The Zombie conceivability argument: An ontological conclusion for phenomenal consciousness

Q: How can I download an article?

To download an article from SID, first log in to the site, search for the article title, and click on the 'Download Article' option.

Q: How can I download an ISI article?

To download an ISI article on SID, enter the keyword or article title in the search bar, view the relevant results, click on the desired article, and select the 'Download Article' option.

Q: How can I access the SID database?

To access the SID database, visit SID.ir, create an account, and log in to access scientific resources.

Q: Is downloading articles from SID free?

Some articles on SID are available for free, while others require payment. Details are specified on the article's page.

Delfani Yasser; Hemmatimoghaddam Ahmadreza; MOSMER REZA; Sadat Mansouri Mohammad

مرکز اطلاعات علمی Scientific Information Database (SID) - Trusted Source for Research and Academic Resources

Journal Paper

Paper Information

Journal: Advances in Cognitive Sciences Year:2020 | Volume:22 | Issue:3 Page(s): 105-113

Download Full-Text

Persian Verion

View:

486

Download:

Cites:

Information Journal Paper

Title

The Zombie conceivability argument: An ontological conclusion for phenomenal consciousness

Author(s)

Delfani Yasser | Hemmatimoghaddam Ahmadreza | MOSMER REZA | Sadat Mansouri Mohammad | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

ConceivabilityQ1

PossibilityQ1

ZombieQ1

Phenomenal consciousness PhysicalismQ1

Abstract

Introduction: Physicalism is a view that believes that everything is physical and considers phenomenal consciousness as a physical phenomenon. The present study aims to show through the Zombie Conceivability argument raised by Chalmers that phenomenal consciousness is not a physical phenomenon. As a result, it is a claim of false physicalism is false. Methods: This study is based on the study of the main and primary sources about this matter and has attempted to obtain some results about phenomenal consciousness through conceptual analysis, philosophical, and rational arguments. Results: According to the Zombie Conceivability argument, a creature that is physically like a human but lacks phenomenal consciousness is conceivable. Accordingly if this creature is conceivable then it is possible, and the Possibility of this creature shows that phenomenal consciousness is not a physical phenomenon. This argument first indicates by proposing the epistemological gap between physical and phenomenal realms that there is no epistemic entailment from physical facts to facts about phenomenal consciousness. Thus, one can be imagined without the other, and then it argues for a modal gap between the two realms, that is, there may be physical properties but no phenomenal consciousness. Finally, this gap argues for the ontological gap between the physical properties and the phenomenal consciousness and shows there is no ontological implication between the physical properties and the phenomenal consciousness, and the physical properties do not necessitate phenomenal consciousness. Conclusion: Phenomenal consciousness and physical properties are ontologically independent. Phenomenal consciousness is not a physical phenomenon; therefore the claim of physicalism is false.

Cites

No record.

References

No record.

Cite

APA: Copy

Delfani, Yasser, Hemmatimoghaddam, Ahmadreza, MOSMER, REZA, & Sadat Mansouri, Mohammad. (2020). The Zombie conceivability argument: An ontological conclusion for phenomenal consciousness. ADVANCES IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE, 22(3 ), 105-113. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/387317/en

Vancouver: Copy

Delfani Yasser, Hemmatimoghaddam Ahmadreza, MOSMER REZA, Sadat Mansouri Mohammad. The Zombie conceivability argument: An ontological conclusion for phenomenal consciousness. ADVANCES IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE[Internet]. 2020;22(3 ):105-113. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/387317/en

IEEE: Copy

Yasser Delfani, Ahmadreza Hemmatimoghaddam, REZA MOSMER, and Mohammad Sadat Mansouri, “The Zombie conceivability argument: An ontological conclusion for phenomenal consciousness,” ADVANCES IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE, vol. 22, no. 3 , pp. 105–113, 2020, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/387317/en

Related Journal Papers

No record.

Related Seminar Papers

No record.

Related Plans

No record.

Recommended Workshops