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Information Journal Paper

Title

Designing a Timeless Voting Model in the Political Market Using the Economic Market Mechanism

Pages

  181-208

Abstract

 In their economic analysis of democracy and its institutions, economists often use methods which are very similar to market analysis. When methods and techniques of economic analysis are used in studying democracy, one of the interesting results is that the performance of the Political market is similar to that of Economic market. The timelessness of money as private good is an important condition for the optimal resource allocation mechanism in the Economic market. In this regard, this article uses the mechanism of the timelessness of money in the Economic market in order to allocate advantages and benefits to citizens in the Political market optimally. To do this, a monetary model similar to the Political market sphere is designed using the concept of Anthony Downs’s (1957) rational voter hypothesis, and applying the idea of Paul Samuelson's (1958) monetary model within microeconomic theory of consumption. Using such model, the timelessness and storability of votes can investigated. The results show that the timelessness of money leads to a superior allocation, Pareto optimality and improvement in the optimal situation of voters.

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  • Cite

    APA: Copy

    JABBARI, AMIR, RENANI, MOHSEN, DASHTBAN FAROOJI, MAJID, & AKBARI, NARGES. (2018). Designing a Timeless Voting Model in the Political Market Using the Economic Market Mechanism. JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT (THE ECONOMIC RESEARCH), 18(2 ), 181-208. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/371062/en

    Vancouver: Copy

    JABBARI AMIR, RENANI MOHSEN, DASHTBAN FAROOJI MAJID, AKBARI NARGES. Designing a Timeless Voting Model in the Political Market Using the Economic Market Mechanism. JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT (THE ECONOMIC RESEARCH)[Internet]. 2018;18(2 ):181-208. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/371062/en

    IEEE: Copy

    AMIR JABBARI, MOHSEN RENANI, MAJID DASHTBAN FAROOJI, and NARGES AKBARI, “Designing a Timeless Voting Model in the Political Market Using the Economic Market Mechanism,” JOURNAL OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT (THE ECONOMIC RESEARCH), vol. 18, no. 2 , pp. 181–208, 2018, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/371062/en

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