PERCEPTION, SELF-CORRECTION AND PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITION

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POURGHANNAD PEYMAN; HOSSEINI DAVOOD; NABAVI LOTFOLLAH

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Journal: RESEARCH ON METAPHYSIK Year:2017 | Volume:52 | Issue:22 Page(s): 47-59

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Information Journal Paper

Title

PERCEPTION, SELF-CORRECTION AND PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITION

Author(s)

POURGHANNAD PEYMAN | HOSSEINI DAVOOD | NABAVI LOTFOLLAH | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

INTUITIONQ2

JUSTIFICATIONQ3

PHENOMENALISMQ1

SELF-CORRECTIONQ1

Abstract

According to the dominant methodology of contemporary analytic philosophy, philosophical INTUITIONs play evidential roles for or against philosophical theories. However, INTUITIONs can play the supposed role successfully only if they are justified. PHENOMENALISM, as one of the proposed theories that aim to explain and argue for justifiedness of INTUITIONs, claim that INTUITIONs are justified because they have a certain phenomenal character: Intuitive contents seem to be true. Furthermore, it argues that sensory perception has similar phenomenal character, in virtue of which it is justified. This analogy confirms the justifiedness of INTUITIONs. In this article, however, we argue that there is at least one another epistemological feature of sensory perception which is relevant to its justifiedness that is SELF-CORRECTION. Although sensory perception is highly self-correcting, INTUITIONs normally resist SELF-CORRECTION, even in the case of further recalcitrant evidences. The disanalogy threatens phenomenalist analogy for justifiedness of INTUITIONs.

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APA: Copy

POURGHANNAD, PEYMAN, HOSSEINI, DAVOOD, & NABAVI, LOTFOLLAH. (2017). PERCEPTION, SELF-CORRECTION AND PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITION. RESEARCH ON METAPHYSIK, 52(22 ), 47-59. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/157525/en

Vancouver: Copy

POURGHANNAD PEYMAN, HOSSEINI DAVOOD, NABAVI LOTFOLLAH. PERCEPTION, SELF-CORRECTION AND PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITION. RESEARCH ON METAPHYSIK[Internet]. 2017;52(22 ):47-59. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/157525/en

IEEE: Copy

PEYMAN POURGHANNAD, DAVOOD HOSSEINI, and LOTFOLLAH NABAVI, “PERCEPTION, SELF-CORRECTION AND PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITION,” RESEARCH ON METAPHYSIK, vol. 52, no. 22 , pp. 47–59, 2017, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/157525/en

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