the “, unverifiability”,condition and “, enforceability”,condition. In the complex and uncertain economic environment, financial contract is incomplete. Contractual incompleteness decrease contract effectiveness. We analyze banking contracts with respect to incomplete contract theory. The results show that the banking contracts in Iran are incomplete. Because of high transaction cost, uncertainty, ambiguity, complexity and unenforceable contract, lead not to perfect implementation of commitment. The fact that contracts are incomplete allows for opportunistic behavior of entrepreneur and hold-up bank inside credit contract. Some mechanisms needed for gap filling in incomplete contract. In banking contract this mechanism is designed in Relationship banking that help to balanced bargaining power between parties and can reduce problems caused by Contractual incompleteness.

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APA: Copy

NADRI, KAMRAN, ASKARI, MOHAMMAD MAHDI, ZAHEDI VAFA, MOHAMMAD HADI, & MOSTAFAVI SANI, ALI. (2021). Optimization of Banking Contract Structure Based on Incomplete Contracting in non interest banking. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ESSAYS, 17(34 ), 9-35. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/1038709/en

Vancouver: Copy

NADRI KAMRAN, ASKARI MOHAMMAD MAHDI, ZAHEDI VAFA MOHAMMAD HADI, MOSTAFAVI SANI ALI. Optimization of Banking Contract Structure Based on Incomplete Contracting in non interest banking. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ESSAYS[Internet]. 2021;17(34 ):9-35. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/1038709/en

IEEE: Copy

KAMRAN NADRI, MOHAMMAD MAHDI ASKARI, MOHAMMAD HADI ZAHEDI VAFA, and ALI MOSTAFAVI SANI, “Optimization of Banking Contract Structure Based on Incomplete Contracting in non interest banking,” JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ESSAYS, vol. 17, no. 34 , pp. 9–35, 2021, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/1038709/en

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