Ayeneh Ma‘refat
Year:2007 | Volume:- | Issue:11|Papers Count:8

In this paper, after propounding the issue of corporeal resurrection and discussing its importance, the writer argues that Mulla Sadra's interpretation of corporeal resurrection is greatly influenced by the theory of the corporeal origination of the soul. Based on this theory and given the conformity between this principle and other principles in relation to corporeal resurrection, by emphasizing the issue of objectivity, Mulla Sadra concludes that, the soul is always administered by the body; however, by this body he means a vague and alternative one. The identity of the otherworldly and worldly bodies does not necessitate the consideration of worldly matter in the otherworldly body, which is, rather, a form without matter. His main key in this interpretation is the principle of the trans-substantial motion, upon which is based the origination of the soul. According to Mulla Sadra, all the existents of the material world are in trans-substantial motion. The soul, because of being material at the beginning of its origination, is also in trans-substantial motion, and in this process, like all the existents of the world, it is moving towards its end, i.e. the Hereafter. In addition to the principle of the trans-substantial motion, the immateriality of the soul at the level of imagination and the possibility of the journey of the soul in the three-fold worlds can also be clarified by means of the theory of the corporeal origination of the soul on the justification and interpretation of corporeal resurrection. Here, Mulla Sadra succeeds in demonstrating the existence of the intermediate body; nevertheless, his demonstration of the otherworldly body suffers from many problems. Of course, these problems do not lead to the separation of the fields of faith and intellect in relation to corporeal resurrection. Rather, one can still demonstrate corporeal resurrection by means of rational and philosophical principles, as both Hakim Zunuzi and Allamah Tabataba'i did.

The division of propositions into verity and actuality propositions is one of the innovations of Muslim logicians succeeding Ibn Sina, such as Fakhr Razi and his students, Afzal al-Din Khawnji, and Athir aI-Din Abhari. This division corresponds to Western philosophers' divisions of propositions into necessary and contingent ones (by Aristotle), analytic and synthetic ones, and a priori and a posteriori ones (by Hume and Kant). It also reveals Muslim logicians' view of these divisions. It was first criticized by such logicians as Khwajah Nasir and his students, however, all later logicians agreed with this division and attached great importance to it. In recent years, a number of classifications for verity and actuality propositions have been presented in modern logic (by Ha'iri Yazdi, Muradi Ufusi, Kurdi, and Vahid Dastjerdi). In this paper, by means of revealing the weaknesses of these classifications in our logicians' analyses of the issue, the writer has offered a new classification and demonstrated its correspondence with the elevated thoughts of Islamic logic.

In the Transcendent Philosophy, the issue of epistemology was first introduced by Allamah Tabataba' i and was later followed by Mutahhari in particular According to the later, only Islamic philosophy has been able to find a way out of the dead-end of knowledge. He explains the solution as follows: quiddities or primary intelligibles are the sources of abstracting such philosophical concepts as possibility, necessity, causality, etc. and since the mental existence of primary intelligibles conforms to what exists in the outside world, it is possible to attain knowledge. This paper provides an analysis and critique of the reasons given in the Transcendent Philosophy for the conformity between mental forms and external quiddities. Concerning this theory, we can accept that secondary intelligibles are abstracted from primary ones. However, the major problems regarding the issue of knowledge are the same primary intelligibles and the reasons that justify the conformity. Considering knowledge as being evident, in fact, means erasing the problem rather than offering a solution for it. If the objection concerning the conformity between the mind and the outside is advanced, the issue of secondary intelligibles cannot solve the problem of knowledge. In the Transcendent Philosophy, the issue of knowledge is not separable from the issues of existence and quiddity. Seemingly, the discussion of the conformity between mental and objective quiddities concerning the issue of mental existence is mainly based on the "principiality of quiddity" and not the "principiality of existence". Presenting a solution for the problem of knowledge is, of course, the subject of an independent research, and this paper merely provides a critique of the theory of knowledge in the Transcendent Philosophy. It is hoped that, given the existing problems, other thinkers can arrive at convenient answers in this regard.

Sana'i is one of the prominent Persian poets who has benefitted from more theological and religious beliefs in his works in comparison to others. In spite of the dominance of Sunnite religions, such as the Ash’arite and Hanafite, in his time and place of living, the Shi’ite theological beliefs are vastly reflected in the works of this philosopher so that he has accurately referred to many of the religious principles of this group alongside those of others and defended them as theological and religious realities. The purpose of this paper is to show that in the middle of the lines of his gnostic and religious poems, Sana'i has extensively dealt with theological issues, particularly, those in Shi'i theology, and in many cases, he has preferred them to the beliefs of other religious branches. In doing so, the writer initially propounds the issue of oneness, in which, by rejecting "vision" and turning to esoteric exegesis and the interior of the Qur'an, he goes far from the religious principles of the Ash'arites and comes close to Shi' i beliefs. Then he poses the issue of "leadership" (Imamat) and, by referring to a number of rational and traditional arguments, aggresses with Imam Ali's wilayah (guardianship) and being the successor of the Holy Prophet (pbuh). In this regard, the writer declares his solidarity with Imam Ali's friends and household and denounces his enemies. In what follows, he emphasizes that the element of "acknowledging act", like the element of affirmation by heart, is one of the main pillars of faith.of course, the writer also discusses Sana'i's ideas of other theological issues, such as justice, favor, the knowledge of God through God, and the best system, which reflect his Shi'i viewpoints, by resorting to his poems and valid theological sources so that it comes to light that, through research and without any prejudice, as he accepts the theological realities of other religious groups, he also acknowledges important Shi'i theological truths. In fact, we can infer from Sana'i's theological discussions that, through posing, collecting, and presenting the theological beliefs of various groups, particularly the Ash'arites and Shi'ites, in his works, he intends to establish a kind of proximity between them.