MAQALAT WA BARRASIHA
Year:2006 | Volume:39 | Issue:81|Papers Count:7

The term of Hyalo (matter) is as much current in philosophical discussions that its existence has become a definitive hypothesis, so there is no attention to proofs affirms its being, The critical approach to philosophers' viewpoints reveals significant faults in these reasoning, In ontological philosophy three proofs for affirmation of Hyalo are used: Fasl wa Vasl proof (connection and disconnection)- Takhalkhol and Takathof proof (distension and condensation)-Qovveh and Fe'al Proof (potentiality and actuality), However, all of them involve in an important methodological problem, These philosophers have observed natural world by trusting on external senses, so they have gone beyond metaphysics and have put experimental and material extensions as the base of metaphysical principals. They have chosen a particular definition of "Material Physique" (jism) and then have presented the proofs that are not correct. Therefore, we can declare two classes of faults in these proofs; one of them is common in all these three and the second one depends on everyone separately.So, all of the Hyalo's affirmative proofs and arguments that depend on them are wrong. Thus, we should review some philosophical arguments, such as substantial movement etc.

The fundamental principles of the transcendent Theosophy have had deep effects in different philosophical areas. Among the principles related to soul, substantial movement and gradating of existence is more prominent. Among discussions related to soul, the one related to the relationship between soul and faculties has been more subjected to change as it has been linked with these principles. Between the two divisions being discussed, that is between the one related to the subjectivity of soul and faculties, and the one related to their unity or multiplicity of existence, the first one has been subjected to less disagreement. Avicenna and Sadra, with minute differences, believe in the soul as being the doer of all the actions including perceptual and motivating actions, and the Perceiver of all the perceptions; but the original difference between the two philosophers becomes apparent in the second division, in which contrary to Avicenna who believes in the multiplicity of the existence of soul and faculties, Sadra puts the theory of the existential unity of soul and faculties. They relate principles of their theories about the relationship between soul and faculties to the relationship between soul and body; therefore, the same disagreements are observed in this regard as well.

The Soul-body problem is will know the Mind-Body problem, it is a gaping hole the various views confront Monismand dulism. Leibniz and Mulla Sadra who have similar views delivering themselves from Avicenna and Decartes problems, try to solve the problem of relation of soul and body with more inherent coherency, in their the ories. For example Mullasadra has introduced soul as an existence between the border of material world and immaterial world and leibniz has called it as an special mond that isn't completely material nor completely immaterial. Mulla Sadra has expressed the unified combination of soul with body as an special sort of combination from all kinds of it. Leibniz believes that the combination of mondsoul with body isn't similar with the material ones. The theorical approximate of soul and body, and the special definition of combination of soul and body, are two common views of Mulla Sadra and Leibniz doctrines.

Some Theosophists believe that any abstract being, through intuitive knowledge has knowledge of it and as a result is known through intuitive knowledge to itself. Others hold that the intuitive knowledge of the abstract being is limited to the knowledge of its essence, and some others present that as more general than the knowledge of its essence and the knowledge of its cause or effect. These scholars do not agree as to whether the known object of the abstract being should necessarily be abstract nor can a concrete being be known through intuition to the abstract being as well. This disagreement leads us to two opposing groups of theosophists: those to whom material beings as they are, are not present to God in their essence and those who hold that material beings as they are in essence are known to God's intuitive knowledge. This paper, while recounting the relevant ideas of theosophists from Avicenna to Tabatabaee and presenting the reasons, which are used to support the two conflicting ideas, argues in favor of the second idea through evidence from religion and mysticism. Finally, the possible overlap between the two ideas will be explored.

Self – knowledge and its relation to the knowledge of God is a problem that has occupied the minds of philosophers and Gnostics since long ago; as far as we can't find a philosopher or mystic who hasn't talk about it. The present paper has presented different views of Ibn Arabi and Mulla sadra over "the epistemological relation between the soul and Truth" through some titles such as: Form, Perfect man, Defect, Copulative existence,... Furthermore this paper undertakes to clarify the stages and the kind of "epistemological relation between the soul and the Truth".

Gadamer considers understanding as the most fundamental character of human nature. His intention is phenomenological and ontological research of understanding. His real concern is philosophic, not what we do or what we ought to do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting and doing. He considers understanding as an event that goes far back. Understanding is a dialectical, historical and lingual event that rises from dialectical conversation and fusion of horizon. It has a very close relation to factors such as tradition, horizon, language, time, history, prejudice, hermeneutical circle, application and so on.

This article discusses about the different definitions of the category of quantity. From these definitions, the second and the third are zoomed on more. Because number is not a secondary philosophical intelligible. It is not also from the genus of existence. On the contrary, it exists in its object existence and it is a first intelligible. We demonstrate that number is of nature and the thing, which actually is divided, is object not number. Number is a thing although it can be divided. It also deduces that different numbers are species. We argue that the difference between connected quantity and separate quantity is not in defect division, but in having common component. We also criticize the argument that declares straight lines and curves are species.