An Option-Revenue Sharing Coordination Contract with Price and Sales Effort Dependent Demand

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RABBANI MASOUD; Manavizadeh Neda; Vafa Arani Hamed; Aghamohamadi Bosjin Soroush

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Journal Paper

Paper Information

Journal: Interdisciplinary Journal of Management Studies Year:2020 | Volume:13 | Issue:2 Page(s): 221-244

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Title

An Option-Revenue Sharing Coordination Contract with Price and Sales Effort Dependent Demand

Author(s)

RABBANI MASOUD | Manavizadeh Neda | Vafa Arani Hamed | Aghamohamadi Bosjin Soroush | Issue Writer Certificate

Keywords

Supply chain management

Coordination

Option-revenue sharing contract

Pricesales effort dependent demand

Abstract

This study proposes a novel option-revenue sharing Coordination contract framework. In the proposed model, the retailer determines the number of order sales effort. The manufacturer sets the price of products for the wholesale strategy. The investigated supply chain problem analyzes the results of different strategies. In the proposed Coordination contract problem, two types of games including retailer-based game and manufacturer-based Stackelberg game are considered. In both cases the retailer adopts the value of order and the sales effort and the manufacturer determines the wholesale price. To assess the performance of the proposed contract, a wholesale and a basic selection contract are considered in the model. To obtain the Nash equilibrium in the retailer-based state of the proposed option-revenue sharing Coordination contract problem, a hybrid algorithm consisting of a heuristic and a genetic algorithm is proposed by considering the computational complexities of the proposed model. A numerical comparison between the proposed contract and other cases demonstrates that the Option-revenue sharing contract significantly dominates the basic option and the wholesale price contract. Finally, we implemented some numerical experiments on the critical parameters of the contract. Based on the results, increasing the price-dependency of demand results in less number of products ordered by the retailer.

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APA: Copy

RABBANI, MASOUD, Manavizadeh, Neda, Vafa Arani, Hamed, & Aghamohamadi Bosjin, Soroush. (2020). An Option-Revenue Sharing Coordination Contract with Price and Sales Effort Dependent Demand. IRANIAN JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, 13(2), 221-244. SID. https://sid.ir/paper/777160/en

Vancouver: Copy

RABBANI MASOUD, Manavizadeh Neda, Vafa Arani Hamed, Aghamohamadi Bosjin Soroush. An Option-Revenue Sharing Coordination Contract with Price and Sales Effort Dependent Demand. IRANIAN JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES[Internet]. 2020;13(2):221-244. Available from: https://sid.ir/paper/777160/en

IEEE: Copy

MASOUD RABBANI, Neda Manavizadeh, Hamed Vafa Arani, and Soroush Aghamohamadi Bosjin, “An Option-Revenue Sharing Coordination Contract with Price and Sales Effort Dependent Demand,” IRANIAN JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 221–244, 2020, [Online]. Available: https://sid.ir/paper/777160/en

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