PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION RESEARCH (NAMAH-I HIKMAT)
Year:2017 | Volume:15 | Issue:1 (29) |Papers Count:13

Kant categorizes the arguments for the existence of God into ontological, cosmological, and design arguments. He holds that whereas existence is not a real and determining predicate, it is not allowed to be a part of object’s definition and so the ontological argument is fruitless. Along with Kant and Bennett, I shall try to show that existence is not a perfection nor a determining predicate. Besides, contrary to Bennett, who assesses Kant's reasoning insufficient, I argue that Kant finds the fallacy hidden in the argument and argues that the flaw of cosmological argument is its dependence on the insecure ontological argument. While Bennett truly notices the ambiguity and weakness of this relation, Kant, by appealing to a strong criticism, destructs the cosmological argument later. Finally, despite his interest in the argument from design, Kant asserts that it is based on the invalid cosmological argument. In this stage, Bennett criticism neglects the inherent connection between design and cosmological argument.

One of the criticisms of the philosophers to the Muslim theologians concerning the debate on the eternity or the creation of the universe is that adopting of the universe temporal origination could lead to detachment of Divine Grace, because Temporal Origination requires specific time on which, despite the presence of God, the universe has not been existed. However, if it can be shown that the physical universe would not have eternal capacity, then Divine Grace would not be damaged. So, in this paper, we have applied two approaches to show that Temporal Origination does not require the rejection of Divine Grace. The first approach is an a posteriori reasoning based on the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Accordingly, the Physical World's entropy as an isolated system, tends to increase and therefore lead to Heat Death. So it has not capacity to be eternal. And the second one is an a priori reasoning using the concept of the Universe Temporal Origination. The implication of philosophers' definition about Temporal Origination, leads to the assumption of a period in which the physical world did not exist. But this is a subjective and contradictory assumption.

As two Muslim thinkers, Qażi ʿAbd-Al-Jabbar B. Aḥmad and Abu Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ṭayyib al-Baqillani agree on the possibility and necessity of the knowledge of Allah and the necessity of thinking and reasoning for knowing God. But they disagree over some epistemological and methodological principles. In this article, we will investigate some of these disagreements. The main differences between the two theologians in the epistemological foundations are focused on answers to questions such as whether reason or religion prove the necessity of the knowledge of God or whether the relationship between thought and knowledge is productive or implicative. Qażi ʿAbd-Al-Jabbar defends the "rational necessity" of the knowledge of God as well as the 'productive relation' between thought and knowledge. He also believes the thought, as a human free action, to be the root of knowledge. However, Abu Bakr al-Baqillani defends the "religious necessity" of the knowledge of God and the "implicative relation" between thought and knowledge. Besides, based on the Ash’arite theory of acquisition, he believes that creation of knowledge is based on the power of creator. So, although two theologians are agreed on the validity of empirical, rational and religious methods in theology, they disagree over the degree of validity and priority of each of these methods.

The different versions of van Inwagen’s indirect argument for the incompatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility asserts that (1) the causal necessity and determination indicates that human actions are the results of past events and the laws of nature and thus does not have any alternative possibilities, while (2) every type of human free will and moral responsibility is based on such an alternative possibility to be capable of being chosen. Agreeing with the incompatibility of causal determination and the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), Frankfurt tries to call the dependence of moral responsibility on the PAP into question. It seems, however, that the Frankfurt-style approach against the indirect argument suffers from being ambiguous in the status of the intervener. It is also incapable of explaining the significance and function of alternative possibility.

In the light of four, traditional, rational, intuitional and experimental/ historical approaches, Ayatollah Shahabadi’s theory of fiṭrah as an interdisciplinary anthropological theory seeks to outline an a priori structure of human existence, whose foundation is based on the intrinsic enthusiasm of soul towards the absolute perfection. He tries to explain his theory through the ontological analysis of the notion of fiṭrah as a requirement for the existence of the perceiver as well as finding the tendencies peculiar to the human soul.

Tabatabie is an Islamic philosopher who believes in supernatural world and also believes in the causal relation between supernatural world and the nature. He was living in the modern world where the empirical science has an outstanding position. According to Quine, science is biased on physicalism which considers the nature independent. It seems that there is a contradiction between these two points of view. Tabatabie did not address this issue directly. However, in his philosophical writings, it can be found two theories in order to describe the relation between nature and the supernatural world that can be used as a solution for the aforementioned contradiction. The first solution is that although the ultimate cause of nature is the supernatural world, the near cause of natural activities are forms of the species. This solution opens the way to the consistency between science and Islamic philosophy. Nevertheless, it has also some difficulties. Another solution is that the nature in whole is the effect of the supernatural world as a simple creation, but all of the activities in the nature are related to natural causes. It seems that the second solution is better and can prepare better ground for the consistency between physicalism and the claim of Islamic philosophy. Still, it requires additional complimentary explanations to be coordinated with other philosophical claims.

One of the debates concerning Hume’s Philosophy is whether he believes in God. Through investigating his own works and extraction of his assertions concerning God, we try in this paper to examine the internal consistency of his system. In order to do this, we shall analytically examine whether the current tags attached to him are consistent with implications of his works. This research shows that it is problematic to call him an “atheist” or an “agnostic”. Furthermore, the findings of this paper shows that his minimal belief in God can be found in all of his works. Finally, according to the results, it is suggested to call him a weak or non-dogmatic agnostic.

Suhrawardi has explained the relation between beings and god or the relation between detached lights, especially the intellective soul, and the Light of lights, using the concept of illuminative relation. In the illuminative relation, the related which is the same as the relation, has a dependent existence, that is, existence by something else which is a self-existent unique reality. Suhrawardi deems the essence of this relation as light. He holds that the intellective human soul can reach high levels of cognition and faith in God, in the light of illuminative relation. This faith is demonstrated in the soul’s love for the higher world. In the light of the illuinative relation to the higher lights, the soul finds itself in need to God, and then reaches the state of annihilation and then the state of immortality after annihilation and then the state of servitude and then the state of the peaceful soul. When thw human soul is immortalized by the light of intellect, it is transferred from the state of need, imperfection and ignorance, to richness, perfection and knowledge. This is why the illuminative relation is the noblest relation.

The Principle of the Unity of Divine Acts which can be defined as conditionality of everything to Divine permission, Providence and will, has caused numerous objections. Fakhr al-Din al-Razi has tried to respond to the aforementioned objections. In this article, in order to review these responses and provide a proper explanation of the Unity of Divine Acts, I shall include the objections into three categories which are (1) objections based on restriction of the domain of divine power, (2) those which are based on restriction of the Knowledge and the Will of God, and (3) those which are based on rationality of good and evil. I shall then reread and analyze al-Razi’s ideas about these objections. It is concluded that none of the objections cast doubt on the principle of the unity of divine acts. Furthermore, while some of al-Razi’s responses are satisfactory, his other responses are based on doubtful foundations.

One can derive three main meanings from Mulla Sadra's use of the word ḥašr. The first usage is in the general meaning of hereafter that contains all the stages of the judgment day. Using the word in this meaning is also popular among theologians. The second meaning, is using the word ḥašr as one specific stage in the Day of Judgment. Based on this meaning, all human beings would be gathered at the same place at the same time, waiting for the judgment. This ḥašr happens after the resurrection and before judgment and the word maḥšar might have been derived from it. The third meaning is the return of all beings to their final destinations and extremes. Based on what he introduced as ḥašr, beings of all phases and levels move towards the higher levels in a universal process and this process will continue until all beings gather at the highest level of existence. This highest level of being that can contain all beings, is God himself. So we can claim that ḥašr means returning to God.

The argument based on the existence of evil in the world, as an atheistic argument against the existence of God, has two versions: logical and evidential. In this article, we have merely dealt with the first version that attempts to prove a logical inconsistency in the theists’ set of beliefs. Many hold that the traditional logical problem of evil has found a definite answer through Plantinga’s free will defense. However, in recent years, John Schellenberg has claimed a new logical problem of evil. He holds that Plantinga’s free will defense would not refute this new version. In the present paper, without any concern for fully criticizing Schellenberg’s new problem of evil and without any intent for completely representing Plantinga’s free will defense, we have challenged Schellenberg’s claim about the immunity of his version to Plantinga’s free will defense. Through undermining one of the central premises of his argument, we prove that this version is also vulnerable to plantinga’s solution.

The problem of death is a much debated and longstanding issue in the history of human thought. The transition from the realm of tradition to modernity and post-modernity, has increased focus on this issue once again. One of the scholars who comprehended the modern world and its needs, was Morteza Motahari. This article both presents and critically analyzes two arguments he has put forth for the immortality of human beings. Divine justice and divine wisdom are two theological foundations used to prove resurrection by Motahari. In the first argument discussed in this paper, he proves resurrection by an argument based on divine justice and identity of acts and punishments. The other argument is based on divine wisdom by using the example of embryo. In this paper, these two foundations and motahari’s arguments are explained and then examined. These doctrines and arguments are criticized for presupposing God’s attributes, unused limbs in the human body and necessary actualization of all human potential capacities.