GOVERNMENT MANAGING ON THE BEHAVIOR OF AUDITORS AND TAXPAYERS WHEN THERE PROBABILITY OF EVASION IN THE TAX REPORTS

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NAVIDI H.R.; ABDOLI GH.

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Journal Paper

Paper Information

Journal: DANESHVAR RAFTAR Year:2007 | Volume:13 | Issue:20 (SPECIAL EDITION ON PSYCHOLOGY 7) Page(s): 85-94

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Information Journal Paper

Title

GOVERNMENT MANAGING ON THE BEHAVIOR OF AUDITORS AND TAXPAYERS WHEN THERE PROBABILITY OF EVASION IN THE TAX REPORTS

Author(s)

NAVIDI H.R. | ABDOLI GH. | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

STRATEGYQ3

HONEST AND DISHONEST AUDITORQ3

COLLUSION AND REMUNERATIONQ3

PROBABILITY OF COLLUSIONQ3

TAX INCOMEQ3

INSPECTIONQ3

Abstract

In this paper we are going to investigate the collusion between tax payers and tax auditor (inspector) in order to take evasive action in taxpaying, in a simple game theatrical model. In this model from the government (or tax administration) view point, there are kinds of tow auditors: honest and dishonest and There is the probability that the taxpayer may collude with dishonest auditors, and repeat the tax low. Therefore, in this model there are three players: taxpayers, auditors, and the Government. The aim of the government in this game is to select a STRATEGY that maximizes TAX INCOMEs and minimizes tax evasion (net income). We found a condition in which the net income maximized the collusion parameter.

Cites

THE DETERMINATION AND ANALYSIS OF TAXPAYERS' BEHAVIOR IN VIOLATION AND COLLUSION CIRCUMSTANCES

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APA: Copy

NAVIDI, H.R., & ABDOLI, GH.. (2007). GOVERNMENT MANAGING ON THE BEHAVIOR OF AUDITORS AND TAXPAYERS WHEN THERE PROBABILITY OF EVASION IN THE TAX REPORTS. DANESHVAR RAFTAR, 13(20 (SPECIAL EDITION ON PSYCHOLOGY 7)), 85-94. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/385959/en

Vancouver: Copy

NAVIDI H.R., ABDOLI GH.. GOVERNMENT MANAGING ON THE BEHAVIOR OF AUDITORS AND TAXPAYERS WHEN THERE PROBABILITY OF EVASION IN THE TAX REPORTS. DANESHVAR RAFTAR[Internet]. 2007;13(20 (SPECIAL EDITION ON PSYCHOLOGY 7)):85-94. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/385959/en

IEEE: Copy

H.R. NAVIDI, and GH. ABDOLI, “GOVERNMENT MANAGING ON THE BEHAVIOR OF AUDITORS AND TAXPAYERS WHEN THERE PROBABILITY OF EVASION IN THE TAX REPORTS,” DANESHVAR RAFTAR, vol. 13, no. 20 (SPECIAL EDITION ON PSYCHOLOGY 7), pp. 85–94, 2007, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/385959/en

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