Moore’ s Open-Question Argument in Moral Philosophy and its Challenge of the Analytical Paradox

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Vale Hossein; NAGHAVI REZA

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Journal: JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGICAL RESEARCH Year:2019 | Volume:21 | Issue:2 (80) Page(s): 73-96

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Title

Moore’ s Open-Question Argument in Moral Philosophy and its Challenge of the Analytical Paradox

Author(s)

Vale Hossein | NAGHAVI REZA | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

the Open-Question ArgumentQ1

the paradox of analysisQ1

goodQ1

intuitionQ2

KripkeQ1

MooreQ1

Abstract

the Open-Question Argument is a connecting point in contemporary Analytical Ethics, in response to which many new views were addressed as positive or negative reactions to this argument. In this article, we strive to study and critique the Open-Question Argument and its semantic suppositions and to show that this argument is an application of paradox of analysis and descriptive theory of meaning on ethical concepts. According to the paradox of analysis, the constituents of things contribute to their concepts and therefore, the real definitions which include the constitutents elements are tautological and lack new information. Going forward, we address the semantic views of Frege, logical positivism, Suhravardi-Locke and Kripke-Putnam in order to resolve the paradox of analysis and show that none of these views can be applied to ethical concepts and cannot be considered as a satisfactory answer to open-argument paradox. Finally, we have explained that another solution can be suggested for the paradox of analysis by taking inspiration from the Kripke-Putnam theory and linguistic inspiration. According to this solution, the primary reference of ethical terms to external instances happens without the mediation of concepts and through common intuitions of the linguistics and the precise concept of these terms is gradually addressed and formed in the process of analysis and by considering primary intuitions.

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APA: Copy

Vale, Hossein, & NAGHAVI, REZA. (2019). Moore’ s Open-Question Argument in Moral Philosophy and its Challenge of the Analytical Paradox. JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGICAL RESEARCH, 21(2 (80) ), 73-96. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/373538/en

Vancouver: Copy

Vale Hossein, NAGHAVI REZA. Moore’ s Open-Question Argument in Moral Philosophy and its Challenge of the Analytical Paradox. JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGICAL RESEARCH[Internet]. 2019;21(2 (80) ):73-96. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/373538/en

IEEE: Copy

Hossein Vale, and REZA NAGHAVI, “Moore’ s Open-Question Argument in Moral Philosophy and its Challenge of the Analytical Paradox,” JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGICAL RESEARCH, vol. 21, no. 2 (80) , pp. 73–96, 2019, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/373538/en

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