The Blurred Edges of 'Game'; Responding to McGinn's Challenges on Family Resemblance

Q: How can I download an article?

To download an article from SID, first log in to the site, search for the article title, and click on the 'Download Article' option.

Q: How can I download an ISI article?

To download an ISI article on SID, enter the keyword or article title in the search bar, view the relevant results, click on the desired article, and select the 'Download Article' option.

Q: How can I access the SID database?

To access the SID database, visit SID.ir, create an account, and log in to access scientific resources.

Q: Is downloading articles from SID free?

Some articles on SID are available for free, while others require payment. Details are specified on the article's page.

Hojjat Minoo

مرکز اطلاعات علمی Scientific Information Database (SID) - Trusted Source for Research and Academic Resources

Journal Paper

Paper Information

Journal: Journal of Philosophical Investigations in Scopus Year:2024 | Volume: | Issue: Page(s): 171-189

Download Full-Text

Persian Verion

View:

Download:

Cites:

Information Journal Paper

Title

The Blurred Edges of 'Game'; Responding to McGinn's Challenges on Family Resemblance

Author(s)

Hojjat Minoo | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

WittgensteinQ4

EssentialismQ4

gameQ4

necessary and sufficient conditionsQ4

Bernard SuitsQ4

prelusory goalQ4

lusory goalQ4

Abstract

In "Truth by Analysis: games, Names, and Philosophy," Colin McGinn seeks to revitalize the traditional approach to conceptual analysis. He asserts that the definition of a concept involves specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for its application, a task he deems achievable. In pursuit of this goal, McGinn critiques opposing perspectives, including that of Wittgenstein. He explores various ways to define the concept of game, and at his best, he relies on Bernard Suits' definition. This paper argues that McGinn's attempts fall short and affirms the significance of Wittgenstein's insight. It critiques all definitions put forth by McGinn, particularly that of Suits, presenting counterexamples to challenge them. Furthermore, the paper uncovers deeper misconceptions underlying these criticisms: McGinn expects family resemblance to serve as both the necessary and sufficient conditions for applying a concept and perceives it as a theory explaining how concepts refer to their extensions, contrasting with Wittgenstein, who does not aim to develop a theory and does not propose family resemblance as a sufficient condition for a concept's application.

Cites

No record.

References

No record.

Cite

Related Journal Papers

No record.

Related Seminar Papers

No record.

Related Plans

No record.

Recommended Workshops