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Information Journal Paper

Title

A defence of phenomenal consciousness (Qualia)

Pages

  119-130

Abstract

 Emotions and feelings include a diversity of mental states with distinct qualitative features known as “ Qualia” . These mental states' qualitative features consist of how these mental states are perceived or how things appear to us. For this reason, these features are often called phenomenal aspects or Phenomenal consciousness. This is how mental states appear to us. This subjective phenomenal feature is commonly defined as follows: there is a thing such that it is the specific quality of the existence of a particular mental state. Some philosophers have gone too far to deny the existence of Qualia. George Rey is among these philosophers. He argues that it is possible to design a machine that possesses all mental processes and capacities. Even though such a machine has all the mental capacities that human beings can have, Rey argues, it is dubious that it has Qualia. If it is suspicious that this machine has Qualia, then no mental capacities and processes are reasonable candidates for Qualia. Rey concludes that it is equally reasonable to doubt if human beings possess Qualia. The present studyshall first formulate Rey’ s argument and then shows that it is inefficient. This research will explore the question if it is possible to design a machine that, analogous to human beings, possesses mental capacities.

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  • Cite

    APA: Copy

    Hadinia, Shima, HEMMATI MOGHADDAM, AHMADREZA, & ABBASI, BABAK. (2021). A defence of phenomenal consciousness (Qualia). ADVANCES IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE, 23(2 ), 119-130. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/960917/en

    Vancouver: Copy

    Hadinia Shima, HEMMATI MOGHADDAM AHMADREZA, ABBASI BABAK. A defence of phenomenal consciousness (Qualia). ADVANCES IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE[Internet]. 2021;23(2 ):119-130. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/960917/en

    IEEE: Copy

    Shima Hadinia, AHMADREZA HEMMATI MOGHADDAM, and BABAK ABBASI, “A defence of phenomenal consciousness (Qualia),” ADVANCES IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE, vol. 23, no. 2 , pp. 119–130, 2021, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/960917/en

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