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Information Journal Paper

Title

INTENTIONALITY AND REPRESENTATION IN THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN DREYFUS AND SEARLE

Author(s)

 MOHAMAD ALI KHALAJ MOHAMAD HOSEIN | HESHMATI ATA | Issue Writer Certificate 

Pages

  91-116

Abstract

 Dialogue between Dreyfus, as the biggest American commentator of Heidegger and Merleau- Ponty, and Searle, as one of the biggest analytic philosophers, started at the seventies. According to Searle, PHENOMENOLOGY is superficially and blind and has systematic errors. Additionally, in his view the concept of non-representational intention as center of Dreyfus’s PHENOMENOLOGY is inconsistent. But, in our opinion, Dreyfus introduces a consistent concept of non-representational intention, and proposes that Searle does not have a sound understanding of PHENOMENOLOGY. Dreyfus draws a distinction between two interpretations of Searle: Searle as phenomenologist and Searle as analytic philosopher. Dreyfus believes Searle’s approach as a phenomenologist is wrong because ignores non-representational intention; He also criticizes Searle’s approach as analytic philosopher because this approach accepts causality for an abstract structure. However, we believe that Dreyfus himself fails to go beyond the subject-object DUALISM. Moreover, we show in this paper that introducing non-representational intention is not sufficient for rejecting Descartes DUALISM.

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    APA: Copy

    MOHAMAD ALI KHALAJ, MOHAMAD HOSEIN, & HESHMATI, ATA. (2017). INTENTIONALITY AND REPRESENTATION IN THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN DREYFUS AND SEARLE. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION (JOURNAL OF FACULTY OF LETTERS AND HUMANITIES) (TABRIZ), 11(20 ), 91-116. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/140917/en

    Vancouver: Copy

    MOHAMAD ALI KHALAJ MOHAMAD HOSEIN, HESHMATI ATA. INTENTIONALITY AND REPRESENTATION IN THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN DREYFUS AND SEARLE. PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION (JOURNAL OF FACULTY OF LETTERS AND HUMANITIES) (TABRIZ)[Internet]. 2017;11(20 ):91-116. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/140917/en

    IEEE: Copy

    MOHAMAD HOSEIN MOHAMAD ALI KHALAJ, and ATA HESHMATI, “INTENTIONALITY AND REPRESENTATION IN THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN DREYFUS AND SEARLE,” PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION (JOURNAL OF FACULTY OF LETTERS AND HUMANITIES) (TABRIZ), vol. 11, no. 20 , pp. 91–116, 2017, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/140917/en

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