It is a common view that, most of the elements of Copenhagen interpretation, as the first and the most famous interpretation of quantum mechanics, is rooted historically and philosophically, logical positivism. The aim of this paper is to show that, philosophically, pragmatism supports Copenhagen interpretation more intensively, whether or not the initiators of the interpretation, such as Niels Bohr as the most important figure of the interpretation, were aware of that. We proclaim that some elements of the interpretation, which are consistent with logical positivism, are perfectly supported by pragmatism. Some of these elements are: weak objectivism, senselessness of the concept of “thing in itself”, instrumentalist approaches to theories, and the avoidance to deal with ontological issues irrespective of experiment. Furthermore, and more particularly, it is argued that pragmatism espouses some of other fundamental and important elements of Copenhagen interpretation such as holism, uncertainty principle, and complementarity.