Libertarianism and Luck

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Haji Ishtiyaque

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Journal Paper

Paper Information

Journal: JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGICAL RESEARCH Year:2022 | Volume:24 | Issue:3 Page(s): 115-134

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Information Journal Paper

Title

Libertarianism and Luck

Author(s)

Haji Ishtiyaque | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

agent-causal

Event-causal

Luck objection

Modest Libertarianism

Weighting reasons

Abstract

According to event-causal modest libertarian accounts of free action, the sort of control an agent requires to perform free actions consists in the action’s being nondeviantly and indeterministically caused by apt reasons of the agent. It has been argued that these modest views succumb to a problem of luck because they imply that, given exactly the same past up to the time of action, and the same laws of nature, at this time the agent could have performed a different action, or no action at all. Hence, it appears that whatever the agent does at this time as a result of indeterministic deliberation is a matter of freedom- or responsibility-undermining luck. In this paper, I argue that neither Robert Kane’s variant of modest libertarianism, which combines a form of non-traditional agent causation with indeterministic event causation, nor John Lemos’ weightings variant, in which agents perform intentional acts of assigning weights to their reasons, circumvents the luck objection.

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