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Information Journal Paper

Title

Anselm’ s Ontological Argument (According to Graham Oppy’ s Formulation) and Its Comparison with Avicenna’ s Argument of the Sincere

Pages

  107-136

Abstract

Anselm’ s has been one of the most controversial Ontological arguments and the origin of other versions of such arguments. According to Graham Oppy, the argument can be subsumed under modal, Meinongian, or conceptual arguments. He believes that one source of Anselm’ s Ontological argument was Avicenna’ s modal Ontological argument. In this paper, I seek to answer the following questions: Can we see Avicenna’ s argument of the sincere (burhān al-ṣiddiqīn) as a version of Ontological argument? And is Anselm’ s argument one argument with two different interpretations or was he after devising two separate arguments? The research seeks to compare Anselm’ s argument with Avicenna’ s argument of the sincere, drawing on a descriptive-analytic method. I conclude that, for Oppy, Anselm has just provided one argument for God’ s existence in his Proslogion. While the argument bears similarities to the argument of the sincere in being a priori, being based on the holy text, and the path from God to God, the natures of the two arguments are to an extent that those similarities can be plainly ignored. The Ontological argument begins from the “ very concept of existence, ” whereas Avicenna’ s argument is grounded in the “ very reality of existence” and this is the origin of major differences between the two arguments.

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    APA: Copy

    RAMIN, FARAH. (2020). Anselm’ s Ontological Argument (According to Graham Oppy’ s Formulation) and Its Comparison with Avicenna’ s Argument of the Sincere. NAQD VA NAZAR, 25(2 (98) ), 107-136. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/958918/en

    Vancouver: Copy

    RAMIN FARAH. Anselm’ s Ontological Argument (According to Graham Oppy’ s Formulation) and Its Comparison with Avicenna’ s Argument of the Sincere. NAQD VA NAZAR[Internet]. 2020;25(2 (98) ):107-136. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/958918/en

    IEEE: Copy

    FARAH RAMIN, “Anselm’ s Ontological Argument (According to Graham Oppy’ s Formulation) and Its Comparison with Avicenna’ s Argument of the Sincere,” NAQD VA NAZAR, vol. 25, no. 2 (98) , pp. 107–136, 2020, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/958918/en

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