EFFECTIVE CONSTRUCTS ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ AWARD DETERMINATION (THE EXPERIMENT OF STOCK EXCHNGE)

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KABIRZADEH M.

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Paper Information

Journal: PEYKE NOOR JOURNAL Year:2008 | Volume:6 | Issue:1 (MANAGEMENT 2) Page(s): 127-145

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Information Journal Paper

Title

EFFECTIVE CONSTRUCTS ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ AWARD DETERMINATION (THE EXPERIMENT OF STOCK EXCHNGE)

Author(s)

KABIRZADEH M. | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

AGENCY THEORYQ3

MANEGERIALISMQ3

ACCOUNTING BASED PERFORMANCE MEASURESQ3

MARKET BASED PERFORMANCE MEASURESQ3

INCENTIVE DRIVERSQ3

AGENCY COSTQ3

Abstract

Direct supervising on the efficiency of modern agencies is not possible by their stockholders because of the owners and stockholders numbers can only obtain the resulted efficiencies. Thus, it is logical to establish supervision mechanisms in order to preserve their own profits and the optimal control of directors’ function. Awarding to directors based on their functions, is one of prevalent means of this aim attainment.The main goal of this article is the experiment of AGENCY THEORY concepts in order to make clear the invest market from director’s function and the board of directors awarding system based upon attained information on 1378-1382 in Tehran Stock Exchange. In experiment process, the board of directors’ award of elective agencies, connected with some variants of market and accounting based performances by a linear regression modle meanwhile observed some stable factors (irrelevant to function) such as size of agency and ownership concentration.There ere a significant correlation between Return on Assets (ROA) and its changes, size of agency, ownership concentration and financial risk with the board of directors’ award. ROA and the size of agency were more useful in comparison with other variants. Replacement of award changes will weaken the results. In this stage the only variant is Return On Assets (ROA) which has a significant relation with award changes.

Cites

INVESTIGATION ON THE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ COMPENSATION AND FIRMS PERFORMANCE LISTED IN TEHRAN STOCK EXCHANGE

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APA: Copy

KABIRZADEH, M.. (2008). EFFECTIVE CONSTRUCTS ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ AWARD DETERMINATION (THE EXPERIMENT OF STOCK EXCHNGE). PEYKE NOOR JOURNAL, 6(1 (MANAGEMENT 2)), 127-145. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/128628/en

Vancouver: Copy

KABIRZADEH M.. EFFECTIVE CONSTRUCTS ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ AWARD DETERMINATION (THE EXPERIMENT OF STOCK EXCHNGE). PEYKE NOOR JOURNAL[Internet]. 2008;6(1 (MANAGEMENT 2)):127-145. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/128628/en

IEEE: Copy

M. KABIRZADEH, “EFFECTIVE CONSTRUCTS ON THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ AWARD DETERMINATION (THE EXPERIMENT OF STOCK EXCHNGE),” PEYKE NOOR JOURNAL, vol. 6, no. 1 (MANAGEMENT 2), pp. 127–145, 2008, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/128628/en

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