ANALYSIS OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYEE, EMPLOYER, AND GOVERNMENT BASED ON GAME THEORY

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SADEGHI HOSSEIN; BRUMAND YOUNES

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Paper Information

Journal: Journal of Economic Research Year:2012 | Volume:47 | Issue:98 Page(s): 51-67

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Information Journal Paper

Title

ANALYSIS OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYEE, EMPLOYER, AND GOVERNMENT BASED ON GAME THEORY

Author(s)

SADEGHI HOSSEIN | BRUMAND YOUNES | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

EMPLOYEEQ2

EMPLOYERQ2

GOVERNMENTQ2

GAME THEORYQ2

STATIC GAMESQ2

Abstract

This paper aims to analyze the relationship among the EMPLOYEE, the EMPLOYER, and the GOVERNMENT with the help of GAME THEORY. The game among these three players is of the sort of STATIC GAMES with complete information and the strategies used by each player have been determined in the figure of tending to change the current situation and tending to keep it. The equilibrium among these three players is a type of Nash equilibrium, that all players select strategy of tending to keep the current situation, although it doesn’t involve the maximum pay off for them.So the reason of this action is that the selection of the strategy of tending to change the current situation will be a risky one. And as risk is significant, they prefer to active equilibrium in low productivity.

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