Consideration and Critique of Horwich’s Solution for the Liar Paradox in terms of the Minimalist Theory of Truth

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Mohammad Ghorbanian Hooman

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Journal Paper

Paper Information

Journal: NAQD VA NAZAR Year:2021 | Volume:26 | Issue:2 (102) Page(s): 33-61

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Information Journal Paper

Title

Consideration and Critique of Horwich’s Solution for the Liar Paradox in terms of the Minimalist Theory of Truth

Author(s)

Mohammad Ghorbanian Hooman | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

Liar paradox

self-referring sentence

minimalist theory of truth

equivalence schema

Abstract

The Liar paradox involves a self-referring sentence which claims its own falsity. A host of solutions have been offered for the paradox, some of which take the dismissal of the natural language and deployment of formal languages as the fundamental solution, while others try to solve the paradox in terms of natural languages. The problem of this paper is why Paul Horwichs solution for the paradox in terms of the minimalist theory of truth-which falls in the second category of solutions-is flawed. Drawing on the descriptive-analytic method, this research aims to show the inadequacy of Horwich’s claim that it is possible to explain all uses of the concept of truth by making recourse to our intrinsic and linguistic tendency to endorse all instances of equivalence schema. His solution to the Liar paradox is to dismiss the instances of equivalence schema related to self-referring sentences. I conclude that this answer not only fails to be a proper answer to the paradox, but also amounts to a flaw in the explanation provided by the minimalist theory of the concept of truth.

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APA: Copy

Mohammad Ghorbanian, Hooman. (2021). Consideration and Critique of Horwich’s Solution for the Liar Paradox in terms of the Minimalist Theory of Truth. NAQD VA NAZAR, 26(2 (102) ), 33-61. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/955444/en

Vancouver: Copy

Mohammad Ghorbanian Hooman. Consideration and Critique of Horwich’s Solution for the Liar Paradox in terms of the Minimalist Theory of Truth. NAQD VA NAZAR[Internet]. 2021;26(2 (102) ):33-61. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/955444/en

IEEE: Copy

Hooman Mohammad Ghorbanian, “Consideration and Critique of Horwich’s Solution for the Liar Paradox in terms of the Minimalist Theory of Truth,” NAQD VA NAZAR, vol. 26, no. 2 (102) , pp. 33–61, 2021, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/955444/en

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