A SURVEY ON THE EFFECT OF MONITORING MECHANISM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON REBATING THE EARNING MANAGEMENT INTENSITY

Q: How can I download an article?

To download an article from SID, first log in to the site, search for the article title, and click on the 'Download Article' option.

Q: How can I download an ISI article?

To download an ISI article on SID, enter the keyword or article title in the search bar, view the relevant results, click on the desired article, and select the 'Download Article' option.

Q: How can I access the SID database?

To access the SID database, visit SID.ir, create an account, and log in to access scientific resources.

Q: Is downloading articles from SID free?

Some articles on SID are available for free, while others require payment. Details are specified on the article's page.

MEHRANI SASAN; FOROUGHI DARYOUSH; KORDTABAR HOSEIN; RASAIIAN AMIR

مرکز اطلاعات علمی Scientific Information Database (SID) - Trusted Source for Research and Academic Resources

Journal Paper

Paper Information

Journal: Management and Development Process Year:2011 | Volume:24 | Issue:76 Page(s): 51-78

Download Full-Text

Persian Verion

View:

1,055

Download:

Cites:

Information Journal Paper

Title

A SURVEY ON THE EFFECT OF MONITORING MECHANISM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON REBATING THE EARNING MANAGEMENT INTENSITY

Author(s)

MEHRANI SASAN | FOROUGHI DARYOUSH | KORDTABAR HOSEIN | RASAIIAN AMIR | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

CONSERVATIVE EARNING MANAGEMENTQ2

AGGRESSIVE EARNING MANAGEMENTQ2

THRESHOLDSQ2

CORPORATE GOVERNANCEQ1

OUTSIDE DIRECTORSQ2

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORSQ2

Abstract

This study tries to examine the effect of monitoring mechanism of CORPORATE GOVERNANCE to decreasing the Earning Management Intensity. Intensity of earning management behavior is described on the basis of the 'threshold model' through bringing up the reported earnings to THRESHOLDS. It consists beating the benchmark (thresholds) and not doing so. Our empirical tests are conducted by regression analysis using data 185 listed firms with fiscal years 1382-1388, and pooling time series and cross-section data. The results of empirical tests indicate that with a=0.01 there is income-increasing earning management behavior both each THRESHOLDS. Examining the role of monitoring device of CORPORATE GOVERNANCE in intensity of EM behavior that is tested by logistic regression and U Mann Whitney indicates that monitoring device don't restrict it. Only when pre-managed earning are below last period's reported earning OUTSIDE DIRECTORS and INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS influence the likelihood that reported earnings exceed the THRESHOLDS.

Cites

No record.

References

No record.

Cite

APA: Copy

MEHRANI, SASAN, FOROUGHI, DARYOUSH, KORDTABAR, HOSEIN, & RASAIIAN, AMIR. (2011). A SURVEY ON THE EFFECT OF MONITORING MECHANISM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON REBATING THE EARNING MANAGEMENT INTENSITY. JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, 24(76), 51-78. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/246232/en

Vancouver: Copy

MEHRANI SASAN, FOROUGHI DARYOUSH, KORDTABAR HOSEIN, RASAIIAN AMIR. A SURVEY ON THE EFFECT OF MONITORING MECHANISM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON REBATING THE EARNING MANAGEMENT INTENSITY. JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT PROCESS[Internet]. 2011;24(76):51-78. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/246232/en

IEEE: Copy

SASAN MEHRANI, DARYOUSH FOROUGHI, HOSEIN KORDTABAR, and AMIR RASAIIAN, “A SURVEY ON THE EFFECT OF MONITORING MECHANISM OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON REBATING THE EARNING MANAGEMENT INTENSITY,” JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, vol. 24, no. 76, pp. 51–78, 2011, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/246232/en

Related Journal Papers