AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF GAME THEORY IN TAX REPORT

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NAVIDI H.R.

مرکز اطلاعات علمی Scientific Information Database (SID) - Trusted Source for Research and Academic Resources

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Journal: Journal of Economic Research Year:2005 | Volume:- | Issue:69 Page(s): 261-276

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Information Journal Paper

Title

AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF GAME THEORY IN TAX REPORT"S DEVIATION

Author(s)

NAVIDI H.R. | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

STRATEGYQ2

HONEST AND DISHONEST INSPECTORSQ4

TAX CONTROLQ4

COLLUSIONQ4

BRIBEQ2

TAX INCOMEQ4

Abstract

In the present paper, the theoretical model of mathematical games is examined with respect to deviations which may occur in tax reports and corruptions that may be found in tax organizations.Suppose that TAX CONTROL center can employ tax inspectors of two types: "honest" or "dishonest" inspectors. In this paper, we propose a model in which the dishonest inspectors may operate in COLLUSION with tax payers is considered. In this case, a tripartite game takes place amongst TAX CONTROL center, tax payers and inspectors. Tax collector tries to find a STRATEGY amongst possible choices in order to optimize the net income of the treasury.The strategies of tax collector (government) and its target dependent (income function) is described, and finally the optimum (the best) STRATEGY of the tax collector in comparison with strategies of the two sides of the game and parameters of the model are founded.

Cites

FAVORABLE TAX AUDIT IN ORDER TO REDUCE TAX EVASION IN INCOME TAX: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

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APA: Copy

NAVIDI, H.R.. (2005). AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF GAME THEORY IN TAX REPORT"S DEVIATION. TAHGHIGHAT-E-EGHTESADI, -(69), 261-276. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/11721/en

Vancouver: Copy

NAVIDI H.R.. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF GAME THEORY IN TAX REPORT"S DEVIATION. TAHGHIGHAT-E-EGHTESADI[Internet]. 2005;-(69):261-276. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/11721/en

IEEE: Copy

H.R. NAVIDI, “AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF GAME THEORY IN TAX REPORT"S DEVIATION,” TAHGHIGHAT-E-EGHTESADI, vol. -, no. 69, pp. 261–276, 2005, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/11721/en

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