OPTIMISATION OF HEALTHCARE CONTRACTS: TENSIONS BETWEEN STANDARDISATION AND INNOVATION; COMMENT ON “COMPETITION IN HEALTHCARE: GOOD, BAD OR UGLY?”; COMMENTARY

Q: How can I download an article?

To download an article from SID, first log in to the site, search for the article title, and click on the 'Download Article' option.

Q: How can I download an ISI article?

To download an ISI article on SID, enter the keyword or article title in the search bar, view the relevant results, click on the desired article, and select the 'Download Article' option.

Q: How can I access the SID database?

To access the SID database, visit SID.ir, create an account, and log in to access scientific resources.

Q: Is downloading articles from SID free?

Some articles on SID are available for free, while others require payment. Details are specified on the article's page.

MIKKERS MISJA; RYAN PADHRAIG

Scientific Information Database (SID) - Trusted Source for Research and Academic Resources

Journal Paper

Paper Information

Journal: International Journal of Health Policy and Management Year:2016 | Volume:5 | Issue:2 Page(s): 121-123

Download Full-Text

View:

292

Download:

135

Cites:

Information Journal Paper

Title

OPTIMISATION OF HEALTHCARE CONTRACTS: TENSIONS BETWEEN STANDARDISATION AND INNOVATION; COMMENT ON “COMPETITION IN HEALTHCARE: GOOD, BAD OR UGLY?”; COMMENTARY

Author(s)

MIKKERS MISJA | RYAN PADHRAIG | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

HEALTHCARE

COMPETITION

CONTRACTS

INNOVATION

PERFORMANCE

Abstract

An important determinant of health system PERFORMANCE is contracting. Providers often respond to financial incentives, despite the ethical underpinnings of medicine, and payers can craft CONTRACTS to influence PERFORMANCE. Yet contracting is highly imperfect in both single-payer and multi-payer health systems. Arguably, in a competitive, multi-payer environment, contractual INNOVATION may occur more rapidly than in a single-payer system. This INNOVATION in contract design could enhance PERFORMANCE. However, contractual INNOVATION often fails to improve PERFORMANCE as payer incentives are misaligned with public policy objectives. Numerous countries seek to improve HEALTHCARE CONTRACTS, but thus far no health system has demonstrably crafted the necessary blend of incentives to stimulate optimal contracting.

Cites

No record.

References

No record.

Cite

APA: Copy

MIKKERS, MISJA, & RYAN, PADHRAIG. (2016). OPTIMISATION OF HEALTHCARE CONTRACTS: TENSIONS BETWEEN STANDARDISATION AND INNOVATION; COMMENT ON “COMPETITION IN HEALTHCARE: GOOD, BAD OR UGLY?”; COMMENTARY. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY AND MANAGEMENT, 5(2), 121-123. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/338253/en

Vancouver: Copy

MIKKERS MISJA, RYAN PADHRAIG. OPTIMISATION OF HEALTHCARE CONTRACTS: TENSIONS BETWEEN STANDARDISATION AND INNOVATION; COMMENT ON “COMPETITION IN HEALTHCARE: GOOD, BAD OR UGLY?”; COMMENTARY. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY AND MANAGEMENT[Internet]. 2016;5(2):121-123. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/338253/en

IEEE: Copy

MISJA MIKKERS, and PADHRAIG RYAN, “OPTIMISATION OF HEALTHCARE CONTRACTS: TENSIONS BETWEEN STANDARDISATION AND INNOVATION; COMMENT ON “COMPETITION IN HEALTHCARE: GOOD, BAD OR UGLY?”; COMMENTARY,” INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY AND MANAGEMENT, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 121–123, 2016, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/338253/en

Related Journal Papers

No record.

Related Seminar Papers

No record.

Related Plans

No record.

Recommended Workshops