The purpose of this study is to examine the arguments used in Tahaddy verses based on Douglas Walton’ s (2008) framework. In this study, we contrast the arguments presented by Tahaddy verses with Douglas Walton's (2008) arguments, and then examine each argument in turn. Muslims believe that God, as the creator of man and the absolute universe, provides the best argument for convincing people, so it seems crucial to examine the arguments in the Qur'an and make them known for their own benefit. Therefore, it is necessary to examine these arguments, since the results of this research might lead to a deeper and more accurate understanding of human logic based on God's knowledge of man. It is known that God asks the polytheists in five verses if they claim this Qur'an is a human word (and the word of the Prophet himself), then bring even one verse like them. These verses are called Tahaddy in the Qur'an. This type of argument seems to be a unique and exclusive type of argument that does not fit into Walton's context due to its idiomatic meaning. Following our review of the Tahaddy verses and comparison with Walton's argument schemas, the study came to the conclusion that the argument used in the Tahaddy did not correspond to any of the sixty cases Walton introduced. Therefore, we introduced Tahaddy as a new argument to this model with a new scheme.

The argument from illusion and the argument from hallucination refute the directness of visual perceptual experience. Although the first argument includes at least two disputable premises (the phenomenal principle and the common kind assumption), the second one just includes the common kind assumption. I will illustrate that the arguments, not only have different premises, but concern different subjects. The argument from illusion concerns the object of visual perceptual experience, but the argument from hallucination concerns the nature of the experience. On the basis of this consideration, I will propose the two different senses of directness. According to the first sense, an experience is direct, if it is directed to the world itself. But according to the second sense, an experience is direct, if the world itself, notably not its representation, constitutes the experience.

In this paper, I have tried to discuss the following questions: Do reasons that have been/have not been put forward, all have a trans-historical and universal nature or essence? And has there been or will there be a unanimous consensus on that? Why do so many reasons in the history of philosophy that seemed convincing at a time have lost their cogency? When we say "I have become convinced by your reasons", do we mean that your reasons have characteristics that anyone in any historical era and with whatever cultural make-up who hears or reads it will become convinced?Do we have to ask for the convincingness or persuasiveness of reasons and its measure? Why is it that during the long history of argumentation, theorization, and taking of positions in philosophy, and during the not so long history of social sciences, there has not been a single position for which reasons have been advanced and those had convinced all those concerned?6. Why is it that roughly for the number of philosophers who have reflected on the Idea of reasoning, there are different Ideas of reason.7. Are reasons necessary for acquiring important and/or interesting knowledge?

E'tebāriāt is an outstanding question in modern Islamic philosophy and ŪsŪlal-Fiq. It did not use to be discussed as a separate subject in the traditional Islamic philosophy until 'Allamah Tabātabā'ī propounded it in Foundations of Philosophy and Method of Realism. In ŪsŪlal -Fiq, there were only scattered discussions, under different topics and without enough depth. Now there are many different questions, some of which have been addressed and discussed in detail in my lectures on philosophy of In ŪsŪlal -Fiq. One important question in this connection is whether logical reasoning can be given within the domain of E'tebāriāt. Tabātabā'ī and his great student, Mutahhari, argued that logical reasoning can not be given within that domain. Contrary to these philosophers, the writer thinks that such reasoning can be set forth and represents a developed discussion to prove that their views on it are not true.  

The imami-shi'i philosopher and theologian, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi in his great and influential work, Tajrid al-iʿ tiqad, had advanced three arguments for what is commonly called "intellectual moral good and bad" (husn wa qubh 'aqli). Two of these three arguments are what we call respectively: "epistemological argument" and "mutual-reverse argument". Both of the conclusions and premises of the arguments are ambiguous and open to more than one interpretation. This paper separates epistemological and ontological aspects of each argument and after advancing their logical structures assess each one. On authors' opinion none of them can fulfill neither to prove the belief of people of justice ('Adliyya) nor invalidate their opponents' theory.